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V. 
SUMMARY 
The last decade has seen dramatic changes in the environment facing the 
fishing industries of Western Europe. This study looks at Britain and 
France and compares the response of government and industry to those 
changes between 1975 and 1983. It argues in the opening chapter that 
that response can be best understood in terms of the nature of the 
general relations which link state and society in the two countries. 
Thus France can be characterised as a state-led society, which has 
generated protectionist forms of economic policy and a 'dirigiste' 
style of policy making, where the institutions of the state seek 
actively to determine the way in which an economic sector develops. By 
contrast, Britain can be seen as a society-led state, in which a 
liberal conception of economic policy has been matched by a more 
consensual style of policy-making, where the agents within a sector are 
left to develop their own individual responses to change. Chapters two 
to four consider in turn the impact of political and economic change 
upon the structure of the two industries, the transformation of the 
international framework of negotiation within which the two governments 
dealt with the issue and the development of the institutional links 
between government and the fishing interest. The chapters that follow 
(five to eight) are organised around four perspectives on the relations 
between an interest group and government. These are entitled 
interventionist, mediatory, direct-action and self-help and each 
stresses a different aspect of the behaviour of state institutions and 
a societal interest. In all four chapters, the available evidence is 
assessed in terms of what we might expect that behaviour to be, given 
the extent of the change that overtook the industry and the political 
and economic character of the two countries. The final chapter reviews 
the distinction beween a state-led society and a society-led state and 
suggests two conclusions: firstly, that the pattern of relations 
between industry and government retained its distinctive shape in the 
two countries, despite severe pressures and secondly, that any 
judgement of the relative success of the two states and their 
respective industries in developing a response to change depends on 
one's appreciation of the merits of two contrasting political and 
economic philosophies. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CHARACTER OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
Throughout Western Europe the 1970s were characterized by 
industrial decline. The international economic environment ceased 
to be as favourable as it had been in the previous two decades. 
Many industries were faced with new competitors, who were better 
able to adapt to change in a period when the overall level of 
international economic activity was in decline. The effects 
within Western European society were enormous, not least in the 
relationship between the industries concerned and their respective 
governments. Governments tended to alter the emphasis of policy 
from a macro- to a micro- level. Instead of gearing policy to 
create the general conditions necessary for the success of 
particular industries, they found themselves drawn deeper into the 
problems of individual cases. The industries, for their part, 
sought to redefine their relationship with government in order to 
minimise the impact upon them of changes in the international 
environment. Not surprisingly this changing relationship was not 
free from mutual recrimination. Those in the industry would 
complain that government had not done enough to protect them: the 
cry 'sell-out' was often in the air. Those in government would 
point to their own lack of room for manoeuvre: for them it was 
important to display 'realism' and a recognition of the limits of 
action. 
Nowhere was the impact of change more keenly felt than within 
the Western European fishing sector. It was confronted in the 
2 
19704 with an environment which threatened it in three distinct 
ways. In the first place, there was a growing awareness of 
resource scarcity, that fish stocks were in serious decline. This 
was something which had been conspicuously missing hitherto. At 
the beginning of the decade most people within the industry still 
shared T. H. Huxley's view expressed at the end of the last century 
that: 
"... it may be affirmed with confidence that 
in relation to our present modes of fishing a 
number of the most important sea fisheries, 
such as the cod fishery, the herring fishery 
and the mackerel fishery, are inexhaustible; 
nothing we could do seriously affects the 
number of fish. "' 
However, it became increasingly clear that such optimism was 
ill-founded, as the total world catch levelled out and even 
slightly declined during the 1970s. Dramatic improvements in 
technological skills - sonar techniques to locate shoals, more 
sophisticated gear to catch them and better-equipped ships to 
process them - all placed greater pressure on the resource and 
underlined that though renewable, it was not inexhaustible. 
The second problem facing the fishing sector was that of the 
changing rules governing ownership of marine resources. 
Traditionally it had been supposed that beyond a narrow coastal 
belt, the sea and the resources within it were available for use 
by all. Thus no-one could be legitimately prevented from fishing 
on the open sea wherever, as often and as much as they wished. 
However, this idea had never been universally accepted and 
challenges to it grew in the period following World War II. As 
3 
early as 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru issued the Santiago 
Declaration by which they asserted sovereignty over all activities 
within 200 miles of their coasts, including fishing. 
Subsequently, growing awareness of the potential wealth of the 
oceans coincided with a pattern of encroachment upon the oceans by 
coastal states. 
2 
The average size of territorial waters, for 
example, increased markedly. In 1960, forty-three states still 
had territorial waters of only three miles; by 1972, the number 
had declined by eighteen to twenty-five. In the same period the 
number of states with territorial waters of twelve miles and over 
more than doubled from twenty-six to fifty-nine. 
3 
The changes in the rules governing the freedom of the seas 
assumed a more menacing form for the Western European fishing 
industry during the course of the Third Law of the Sea Conference 
(UNCLOS III). This conference which opened in New York in 1973, 
took up the idea of a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
around coastal states, within which they would have the right to 
determine the conditions of access to any economic resources, 
whether on or under the sea bed or in the water-column. Thus 
without exercising all the rights associated with territorial 
waters - "innocent" navigators, for example, could not be 
interfered with - coastal states could, within the EEZ, 
effectively claim ownership of all resources, including fisheries, 
and thereby deny access to outsiders, if they so wished. Though 
the UNCLOS III Convention, opened for signature in May 1982, has 
not yet come into force, the concept of an EEZ is now effectively 
applied as part of the changed pattern of international rules on 
4 
the sea. As a result 35% of the sea area of the world has come 
under coastal state authority. 
4 
The third and final problem which beset the Western European 
fishing industries, was the changed economic conditions under 
which fishing had to be pursued. The fishing sector throughout 
the world was faced with the fourfold increase in the price of 
fuel oil in 1973/1974, an event with damaging implications for an 
industry where the cost of fuel is such a large element in 
overheads. However, the effects varied considerably as the rules 
of ownership changed. For some states, the departure of foreign 
ships from their own EEZs meant reduced pressure on the stock, 
less difficulty in making large catches and a reduction in fuel 
consumption; for others, including the British, French and 
Germans, exclusion from the EEZ of third states meant either 
searching for alternatives further away or increased effort in 
their own, already heavily fished, waters. Either way fuel costs 
would rise: in the first case because of the distance, in the 
second case because of the increased pressure on the stocks and 
the consequent need to be away from port longer to make the same 
level of catch. Moreover, the Europeans suffered in a further way 
because the reduced costs of states like Canada and Iceland 
enabled them to export fishery products at prices with which the 
European fishermen could not compete. 
Changes in these three areas - resource availability, 
resource ownership and economic conditions - affected all those 
concerned with the fisheries sector but not always in the same 
way. 
5 
Exclusion from the grounds of third states made its most 
5 
dramatic impact on Hull. It had been the most important port in 
Western Europe in 1970, but by 1980 the vessel owners' association 
was disbanded and landings reduced to a trickle. For other ports, 
the problem was one of exposure to international competition and 
sudden decline in the value of catches. Peterhead, for example, 
had seen the value of the catch landed increase over three times 
between 1976 and 1978 but in 1980 and 1981, the effect of imports 
on prices made it unprofitable for a time for the fishermen even 
to set sail. Similar contrasts were seen elsewhere in Europe. In 
France, for example, ports such as Fecamp and La Rochelle, heavily 
dependent on fishing in the distant waters of states which claimed 
200 mile EEZs, witnessed a decline in activity which was not seen 
in places such as Boulogne. There the level of landings remained 
fairly steady throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. However, 
increasing costs, particularly of fuel, created different but 
still very sensitive problems for Boulogne. Thus in the summer of 
1980 it was the centre of the largest protest action by fishermen 
in the whole of Western Europe. 
These various difficulties generated a new, higher level of 
pressure from the industry upon the governments concerned. The 
fishermen expected increased help to deal with the changed 
environment. Ministers, for their part, not only had to balance 
the claims of other domestic industries in trouble against those 
of the fishermen but also to acknowledge that they were not free 
to devise national solutions on their own. The member states of 
the EEC devoted considerable effort to devising a common policy 
which would satisfy all concerned and not give an undue advantage 
to any particular industry. This proved an immensely difficult 
6 
task: all EEC fishermen felt that they were being disadvantaged to 
the benefit of their competitors, each industry saw the others as 
receiving higher levels of subsidy than itself. As a result only 
in January 1983 was it possible for the ten member states to agree 
on the overall shape of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), some 13 
years after the first attempt to establish a Community policy 
among the six founder members. The sheer length of the 
negotiations underlines how much more of a political issue fishing 
had become than it had been before the changes in the wider 
international environment had occurred. 
6 
The interest of this study lies in one particular aspect of 
this process of politicization, namely, the character of the 
relationship between fishing industry and government at the 
national level. That relationship has a double importance. At a 
theoretical level, the analyst has the opportunity to consider 
whether the nature of the relationship developed in the way we 
might expect in a period of such rapid change. In more practical 
terms, one is obliged to consider whether events could have turned 
out other than they did, whether government was negligent in its 
defence of the industry or whether the industry missed 
opportunities to influence policy, either through inertia or 
incompetence. To broaden the discussion at both levels, the study 
adopts an explicitly comparative perspective, concentrating its 
attention on two states, Britain and France, with fishing 
industries of roughly similar size and more similar in structure 
than any other pair of fishing industries in the EEC. 
7 
Theoretically, this comparison facilitates the making of 
distinctions between the way in which an interest and government 
interrelate; practically, it opens the way to discussion of 
whether the relationship was better managed and the interests of 
the industry better protected under one or other form of 
institutional arrangements. The final chapter of this study will 
bring these two aspects together by contrasting the notable 
differences between the two countries in the context of the 
decline of the two fishing industries. Were they doomed to 
decline? Were they sold out by their respective governments? Or 
could they have been better protected if interest and government 
had managed their relations in a different way? 
2. Understanding the response to change 
This study assumes that the relationship between the fishing 
industry and government in the two countries cannot be fully 
understood by concentrating attention on one or other of the two 
parties. Thus the discussion will not be cast in terms of a 
traditional pressure group study, which is most concerned to 
establish the ways in which an interest attempts to influence 
government and the variables which determine the success of those 
attempts. 
7 
Equally, it will not look primarily at the 
relationship from the point of view of the government, assuming 
that the sources of policy are to be found in the debates within 
and between ministers and ministries. 
8 
Rather it will be argued 
that it is necessary to set the relationship in the context of a 
wider environment which conditions the attitudes and actions of 
interest and government alike. 
8 
The desire to locate the relationship between interests and 
governments inside a broader framework in this way has generated a 
considerable body of literature. Two strands within that 
literature are of particular relevance to this study. The first 
strand offers the claim that individual relationships between an 
interest and a government cannot be appreciated without 
recognising the general level of pressure placed upon government 
by all interests in society. The democratic basis of Western 
societies is seen as legitimising increased demands from groups 
that see themselves to be economically disadvantaged, with the 
result that governments become 'overloaded' and incapable of 
responding adequately. 
9 
A second strand has developed out of the 
belief that the independence of interest groups is being 
undermined by the growth of corporatism. Proponents of this view 
hold that the difficulty of managing the modern economy has 
encouraged governments to incorporate interests more tightly 
within the decision-making framework, in order that those affected 
by decisions can share responsibility for them. 
10 
These two sets of arguments share the advantage that they 
offer a general context within which to discuss a particular case 
study. However, both make - whether openly or not - the 
assumption that all Western European states are subject to the 
same processes and pressures, and that any differences between 
them are relatively unimportant. Here it will be argued that 
those differences are significant and that the contrast between 
Britain and France within the fisheries sector generates evidence 
that the broader theories need to accommodate. The 'overload' 
thesis cannot ignore that the extra demands made upon French 
9 
governments by the fishing industry fitted into a very different 
pattern of state intervention than that in Britain and that the 
levels of tolerance to such demands varied greatly as a result. 
Equally, no discussion of corporatism in this sector can avoid 
explaining the very different institutional links between industry 
and government in the two countries and the incorporation of the 
French fishing industry by the state into a structure of 
consultation as long ago as 1945. The intention here is not to 
resolve these difficulties but to generate material in the context 
of a case study which will help to broaden the debate on general 
theories about the changing character of policy-making in Western 
Europe. 
In order to be able to raise questions of this kind, this 
study will argue that developments in the fishing sector need to 
be set within the broader relationship existing between state and 
society. This relationship is presented as both similar and 
different in the two countries. It is similar to the extent that 
it enjoys a degree of continuity which is not altered by changes 
of government and minister. In Britain, between 1975 and 1983, a 
Conservative government succeeded a Labour one and three different 
ministers (Peart, Silkin and Walker) were responsible for fishing, 
while in France Giscard d'Estaing was succeeded as President by 
Mitterand and the fishing portfolio was held by four men 
(Cavaille, Le Theule, Hoeffel and Le Pensec). However, these 
changes did not, it will be claimed, fundamentally change the 
relationship between state and society. The difference in the 
relationship is to be seen in its divergent content in the two 
countries. The state as an idea and a set of institutions plays 
10 
so much more important a role in France that it will be argued 
here that it can be fairly characterized as a 
. 
state-led society; 
by contrast, the weakness of the state in Britain justifies the 
use of the term society-led state. 
" 
To justify these claims, it is necessary to draw attention to 
the contrast between the position of the state in the Anglo-Saxon 
(ie British and American) tradition and in the Continental 
tradition. In France, as in other continental countries, "the 
state is a central term of political discourse"; in Britain, 
however well-developed the institutions of the state, the idea of 
the state plays a much more limited role in politics. 
12 
Thus 
Barker has argued that: 
"the state as such does not act in England; a 
multitude of individuals each separately and 
severally act ... There is a bundle of 
individual officials, each exercising a 
measure of authority under the cognizance of 
the Courts but none of them, not even the 
Prime Minister, wielding the authority of the 
state. "' 
0 
This difference is not simply a question of the strength of 
ideas. Those ideas underpin the actions of people both inside and 
outside government. In the case of Britain and France, they have 
been mediated by historical developments in such a way as to 
create divergent policy styles and economic orientations. In the 
French context, the strength of the idea of the state is reflected 
in an assertive style of policy-making linked to a broadly 
11 
protectionist outlook towards economic problems. In Britain, by 
contrast, a more consensual policy style combines with a more 
liberal economic outlook to underline the weakness of the idea of 
the state. 
The contrast in policy styles can be traced to the very 
different historical relationship between nation and state in the 
two countries. Whereas Britain was a single, relatively 
homogeneous nation before it developed the institutional machinery 
of a centralised state, France required the constraints of the 
Napoleonic state to enforce a degree of unity on a heterogeneous 
nation. This difference has continued to make itself felt. In 
France, the thrust for unity has been motivated by a recognition 
of the fragile nature of existing political cohesion. 
Consequently, policy makers are peculiarly conscious of the need 
to buttress the authority of the central state. 
14 In Britain, 
both the success of a process of nation building which is much 
older than the state bureaucracy, and the tradition of a 
representative Parliament for the transmission of grievances have 
obviated the need for, and the possibility of, state institutions 
exercising an equivalent level of authority. 
Thus, within a society like France there is a more widespread 
sense of the legitimacy of public action and those who are in 
positions of authority consider themselves to be entrusted with 
the task of identifying, pursuing and proselytizing the values 
12 
incorporated in the principles of public law. In Britain, by 
contrast, 
"it has proved impossible to develop a notion 
of the inherent responsibilities of the 
official as the embodiment of the state; to 
emphasize the personal responsibility of the 
official in law, or to locate personal 
responsibility, in the managerial sense of 
accountability for results, in an orderly 
manner within the administration. "15 
Very different styles of policy making have emerged as a 
result. The British administrative elite has always been very 
reluctant to give any kind of leadership or to develop policies on 
its own. Independent advisory bodies and committees specifically 
set up to consider particular problems have been much more 
important than individual civil servants in initiating change in 
Britain. Their reports can either be allowed to gather dust or be 
implemented on the basis of clear political approval legitimated 
by Parliament. 
British officials have tended to be drawn into a style of 
policy-making, based on the 'logic of negotiation'. 
16 
Within this 
logic there are no obvious or overriding long-term objectives. 
Rather decisions emerge out of a process of mutual adjustment with 
civil servants, politicians and interest groups involved in 
bargaining over the direction that policy should take. 
Politicians may appear to have a blueprint for the future on 
arrival in office but the incremental nature of policy making in 
the British context generates a constant gnawing away at the 
13 
blueprint, orchestrated by a civil service more eager to present 
options than to choose between them. 
'7 
In France, by contrast, the widespread acceptance of a zone 
of authority independent of Parliament, parties and pressure 
groups, has made it easier for the public official to resist 
particularist claims and to be both more creative and more 
authoritarian than his British counterpart in search of the public 
interest. He is not obliged to register political pressure, nor 
to accept that the only way to govern is to 'muddle through'. As 
a French civil servant in the Ministry of Industry put it: 
"First we make out a report or draw up a text, 
then we pass it around discreetly within the 
administration. Once everyone concerned 
within the administration is agreed on the 
final version then we pass this version around 
outside the administration, Of course, by 
then it's a fait accompli and pressure cannot 
have any effect. "18 
Institutional arrangements have come to underline this notion 
of the independent zone of authority very clearly. Representative 
and state institutions are firmly separated in the constitutional 
arrangements of the Republic: the British idea of the "Government 
in Parliament" has no equivalent in France. This is not to say 
that there is no debate as to the relationship between the two 
sets of institutions, but it is a debate premised on separation. 
And within the state apparatus, every effort is made to underline 
14 
the special character of the role of those active within it. As 
Dyson has put it: 
"... institutional innovation like ENA (Ecole 
Nationale d'Administration) and the French 
Planning Commission cannot be defined 
exhaustively in factual terms; they represent 
an attempt to proselytize 'modernising' 
values, a part of a conception of coherent, 
purposive state action. "19 
Not surprisingly British attempts to copy the French example, 
such as the Civil Service College, have not enjoyed the same 
degree of success because of the lack of an equivalent cultural 
background. Equally, one can understand the basis of the claim 
that "British civil servants, compared with French, generally lack 
the confidence to operate an imposition relationship with 
groups". 
20 
At the same time, the activist tradition within a society 
such as France helps to explain the response of society to 
officialdom. The idea of the state has served as a pole of 
repulsion as well as a pole of attraction. On the one hand, the 
idea of the state has generated a strong sense of public purpose 
with governmental behaviour perceived as serving to lead society 
forward; on the other hand, the 'limited authoritarianism' 
implicit in such an activist state role has tended to provoke 
potential insurrection against authority. 
21 
The state appears as 
an entity which has a dynamic of its own, continually seeking to 
extend its powers and as a result provoking a resistance, which 
found its intellectual expression in anarcho-syndicalism. 
15 
out, the fact that 
As Birnbaum points / the state has never appeared such a 
powerful element in political life in Britain has meant that such 
reactions against the state are absent from her history. 
22 
Consequently there is a much greater 'elasticity' in the political 
process but one where proposals for change in the status quo are 
faced with considerably greater resistance, precisely because of 
the lack of an activist tradition. In Barry's words 
"The result (intended or actual) of a 
power-diffusing system (like that in Britain) 
is to raise a series of obstacles to change in 
the status quo and collective expenditures, 
thus raising the price (in terms of bargaining 
costs) of getting collective action .,, 
23 
However, it is not only the character of the development of 
political institutions and habits in the two countries that has 
conditioned the distinction between state and society in Britain 
and France. Roth countries have also been profoundly affected by 
the way in which their economies have evolved and been directed. 
Tiere too there are long historical traditions which have continued 
to influence the behaviour of governments and interests in society 
and the balancing of public power and private choices in the 
economic sphere. 
The basic difference between the two countries can he 
described in terms of the contrast between mercantilism or 
protectionism and free trade as economic doctrines. The former 
was originally associated with a trade and balance of payments 
surplus but its essence is "the priority of national economic and 
political objectives over considerations of global economic 
16 
efficiency., 
24 
The latter, by contrast, is based on the 
assumption that national wealth depends upon the health of the 
international economy as a whole rather than a calculation of the 
trade balance of one's own country. Mercantilists, therefore, tend 
to view economic policy as a zero-sum game where one nation's 
gains are another's losses, whereas economic liberals perceive it 
as variable sum with everybody able to gain thanks to the 
international division of labour. 
These two economic philosophies have always aroused very 
strong disagreements. For much of the post World War II period, 
it was widely accepted that the protectionist policicies implicit 
in mercantilism had contributed to the build-up of international 
tension in the 1930s, and to the subsequent outbreak of open 
hostilities. 
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Hence the economic order that emerged after 1945 
was premised on the need to reduce to a minimum the harriers to 
trade between countries: it was assumed that a more open 
international economy would help to ensure a more peaceful world. 
This view only came to be seriously challenged during the 1970s 
when Western economies ceased to grow at the high rates of the 
1950s and 1960s and when domestic industries were threatened by 
the free flow of imports which a liberal order had made possible. 
Hence it became respectable once more to favour protection as a 
way of guaranteeing the welfare of sectors of the economy exposed 
to international competiton. 
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Britain and France have always taken opposing stances in this 
debate between liberalism and protectionism. Whereas Britain has 
combined free trade principles with a limited conception of 
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intervention in the economy, France has adopted a protectionist 
stance linked to a highly developed sense of dirigisme or 
state-direction. The reasons for this are linked to their 
different economic histories. British espousal of liberal 
doctrine is attributable to the fact that for so long she enjoyed 
a position of hegemony in the world economy, while France as an 
industrial late-comer was obliged to adopt a mercantilist approach 
to catch up. 
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However, the purpose here is to observe the 
consequences rather than the causes of the difference. Those 
consequences have been very marked. 
Although Britain has consistently favoured the promotion of 
international trade and commerce, the state itself never assumed a 
prominent role in that promotion. Rather commercial and trading 
activities were organized and financed by non-state institutions, 
notably those in the City of London. It is true that in the more 
recent past, the general level of intervention by state 
institutions has developed considerably and no government has 
sought to argue that the economic health of the country could he 
assured without any action on its part. Nevertheless, the very 
fact that the idea of governmental intervention in the economy has 
been so regularly at the centre of political debate underlines the 
strength of opposition to the extension of such intervention. As 
Dyson has put it: 
"Considerable government intervention combines 
with a hesitancy about the use of its 
authority; a sense of the 'necessity' of 
collective action is accompanied by scepticism 
about its desirability or utility. "28 
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The French tradition is completely different. Only in the 
very recent past has the country sought to expose itself to 
foreign competition and the market values that it implies. Until 
then, as Hayward has put it, 
"French governments had for centuries 
alternated between policies of passive 
protection and active promotion - 
state-sponsored captalism and state capitalism 
- based upon close collusion between the 
private sector and its public senior 
partner. " 
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This tradition stretching back to Colbert (whose influence in the 
fisheries sector will he discussed in Chapter 4) generated a very 
distinct set of attitudes in the relations between state and 
society. Whereas the private sector has always looked 
instinctively for support to the state, no-one has seriously 
challenged the legitimacy of state action in shaping that support. 
It is thus not just a question of measuring amounts of money that 
pass from government to industry but also of observing the way in 
which that money is perceived by both donor and recipient. Indeed 
it is for this reason that many observers have argued that despite 
the change in rhetoric of the Barre government in France between 
1976 and 1981 towards a more liberal-sounding conception of 
economic policy, lip-service only was paid to the tenets of 
liberalism. 
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Protectionism remained the knee-jerk reaction of 
those in the public and private sectors alike. 
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The importance of such a claim in the context of the present 
study is particularly great in that the environment of the 1970s 
and 1980s was one which threatened the economies of Britain and 
France in a very stark way. Both countries found themselves 
locked into a series of international commitments to a liberal 
economic order via the EEC and more widely, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which limited their scope for 
manoeuvre. At the same time, both had economies which were 
sufficiently open to feel the effects of interdependence with 
other economies. They were therefore obliged to reassess their 
commitments and the impact of interdependence. Given the 
character of the French economic tradition, it should not be at 
all surprising to hear that "the French state attempted (through 
protective measures) to control and direct the terms of 
interdependence", 
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whereas Britain remained more firmly linked to 
international commitments on open and free trade, despite the 
growth of protests from those domestic industries suffering from 
the recession. 
Britain and France are seen therefore to differ sharply in 
their styles of policy making and in their economic orientations. 
In both areas, the role of the state is very much more important 
in the French than in the British context. It is for this reason 
that France can he characterized as a state-led society, whereas 
Britain resenbles more closely a society-led state. To underline 
the contrast Lt is useful to refer to the two competing, attitudes 
towards the relationship between state and society that Berki 
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identifies. These he entitles transcendentalism and 
instrumentalism and he defines them as follows: 
"Transcendentalism 
... refers to the belief 
that man primarily belongs to a moral 
community ... that the community has a 
paramount moralising function and is, 
therefore, logically speaking 'prior' to its 
members. Individuals, it is held, are united 
together in the service of common and moral 
goals ... instrumentalism, by contrast, 
embodies the belief that man primarily belongs 
to an interest community, in other words that 
the group's existence and functions are 
external to individuals and are not directly 
related to their moral feelings and aims. 
Individuals become or continue as members of 
associations because they see that the latter 
as 'instruments' promote their own individual 
private aims"32 
In France the idea of the state is critical as the expression 
of collective rather than particular interests and in downgrading 
those particular interests through an activist policy-making elite 
concerned to guarantee a high level of protection for the domestic 
economy. For this reason the state can he seen to represent a set 
of broad moral principles, justifying a 'transcendentalist' 
interpretation of the French political process. By contrast, an 
'instrumental' conception of British attitudes can be accepted 
because of the weakness of the idea of collective state principles 
in guiding individual action. Both the style of policy-making and 
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the dominant economic outlook underline the importance accorded to 
particular interests, with the state's role limited to one of 
arbitration rather than direction. We will use this general 
contrast between the two countries to understand theirresponses to 
change in the fisheries sector. 
3. Evaluating the response to change 
This study seeks to go beyond an explanation of the response of 
the two states to change in the fisheries sector: it also attempts 
to evaluate how successful they have been. Such an evaluation 
seems to the author to be important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
plight of the industry, especially in Britain, has generated an 
enormous volume of invective, combined with a high level of 
frustration and helplessness. A not untypical reaction was that 
of Sir Leo Schultz, the Mayor of Hull, when he testified to the 
Trade and Industry Subcommittee of the House of Commons. 
"... surely there is somebody who can see 
through this tangle of causes and effect, 
which has caused this dilemma and who can find 
for us the answer to this problem. "33 
Even if there is no single answer, any study of the area has a 
responsibility to address the issue of succes. 
The second reason justifying an assessment of success is that 
within Britain, there have been a number of writers who have 
argued that the British industry would have benefitted or indeed 
would still benefit From adopting elements of French organisation 
and policy. 
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It will he suggested here that these comparisons 
Fail to recognize the complexity of the differences between the 
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two states, and that they therefore demand a competing assessment 
of the two countries' response to change. 
This study will not apportion praise or blame in relation to 
particular policies. It will not try to suggest, for example, 
that Britain's fishing industry would have avoided difficulty if 
the country had not belonged to the EEC. Rather it will he argued 
that Britain and France had clearly contrasting priorities which 
were reflected in the way interests were balanced. Tiowever, 
neither way seems to the author to be free of difficulty: both 
pose hard choices, especially where the straightforward transfer 
of practices is not possible. The choices to he made can be 
identified in two particular areas. 
The first issue involved in the balancing of interests is the 
identification of the relative importance of the various sectors 
within the fishing industry. This study concentrates its 
attention on the catching sector but it cannot he assumed that 
governments necessarily did do or should do so. There are a whole 
series of activities, both upstream and downstream, whose 
interests may not coincide with those of the catching industry. 
The most obvious example is the relationship between catchers and 
nerchants. The latter are not necessarily dependent, within one 
country, upon the produce of the former. As Mr. Ellington, the 
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President of the Hull Fish Merchants' Protection association 
explained in his testimony to the Trade and Industry Subcommittee: 
"We are rather like the oil people whose oil 
wells run out. We have no control over our 
own raw material. It is up to us to try to 
get our supplies where and when we can. We 
have no objection to importing fish from any 
place. " 
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The possibility of such imports necessarily creates a tension 
between merchants and indigenous fishermen. Equally, such a 
possibility underlines the need to place any idea of success in a 
wider context than that defined by the catching sector of the 
industry. Should government policy he geared to maintaining an 
industry as close as possible to its traditional shape? Or should 
it he prepared to subordinate this objective to the demands of the 
consumer for the product he or she wants, at the best price? It 
will he argued here that the behaviour of the British and French 
governments illustrates that they gave rather different answers to 
these questions and were faced with different kinds of difficulty 
as a result. 
The second area of choice concerns the treatment of the 
interests within the catching sector itself. There are not only 
divergences between fishermen and other sectors of the industry, 
but also between different parts of the catching sector. The 
difficulty of overcoming these individual interests inside the 
catching sector in pursuit of a common interest is an important 
further theme of this study. In particular, it will be argued 
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that fishermen in both countries faced, in a variety of forms, the 
'free-rider' problem of providing a 'collective good' when the 
contribution of a single fisherman to that good makes little or no 
difference and he therefore has no incentive to make that 
contribution. Under such circumstances, as Olson has argued: 
"... it is certain that a collective good will 
not he provided unless there is coercion or 
some outside inducements that will lead the 
members of the large group to act in their 
common interest". 
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As in the case of the relative importance of the catching 
sector, the two governments concerned took distinct positions. In 
this case they perceived differently the degree of 'coercion' and 
'outside inducements' that could he used so as to encourage the 
pursuit of the common interests of the sector. 
These differences will themselves be set in the wider context 
of a balance between the articulation and the aggregation of 
interests. It will be suggested that there was an inevitable 
tension which any assessment of success cannot Ignore. 
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The more 
that particular interests were allowed to make their own 
complaints known, the more difficult it was to identify common 
interests. To prolong discussion in the interests of the widest 
ventilation of grievance was effectively to veto decision. By 
contrast, to push through a decision in order to move beyond 
debate to action risked undermining consensus. The more intense 
the pressure for collective solutions, the less the opportunity 
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for differences to emerge and for the aggrieved to feel that they 
had had their say. Again the broad attitudes towards the state in 
the two countries will be seen to have influenced the way in which 
this balance was struck. 
Finally, in this section, it is important to underline that 
any notion of success has to be set in the context of the changing 
character of the issue. In the period under discussion, it was no 
longer possible to treat the foreign and domestic aspects of the 
fishing industry as belonging to separate compartments. The 
boundary between the two aspects became increasingly blurred 
especially as the debate moved into the context of the EEC. Thus 
the commitments of governments to the maintenance of employment and 
to the promotion of regional development at home were not easily 
disposable once discussion was under way in Brussels. By the same 
token, the commitments involved in membership of an organization 
like the EEC, such as the free movement of goods, reduced the 
scope for a policy of import controls, which a threatened domestic 
interest, like the fishing industry, might call for. The 
resultant interlinkage between the countries of the EEC can be 
said to make it increasingly irrelevant to talk of national 
success: what counts is their joint ability to reach agreement. 
However, this study will argue that whatever the level of 
integration and whatever the need for further integration, 
national policies and attitudes persist and are important in 
determining the nature of the integration achieved. Thus 
contrasting national stances on the relative importance of the 
catching sector or of different groups within that sector can he 
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detected in the debates which take place at the EEC level. In 
this sense the 'acquis communautaire', the shape of the Community's 
policies, is in constant flux and renegotiation. 
At the same time, the difficulties that the separate states 
and industries have in generating collective interests out of 
individual ones are reflected in Community discussions. Despite 
the agreement of January 19R3, success for the integration process 
of the EEC in the fishing area remains elusive for the same 
'free-rider' reason that individual states face domestically. Why 
should national industries accept to contribute to the collective 
good, when their individual contributions are not critical and 
when they suspect that their competitors will not follow suit? 
And yet unless this dilemma can be solved, both nation states and 
the Community may face the unpleasant prospect of decreasing 
catches and declining catching sectors. In this sense national 
success cannot ultimately he separated from success in a wider 
forum. 
4. The method of investigation 
The explanation and evaluation of change in the fishing, industry 
will he developed here in two ways: firstly, the relationship 
between the government and the industry will be examined using a 
set of four perspectives; and secondly, each perspective will be 
considered on the basis of how we might expect the relationship to 
have developed in the light of the material in the first and 
second sections of this chapter. On the one hand, the changes in 
the issue area in terms of resource scarcity, resource ownership 
and the economic conditions of exploitation will he taken and 
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their anticipated effect on the relationship considered; on the 
other hand, the contrasting character of relations between state 
and society in the two countries will be used to prompt discussion 
of the likely development of the relationship. 
The use of perspectives is intended to underline that the 
relationship between interest groups and governments needs to be 
conceptualized in different ways and should be looked at in terms 
of the range of behaviour that they display towards one another. 
The categories used here were derived by the author from the work 
of Finer. Tie suggests that four main views have been presented as 
to the relationship which ought to exist between groups and 
government: groups as opponents of the government, groups as 
substitutes for government, groups as extensions of the government 
and groups as intermediaries between public and government. 
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These views are not just useful as normative categories: they also 
offer a way of dividing up the observed behaviour of groups and 
government. Here they have been renamed and reordered to generate 
a continuum, ranging from the closest Form of involvement to the 
remotest connection between the two. 
The first perspective is entitled 'interventionist' and 
concentrates its attention on the direct involvement of the 
government in determining the behaviour of the industry. Unlike 
the other three perspectives, it is a 'top-down' view but one 
where the industry responds to as well as reflecting the 
government's involvement. 
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The second, 'mediatory' perspective sets the relations 
between industry and government in a broader context. It 
considers the way in which the industry's representatives 
transmitted the views of its members by lobbying government. Here 
the opportunity arises for going beyond direct contacts with 
government and appealing to other sources of influence in order to 
obtain a better deal. 
The third, 'direct action' perspective looks further than 
traditional mechanisms of influence and incorporates behaviour 
which goes outside the legal framework linking the two sides. The 
assumption here is that the 'traditional mechanisms' are no longer 
effective and that the industry feels it has no other way of 
making its voice heard. 
The fourth, 'self help' perspective directs attention away 
from the search for influence and towards the efforts of the 
industry to organize its economic future by itself. In principle, 
such self-help enables an industry to avoid dependence on 
government and thus to ensure maximum distance from it. 
The purpose of these four perspectives should be clarified at 
the outset. Above all, it is important to stress that they are 
aids to organization rather than models of behaviour to he shown 
to offer better or worse 'fits' in terms of explanation. From 
this it follows that the intention is not to establish that one of 
the perspectives represents the 'normal' relationship between 
industry and government, the others applying to divergences from 
the norm. 
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It is true, but for the purposes of this study 
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uninteresting, to point out that in terms of frequency fishermen 
were not resorting to direct action as regularly as their leaders 
were transmitting their views to government. Any search for 
'normalcy' seems to the author to risk relegating certain kinds of 
behaviour to the realm of the aberrant, and to minimise the 
importance of occasional events. 
More important, to attempt to create a hierarchy among the 
perspectives detracts from one of the tasks of this study, namely, 
to underline the relationships among them. In particular, the 
study is concerned to reveal that behaviour discussed tinder one 
perspective may help to explain behaviour discussed under 
another. Thus it will he argued here that much can he learned from 
the character of intervention about the nature of direct action in 
the two countries. Similarly, the type of self-help developed 
will be presented as strongly influenced by the shape of both the 
intervention and the mediation that took place. In this sense, it 
will he claimed that though behaviour relevant to all four 
perspectives can be identified in both countries, the differences 
between them suggest that the behaviour followed a distinct logic 
in the contrasting national environments. It is these logics of 
action that will be explored rather than the possibility of 
identifying any norm in the relationship between the fishermen and 
their governments. 
In addition to developing the four perspectives, each of the 
chapters concerned is linked to two related claims as to how we 
might expect the relationship between the fishing industry and 
government to develop given the severity of change within the 
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issue area and the general character of relations between state 
and society in the two countries. In all four cases, it is 
assumed that change in the issue area would be likely to push the 
relationship in the same direction in both countries but that the 
nature of the differences between the two countries would 
accentuate the development in one of them. 
Within the interventionist perspective, we will start from 
the assumption that the i, npact of change would be that the 
industry would demand increased intervention from government to 
protect it and that the government would feel itself obliged to 
cater For those demands. At the same time, we will suppose at the 
outset that the 'dirigiste' French tradition and the British 
aversion to intervention would mean that government efforts to 
determine the shape of the industry were more developed in France 
than in Britain. 
The mediatory perspective will take as its point of departure 
the idea that the representatives of the industry would be obliged 
to transmit the views of the industry through a much wider set of 
channels because of the disgruntlement of their members at the 
effects of the changing environment. It will also suggest that 
the higher French acceptance of the legitimacy of public action 
and the greater elasticity of British political life would make 
such developments more widespread in Britain than in France. 
In discussing the direct-action perspective, we will argue 
that the expected result of major change in the issue area would 
be for the industry to be pushed into forms of direct action in as 
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far as it perceived that its demands for assistance made no 
headway through the conventional channels. Further we will 
anticipate that the importance of the search for consensus in 
British policy-making and the 'limited authoritarianism' implicit 
in the French activist policy style would make such direct action 
more common in France than it was in Britain. 
As far as the self-help perspective is concerned, the premise 
will be that the industry would respond to change by intensifying 
its efforts to help itself. In addition the expectation will be 
that the difference between the character of French and British 
state intervention in the economy would make such self-help 
efforts much less individualistic in France than they were in 
Britain. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a general outline of the study. It is, 
first of all, a study of the response to change within the fishing 
industry in Britain and France. That change cannot he dated 
precisely, but consideration of its effects will he concentrated 
on the period beween 1975 and 1983. The widespread protests of 
the fishermen in both countries in the earlier year and the 
conclusion of the CFP in the later provide convenient episodes for 
delimiting the main period for investigation. Equally, as 
indicated earlier, it is the changes in the catching sector of the 
industry which are at the centre of attention: the rest of the 
industry will he considered only in as far as its fortunes 
impinged directly on those of the catchers. In seeking to provide 
an understanding of the extent of these changes, the next chapter 
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will examine the way in which the structure of the catching sector 
of the industry changed in the two countries under the pressures 
of resource scarcity, resource reallocation and the change in 
economic conditions. 
The study is also concerned to show how the content of the 
fisheries' issue changed for the two governments. From being a 
limited, sectoral concern, it was transported into a broader, more 
highly-politicised environment where Britain and France were both 
subject to the constraints and opportunities of a collective 
search for a solution to the problems that the industry faced. 
This changed environment, based on the two countries' membership 
of the EEC, and their differing responses to that environment will 
be the subject of chapter three. 
Chapter four draws together the government and industry and 
brings out the next theme of the study: that the response to 
change can only be fully understood in the context of the general 
relationship that has grown up between the two parties in both 
countries. The chapter will introduce the topic by looking at the 
very different institutional arrangements in Britain and France 
and the contrasting ways in which they were challenged and adapted 
in the period under consideration. 
The following four chapters will develop the contrast between 
the two countries in the context of the four perspectives, 
introduced in the previous section. Thus chapter five will 
examine the interventionist perspective, chapter six the mediatory 
perspective, chapter seven the direct-action perspective and 
chapter eight the self-help perspective. 
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Finally, chapter nine will will return to the major themes 
that run through the whole work. The distinction between France 
as a state-led society and Britain as a society-led state will be 
reviewed in the context of the evidence generated by the study. 
On the one hand, the chapter will consider the way in which the 
relationship between industry and government developed; on the 
other, it will underline the dilemmas involved in judging the two 
states as more or less successful in responding to change in the 
fishing industry. The British and French responses were 
different, but neither provides an unproblematical answer to the 
difficulties of a contemporary fishing industry in Western Europe. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
1. Introduction 
1975 was widely regarded as disastrous for the fishing industries 
of Western Europe. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) used the term, "catastrophe" to describe a 
situation where the catch levels of member states were down by 
500,000t. on 1974. In France, Dubreuil, the President of the 
Central Sea Fishery Committee (CCPM) spoke of "the most complex 
and most tragic" crisis in the memory of any fisherman2 and in 
Britain, Wood, the head of the Aberdeen Fishing Vesfels Owners' 
Association, commented at the beginning of 1975 that "the last 
year had seen the most incredible turn-round in the fortunes of 
our industry. "3 
Such sombre talk was to predominate within both the French 
and British fishing industries throughout the rest of the 1970s 
and only in the first years of the 1980s did the tone begin to 
change. In France 1981 was described as a "year of recovery"4 and 
later in Britain, despite some misgivings, the paper of the 
industry conceded that the conclusion of the CFP in Janauary 1983 
put "an end to many of the uncertainties which have wrecked 
British fishing since we joined the EEC. "5 
This chapter will explain why 1975 heralded such a difficult 
era: first, it will stress certain basic features of the industry 
which had exposed fishermen to recurrent misfortune before 1975; 
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second, it will suggest that what was new in the 1970s was the 
internationalization of the sector, a process which significantly 
increased the vulnerability of fishermen to economic change; and 
third, it will point to the different effects that this new 
vulnerability had on the British and French industries. 
2 The character of the fishing industry 
It is not possible to understand the significance of the events of 
the 1970s without an awareness of the peculiar characteristics of 
the fishing industry as an economic activity. In certain 
respects, as a primary industry, it resembles agriculture. The 
weather can play an important part in disrupting activity and the 
cost of equipment, outside the producer's control, is a major 
drain on his resources. However, the fisherman is subject to an 
even greater degree of uncertainty than the farmer. First of all, 
when he sets sail, he can never be sure how much he will catch. 
Secondly and more importantly, he can have only a limited idea of 
the earnings that his catch - large or small - will bring on his 
return to port. This is because fishing has been predominantly 
governed by the law of the auction, where merchants compete with 
one another to buy fish at the price which they consider the 
consumer will pay. If the sale price in the shop is too high, the 
consumer will turn to competing foodstuffs, notably meat. On the 
other hand, the lower the sale price, the less the fisherman will 
have earned. The reason for this is that the auction price and 
the sale price of fish are generally acknowledged to remain in 
roughly the same ratio. Thus in France, the latter is said to be 
three times the level of the former, while in Britain the 
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difference has been calculated at 400%. 6 The nature of 
distribution and commercialisation make it very difficult to 
modify these relationships. 
The fisherman is therefore dependent upon the behaviour of 
those further down the economic chain from him. If he returns with 
too high a catch or more likely, if the catches of those ships 
returning on a particular day are too high, then prices will go 
down and there is little he can do about it. Given the extreme 
perishability of fish he is not free to wait until another auction 
before putting the product on sale, at least if he is selling 
fresh rather than frozen fish. At the same time, the lower the 
catch, the less likely he is to make a profit after covering his 
costs, in terms of fuel, payments to the crew, repayments to the 
bank, etc. These costs may go up but the rise has no influence on 
the price that the merchant or the consumer pays. This is not to 
say that fishermen can never benefit from the auction system: they 
can and often did even in the period under discussion. 
Nevertheless, they are in a unique situation which was summed up 
by Parres, the Secretary General of the Union of French Fishing 
Boat Owners (UAP), as follows: 
"Fishing is the only economic activity in 
which there is no relationship between the 
cost price and the sale price of the 
product. The reason is that the fish 
merchants ply their trade in a food market 
which is heavily controlled and where 
substitute foods and imports prevent the 
passing on of costs in an economic way". 
7 
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. 
In addition to these problems of profitability, fishermen had 
also been aware for a long time that overproduction could threaten 
the stocks of fish from which they derive their livelihood. 
Already in 1946 the countries of the North East Atlantic had 
signed an Overfishing Convention, conscious of the effects of 
indiscriminate catches in the pre-war period and eager to benefit 
from the stock recovery that world war had engendered. La 
Rochelle was an example of a port where this recovery was obvious: 
its catches of hake in 1946 were more than double what they had 
been in 1938.8 
However, the level of catches continued to rise throughout 
the post-war period and this led to periodic slumps, such as those 
which hit Britain and France in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
As prices dropped, ships were kept in port and governments 
provided subsidies to keep the fishermen in business until the 
situation improved. And improve it did, for the 1960s witnessed 
dramatic increases in efficiency. In Britain, for example, 
average, annual landings of those ships that sailed to the most 
distant grounds rose from 29,900 cwts. in 1963 to 42,300 cwts. in 
1969.9 
The factors which enabled these improvements to take place 
are much clearer now than they were at the time. First of all, 
the principle of the freedom of the seas for fisheries remained 
the dominant principle in relations between the states of the 
North Atlantic. It is true that Iceland laid claim to twelve mile 
fishery jurisdiction during the first 'Cod War' with Britain 
between 1958 and 1961 but the situation appeared to be settled by 
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the so-called London Convention of 1964. Under this agreement 
European states acquired the right to reserve fish stocks up to 
six miles from their coasts exclusively for their own vessels, 
with the nationals of other signatories guaranteed access between 
six and twelve miles to the extent that they had traditionally 
fished there. '° As a result it continued to be possible for new 
grounds to be developed as well as for the old grounds to be 
maintained, without apparently seriously threatening stock levels. 
Secondly, it proved possible to increase productivity 
without a corresponding increase in costs. New types of ship, 
notably the stern trawler which came to Britain in 1961 and to 
France in 1965, combined with new techniques, in particular the 
use of sonar for locating shoals, to make fishing more 
cost-effective and less labour-intensive. Indeed the fishing 
industry appeared to be following the path of agriculture with 
marginal producers leaving the sector and the large-scale concerns 
assuming an ever greater role. Thus between 1960 and 1972, the 
number of fishermen fell in Britain from 28,254 to 22,703 and in 
France from 50,670 to 34,609. Over the same period, production 
rose in France from 626,764 t. to 670,143 t., while in Britain the 
catch went up from 813,382t. to 954,837 t. 
11 
The fact that the good times of the 1960s were premised on 
the maintenance of an open-seas regime and of a situation where 
costs did not outstrip productivity was much less evident at the 
time than it is now. There was a general feeling that the 
industry was governed by economic and biological cycles: prices 
might fall, stocks might decrease but eventually, the fish would 
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return, eventually, the market would recover. 12 Indeed the chance 
character of the auction symbolized this inherent confidence that 
the next landing would be the one that brought a bumper wad of 
notes to the fishermen. "The auction", as one French writer has 
put it, "is the temple of fish"* 
13 
By a remarkable irony the critical developments of 1975 and 
after followed a period when the "temple of fish" was giving the 
fleets in both countries rewards that were greater than anything 
previously known in the industry. In Britain the general level of 
profitability was so good that in July 1973 the government 
withdrew operating subsidies without causing any major disquiet. 
Indeed some saw this as a sensible move, as fishermen made a "mad 
rush for new boats", reinvesting their profits to ward off high 
tax bills and overseas competition. 14 In France, too, between 
1971 and 1975 there was a major renewal of the fishing fleet, 
aided by state subsidies. Nearly one half of the largest ships 
were replaced, with 130 new boats coming into service, and amongst 
the smaller vessels, over 250 were built with the help of grants 
and loans. In Southern Brittany alone 60 new trawlers of over 100 
feet in length were delivered during this period. 15 
Nowhere perhaps did the future look better than on 
Humberside. Both Grimsby and Hull were making annual catches of 
over 200,000t. which together accounted for between one third and 
one half of the British total. No ports in Europe came anywhere 
near to matching such catch levels: in France, for example, only 
at Boulogne were annual landings above 100,000t. The start of the 
second 'Cod War' with Iceland in September 1972 
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and attempts by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) to introduce quotas to restrict catches appeared no more 
than minor problems. 16 Yet by 1982 the combined catches of Hull 
and Grimsby at less than 60,000t. amounted to only a little over 
half of the catch at Boulogne. '? Why did this happen and why did 
the fishing industry as a whole undergo structural rather than 
cyclical change? 
3 Fisheries and the international economy 
The basic difference between the earlier difficulties that the 
fishing industry had faced and those it faced in the 1970s was 
that the dynamic of cyclicality became less important than the 
dynamic of externality. 18 Whereas previously the fluctuating 
fortunes of national fishing industries were chiefly determined by 
the behaviour of those within the industry, it now became clear 
that their future shape depended on events within the 
international economy as a whole. The contours of the 
international environment had remained stable for a long period 
but during the 1970s the link between the national and 
international environments emerged as a critical determinant of 
the prosperity of the fishing industry. 
The first overt illustration of this new reality was the 
dramatic increase in the price of fuel for fishing, prompted by 
the actions of the OPEC oil producing states at the end of 1973 
and the beginning of 1974. As a result one gallon of fuel which 
had cost 7 pence in Britain in September 1973 cost 21 pence in 
March 1975, while in France, a price of 12 centimes a litre in 
all 19 June 1973 rose to 42 centimes in Janaoü ry 1974. The 
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possibilities of assimilating such a rise by reduced petrol 
consumption were relatively limited. Even before the autumn of 
1973 fuel was calculated to represent 10% of the running costs of 
the French fishing fleet and that figure now rose to 25%. 20 
Nor was it only a question of fuel: the effects of the rise 
were felt in all the material necessary for the industry from 
nylon nets to the vessels themselves. Purse-seine net equipment 
which had cost £13,000 in 1967 went up in price to £80,000 in 
1974 because of the fuel base needed to make it. 21 And as 
shipyards were obliged to increase prices or go bankrupt, a 
British fisherman could be obliged to find nearly £450,000 in 1976 
for a boat ordered in 1972 at just over £130,000.22 
These difficulties were compounded when the OPEC states 
increased the price of oil again in 1979. By 1980 French fishermen 
were paying 1.23FF per litre, ten times more than the price in 
early 1973.23 At the same time, the average price of fish in 
France did not increase at anything like an equivalent rate: 
whereas in 1972,1000 litres of fuel could be bought by the sale 
of 45kg of fish, by 1982 between 180 and 200kg were needed to make 
the same purchase. 24 Again this was not an isolated national 
phenomenon but one faced by all the Community countries, including 
Britain, and there too the fuel price rose to similar levels to 
those in France. 25 As we shall see, the question of exactly how 
similar those levels were became an important political issue. 
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The second indication of the changing relationship between 
the national and international environments for the fisheries 
industry emerged at UNCLOS III. The European states traditionally 
supported the idea that fishing should be open to allcomers except 
within a relatively narrow coastal band, a concept enshrined in 
the 1964 fisheries convention. But by 1975 it was becoming 
obvious that the international community as a whole was turning 
towards the idea of a 200 mile EEZ, within which the coastal state 
would have exclusive rights to the exploitation of resources, 
including fish. What subsequently happened was that the 
traditional European attachment to extensive freedom to fish was 
traded off within the Law of the Sea conference for the rights of 
the warships and merchant ships of the industrialised world to 
pass through the straits of third world states. 26 In view of 
these wider developments, the decision of Iceland to declare a 200 
mile fishery zone from October 15 1975 should be seen not as an 
isolated act but one that anticipated the imminent action of 
coastal states throughout the world. 27 
The effect of this change upon the fishing industries of 
Western Europe was very dramatic. It eliminated the automatic 
right to fish in the prolific waters of Canada, Iceland, Norway 
and the Soviet Union. On November 30 1976, for example, after a 
final 'Cod War' with Iceland, British trawlers were excluded for 
ever from grounds which they had been fishing since the 1880s and 
where they had been catching 130,000t. per year since the 
settlement of the previous conflict in 1973. All in all, it was 
calculated that the losses in third-country waters amounted to 
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230,000t. for Britain, 173,000t. for West Germany and 52,000t. for 
France. 28 
The gravity of the situation was not as great as it might 
have been, because from January 1977 the members of the EEC agreed 
to extend their fishing limits in the Atlantic simultaneously to 
200 miles. As a result, third-countries, notably the Eastern 
Europeans, were themselves excluded from this zone, unless they 
were willing and able to offer some form of reciprocal access. 
However, the benefit was only a limited one for two reasons. 
Firstly, those ships which were suitable for fishing at long 
distances from European ports were not the kind of ships needed 
for fishing closer to home. They consumed too much fuel and they 
could not make the kinds of catches they had made in the distant 
northern waters. When they attempted to do so they not only came 
into conflict with other smaller vessels but also placed more 
strain on the stocks within the Community zone. The result was a 
severe level of overcapacity, a case of too many boats chasing too 
few fish. Many of the larger ships were therefore laid up. 
The second reason why the creation of an EEC zone offered 
only limited benefit was that the spread of the EEZ concept gave 
those countries, like Canada, from whose waters EEC states were 
increasingly excluded, the opportunity to develop their own fleets 
and to export surpluses to the Community. Moreover, the fact that 
their catch rates were higher, and their fuel costs per unit of 
fish lower, meant that they could export at prices which undercut 
those of Community fishermen. 
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The possibility of taking advantage of the liberal world 
economy in this way was something already acknowledged before the 
1970s. The spread of freezer trawlers in the 1960 offered a means 
of overcoming the problem of the perishability of the product: 
frozen blocks of filletted fish could be transported between 
countries and continents, thereby posing a severe challenge to the 
domestic fresh fish market. This was a particularly interesting 
proposition for those large, multinational companies, who could 
use economies of scale to take advantage of the freezer revolution 
with or without a catching capacity of their own. Unilever, for 
example, the world's largest food multinational, has a major 
shareholding both in Bird's Eye in Britain and Nordsee in 
Germany. 29 However, while the German firm has its own ships and 
shops, the British company has never had any vessels of its own, 
always relying on deals with trawler owners. Either way Unilever 
could assure itself of supply for its downstream food 
activities. 
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But the increasing integration of fishing into the world 
economy was not something that the frozen fish market and 
multinationals alone made possible. There was the further 
question of the relationship between fish prices and those of 
other foodstuffs on the international market. One of the effects 
of the recession in America after the increase in oil prices in 
1973 was that prices of meat and poultry fell. This in turn led 
to a drop in consumption of fish which drove the traditional 
exporters to America to look for new markets. These they found in 
the Community, where the market was overwhelmed by such unlikely 
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candidates as Argentine hake. As a result prices plummeted and 
few mechanisms were available to do anything about it. 31 
It is in this context that the spread of 200 mile fishing 
zones has to be seen. They offered a further incentive for 
fish-exporting countries to turn their attention to the Community. 
By 1978, Canada was able to become the world's premier exporter of 
fish with a fifth of its trade going to the EEC. At the same 
time, the Community countries, with the exception of Denmark, 
Holland and Ireland, all became more dependent on imports. 
Between 1970 and 1982, British imports more than doubled in 
quantity though total supplies (i. e. landings plus imports) 
remained roughly the same, while in France between 1975 and 1979, 
the value of imports rose from 75% to 115% value of landings by 
French vessels. French vessels were no longer able to make 
catches that were worth as much as the value of imports. 
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The effect on individual fishermen was dramatic and showed 
how the future of the industry could not be assured simply by hard 
work and dedication. In August 1975, for example, the brand new 
freezer trawler, 'Arctic Galliard', returned to Hull with a catch 
of 845 tonnes, the largest that any British ship had ever made. 
However, it made a loss of £33,000, when fuel and depreciation 
costs were set against the price that obtained at the auction in a 
market heavily influenced by imports. 33 Nor was this an isolated 
example. Fishermen were faced with the possibility of their catch 
being converted for fish meal, a possibility which when added to 
the dangers of catching fish off Iceland during the final 'Cod 
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War', make it hardly surprising that some asked themselves whether 
it was all worth it: 
"We leather ourselves risking life and limb 
off Iceland to catch this lot, with gunboats 
sat on our tails, then come home to see hours 
, of graft and worry ending up as meal . ý34 
Admittedly the dangers of Icelandic gunboats were not ones 
that many fishermen had to face but all were obliged to be 
concerned about the price that their catch would fetch, not just 
because of the workings of national factors but because their 
industry had undergone structural change and was being 
increasingly integrated into the international economy. 
4. The British and French fishing industries 
Up to this point it has been assumed that the subjects of this 
study, namely the British and French fishing industries, could be 
treated as similarly structured and similarly affected by the 
changes of the 1970s. It is certainly true that these two 
industries resemble one another more than either resembles any 
other fishing industry in the EEC. By the beginning of the 1980s, 
both had about 20,000 fishermen, around 0.1% of the total 
workforce in each country; 
35 both were landing over 700,000 tonnes 
per year, catches representing about 15% of the Community total in 
each case; 
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and both had nearly 500 vessels of over 100 tonnes 
balanced by a substantially greater number of smaller vessels. 
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However, these similarities conceal substantial differences both 
in the shape of the industries and in the impact of change upon 
them. To illustrate these differences this section will look in 
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turn at where the two countries fished, who undertook the fishing, 
what species they caught and from where they set out. 
4.1 Catch areas 
Although the two countries were catching similar amounts of fish 
by the 1980s, ten years earlier the situation had been quite 
different. At that time the British catch amounted to nearly 
1,100,000t. whereas France was still landing around 700,000t. 
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It has already been suggested (p5 ) that the introduction of 200 
mile zones affected Britain more seriously than it did France and 
the difference in third country losses helps to explain why their 
catches developed in such contrasting ways. To understand what 
happened more fully it is useful to look at Figure 1, which shows 
the areas covered by NEAFC and to compare it with Table 1.39 The 
table shows how much Britain and France caught outside the 
Commmunity 200 mile zone before the final 'Cod War' and after the 
extension of limits at the beginning of 1977 (excluding a very 
small French catch in areas 1X (Portugal), X (Azores) and X11 
(North Azores)). 
FIGURE 1- North East Atlantic fishing areas 
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TABLE 1 
British and French landings from selected NEAFC areas in 1974 and 
1977 (in tonnes) 
1974 1977 
BRITAIN FRANCE BRITAIN FRANCE 
Barents Sea (I) 96,313 11,985 58,013 8,341 
Norwegian Sea (IIa) 30,080 15,221 32,237 13,304 
Spitzbergen and Bear 
Island (IIb) 14,366 30,686 30,691 2,182 
Iceland grounds (Va) 142,034 248 29 - 
Faroe Plateau (Vbl) 31,759 25,194 21,291 29,545 
Faroe Bank (Vb2) 4,432 - 219 - 
TOTAL 318,984 88,334 142,480 53,372 
The figures illustrate very clearly the impact of the 
Icelandic success in establishing a 200 mile limit: in 1977 the 
total British catch in non-EEC waters only slightly exceeded her 
catch in 1974 in Icelandic waters alone. The French, by contrast, 
sustained a much smaller loss: in 1974 the distant grounds had 
together contributed only about 13% of the total catch in NEAFC 
areas (over 650,000 t. ) and the percentage fell relatively little 
to around 9% in 1977 when the total was just under 600,000t. In 
the British case, although the total NEAFC area catch remained at 
close to a million tonnes, the percentage from the distant grounds 
declined in the three years from over 30% to about 14%. 
The difference in impact of the Icelandic move needs also to 
be understood in terms of both the balance between NEAFC area 
catches and non-NEAFC catches and the catch distribution within 
the NEAFC areas that form part of the EEC 200 mile zone. Although 
France did see a decline in her catch in the distant water areas 
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of NEAFC, she continued to make substantial landings from areas 
outside the North East Atlantic. In 1976, for example, nearly 20% 
of all French landings came from catches made in the Mediterranean 
(over 50,000t. ), the West African coast (over 60,000t. ) and the 
North West Atlantic (over 35,000t. ). Moreover, despite the spread 
of 200 mile EEZs, the overall contribution of these three areas 
was at a very similar level in 1982.40 Britain, by contrast, has 
never been active outside the NEAFC area (beyond a small catch off 
Canada) and the move to extended fisheries zones did not induce 
her to change this practice, as we shall see in Chapter Five. 
For both countries, however, the largest share of their 
fishing took place and continues to take place within 200 miles of 
the coasts of the EEC. In 1976, for example, over 40% of the 
British catch in NEAFC areas came from the North Sea alone and 
over 25% of the equivalent French catch from the Bay of Biscay. 
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What differentiates the two countries is that whereas British 
fishermen rarely move outside the UK part of the Community zone, 
their French counterparts have always depended to an important 
extent on access to the waters of other EEC states, in particular 
Britain and Ireland. The importance of this difference cannot be 
overemphasized in that it lay at the heart of much of the dispute 
that raged within the EEC over the shape of the CFP. 
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When the prospect of a joint extension of fishing limits to 
200 miles in the EEC loomed, the French Economic and Social 
Council (CES) commented: 
"The zones within the Community will remain, 
as a matter of principle, open to the fishing 
fleets of all the member states: that they 
should do so is absolutely essential for 
France, which takes 72% of her catch from 
Community waters alone. "42 
This presence, however 'essential', looked very different 
from the British point of view: the country appeared to be 
surrounded by the vessels of foreign states. The Trade and 
Industry Subcommittee of the Expenditure Committee was presented 
in 1976 with maps which underlined the activity of non-British 
ships around the coasts of Britain and the lack of activity of 
British ships in the waters of other EEC states. 43 Figure 2 
shows that the French, for example, were fishing in 1974 all 
around Britain in the English and British channels, the Irish Sea, 
the waters off North-West Scotland, near the Shetlands and in the 
southern North Sea. At the same time, Figures 3(a) and 3(b) point 
to the chief effort by British vessels for pelagic and demersal 
species (i. e fish swimming in the water column and those near the 
seabed) as taking place on the British side of a median line 
equidistant between Britain and the surrounding states. Even on a 
very liberal estimate, the level of the British catch off France 
can hardly have amounted to more than 1000t. for the year in 
question. The paucity of the grounds off France offered little 
incentive for British fishermen to visit them, either then or 
later. 
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FIGURES 3a and 3b - Location of demersal and pelagic catch by British 
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After the move to 200 mile limits, less was made in Britain 
of the presence of foreign vessels (the East European were in any 
case shortly to leave) and more of the contribution in terms of 
volume of fish that came from within the British part of the 
so-called EEC 'pond'. As Table 2 indicates, nearly 60% of the 
catch within the 'pond' as a whole was made inside the UK's 200 
mile fishery limits and around 45% within 50 miles of the British 
coast. 44 
TABLE 2: Catch from UK 200 and 50 Mile Zones as a Proportion of 
the Catch from the EEC Pond (1974) (in '000 tonnes) 
Species EEC 200 miles UK 200 Miles UK 50 Miles 
Total Catch Catch % of Catch % of 
EEC EEC 
Demersal 1,518.3 752.6 50 529.4 35 
Pelagic 1,590.8 1,025.4 65 909.4 57 
Industrial* 796.8 522.0 66 282.3 35 
All Species 3,905.9 2,300.0 59 1,721.1 44 
* Industrial species are those not caught for human consumption 
but for conversion into fishmeal. 
French objections to such attempts by Britain to claim the 
lion's share of the EEC 'pond' were in part a product of the 
nature of EEC policy on fishing to which we shall return in the 
next chapter. However, they were also concerned to underline the 
economic dependence of particular ports and regions on the 
maintenance of historic rights around Britain. It was calculated 
that 90% (by weight) of the catch of Brittany came from the 
Anglo-Irish zone and that Boulogne depended for 66% of its 
landings on continued access to that zone. 45 As Figure 4 
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indicates, Breton trawlers were (as they remain) heavily reliant 
on being able to fish not simply within 200 miles of British and 
Irish coasts: 10 of their main catching areas were within 50 miles 
of those coasts. 46 The fear that these grounds might be closed 
was therefore a potent force inside the French fishing industry. 
It would, however, be mistaken to suppose that French 
fishermen were only concerned to maintain access. In their 
relationship with Spain, which grew increasingly tense as the 
period of this study drew to a close, their own sentiments were a 
mirror image of those of their British counterparts. The prospect 
of Spanish membership of the EEC made the French industry nervous 
as to the effects of allowing that country to fish freely within 
their own waters. In 1977, Spain's catch in the Bay of Biscay at 
nearly 400,000t. was more than double that of France and French 
fishermen feared that the large Spanish fleet would devastate the 
stock levels in that area if they were allowed to enjoy the kind 
of access that French vessels had around Britain. 47 However, the 
fact that Spain was still not an EEC country made it possible for 
this threat to be warded off in the context of agreements beween 
the Community and Madrid, which limited the levels and areas of 
Spanish catches. 48 Britain and France's shared membership of the 
EEC made their own arguments about conservation and access an 
internal Community matter, and therefore more difficult to 
resolve. 
It should not be supposed that British fishermen were only 
concerned about the access available to foreign vessels, like the 
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French. The creation of EEZs by countries like Iceland combined 
with the increasing pressure on certain stocks, notably herring, 
to oblige some British fishermen to redirect their efforts around 
the British coast. This proved a particular problem around the 
South West of England where large Scottish and East coast vessels 
came into conflict with smaller local fishermen, who blamed the 
'nomads' for ruining their own livelihoods both by reducing their 
catch and damaging their static gear, such as lobster pots. Thus 
changes in catching areas generated conflicts of interests within 
states as well as between them. 
4.2 Inshore and deep-sea fishing 
It has already been pointed out that the fishing industry is not 
monolithic but composed of a whole series of interests both 
upstream and downstream from the catchers. However, the catching 
sector in both countries is itself not uniform but divided into 
two important categories, which enjoyed contrasting fortunes in 
the context of the changes of the 1970s. The basic distinction is 
between company-owned and skipper-owned vessels: in Britain the 
former are referred to as the deep-sea industry and the latter as 
the inshore industry, whereas in France the equivalent terms are 
'peche industrielle' and 'Peche artisanale'. 
Although the terms will be retained in this study, they are 
in both cases not altogether helpful in clarifying the 
distinction. Thus though British deep-sea vessels have tended to 
operate in the distant waters of other states, this is by no means 
universally the case and it is equally misleading to talk of an 
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inshore industry, when its vessels can range long distances from 
their home ports. As for the French usage, 'industrial fishing' 
is precisely what everyone in France does not want to do. It 
refers to the catching of species for reduction into fishmeal 
which is the chief occupation of Danish fishermen and one of the 
shared dislikes of British and French fishermen. Both argue that 
industrial fishing necessarily harms them by producing a 
substantial 'bycatch' of those fish used for human consumption. 
The idea of 'artisanal' fishing, on the other hand, is more 
accurate than the other terms in that in French it does convey the 
notion that the fisherman or producer does himself own the means 
of production. 
Although it is not universally true in Britain (some boats 
are managed and owned by agencies), 49 inshore fishing boats and 
those of the 'peche artisanale' in France generally belong 
exclusively or in partnership to the skipper of the boat. 
Moreover, the proceeds from the catch are divided amongst the crew 
according to fixed percentages after deducting the shared costs of 
fuel, ice, food, etc. : the earnings of all on board therefore 
vary depending on the value of the catch. In contrast the crews 
and captains of deep-sea vessels are guaranteed a set amount, a 
variable bonus being paid depending on the success of the voyage. 
All on board are therefore employees, hired and fired in 
accordance with the needs of the shore-based companies which own 
and run the vessels. 
The basic criterion for distinguishing between inshore and 
deep-sea fishing relates to the character of the vessels involved. 
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Nevertheless, it remains true that despite some overlap, they are 
also distinguished by size and the range of their operation. Thus 
the British deep-sea fleet has traditionally been divided into 
three categories50: the distant water trawlers of over 140 feet 
with their fishing concentrated within the 200 miles of third 
states, such as Norway, Iceland and the Soviet Union; middle water 
trawlers of between 110-140 feet, fishing off the Faroes and the 
North and West of Scotland and near-water trawlers of under 110 
feet, whose fishing is pursued in the North, Irish and Celtic 
Seas. The term 'inshore' refers generally in Britain to vessels of 
below 80 feet wich operate within the UK 200 mile zone, but the 
range is enormous: skippers have bought ships up to 135 feet in 
length, 51 operating for long periods as far away as Norway and the 
Faroes, while many boats of under 40 feet are at sea for less than 
a day. 
The French, for their part, make a fourfold division of the 
fleet to underline differences in terms of size and range of 
operation. 52 'Petite peche' refers to vessels at sea for less 
than 24 hours and, 'peche cotiere' to trips of between 24 and 96 
hours: in both cases the vessels are under 50t. in weight and 
belong exclusively to the inshore or artisanal category. Then 
comes 'peche au large' which applies to ships weighing up to 
1000t. which are at sea for between 96 hours and 20 days and keep 
fish fresh on ice at OoC: within this category the majority comes 
from the deep-sea or industrial sector but there is a degree of 
overlap with cooperatives and even some individuals operating 
ships of this size. Finally, there is 'grande peche' where the 
vessels, generally over 1000t., are away for more than 20 days and 
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the fish has to be frozen at up to -4000: this freezer fleet, 
exclusively deep-sea in character, is itself divided between those 
operating off Canada to catch cod, those sailing off the West 
coast of Africa for tuna and those looking for lobster off South 
Africa and Madagascar. 
Despite a shared division between inshore and deep-sea in 
France and Britain, the structural balance between the two sectors 
in the two countries was, until the end of the 1970s, rather 
different. In Britain, the deep-sea sector was the larger one 
with roughly two thirds (c. 14,500) of the country's fishermen 
working in it in 1975 and just one third (c. 7,500) in the inshore 
sector. 53 By contrast, in the same year, there were over 25,000 
fishermen in the 'artisanal' sector in France and only 6,000 in 
the deep-sea industry. 54 Moreover, within the British deep-sea 
sector the nature of the companies involved was quite different 
from those in France: they had a far larger number of trawlers and 
a wider range of ports from which they sailed. Back in 1970, for 
example, Associated Fisheries had 79 trawlers, Boston Deep Sea 
Fisheries 61 and Ross 52 and they were distributed around the 
British coast at Grimsby, Hull and Lowestoft in the East, Milford 
Haven and Fleetwood in the West and Aberdeen and Granton in 
Scotland. 55 The French, for their part, were more concentrated in 
single ports with each company owning a much smaller number of 
vessels: the largest firm in Brittany, Jego Quere, based in 
Lorient, never had more than 20 ships. 
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The impact of change upon this structure was felt much more 
keenly by the deep-sea companies. Their larger, more expensive 
vessels, many of which had only been completed in the early 1970s, 
never had a chance to make money in the changed environment. 
Several companies in both countries either went out of business or 
drastically reduced the size of their fleets. This can be seen by 
observing the way in which the overall shape of the industry 
evolved. In Britain in 1974 there were 6,461 vessels under 80 
feet and 455 over 80 feet: seven years later in 1981, the former 
category had expanded to 7,106, while the latter had declined to 
245.57 Over the same period in France, the artisanal fleet did 
decline by nearly 17% from 12,794 to 10,656 boats but the 
predominantly industrial 'peche au large' and 'grande peche' 
collapsed still more spectacularly in size by nearly 55% from 474 
to 217.58 
Two reasons for this collapse can be identified. First the 
creation of 200 mile EEZs had a more severe impact in both 
countries on the deep-sea industry, which depended to an important 
degree on access to the waters of third countries, than it had on 
inshore vessels directed to less distant waters. However, this 
was by no means the only problem. In Brittany, for example, 
despite continued access to British and Irish waters, upon which 
the deep-sea trawlers depended for 85% of their catch (as compared 
with 35% for the inshore vessels)59, there was still an important 
decline in the number of these vessels in Breton ports: at 
Concarneau, for example, the number fell from 107 in 1970 to 48 at 
the begining 1981.60 
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The second and perhaps more important difficulty for the 
deep-sea industry in both countries was that it found itself 
squeezed between a higher rate of increase in costs and a lower 
rate of increase in fish earnings than those found in the inshore 
industry. The White Fish Authority (WFA) in Britain calculated 
the costs and earnings per vessel in each of the length categories 
for the period 1973 to 1977 and concluded: 
"Only in the case of inshore vessels did 
profitability improve generally over the 
period. The near water fleet and the freezers 
(over 140 feet) were unprofitable in four of 
the last five years and the middle water 
vessels are only barely profitable. In none 
of the deep sea groups, in particular, would 
profitability be sufficient to cover the cost 
of new vessels. "61 
The situation was similar in France with the bulk of the deep-sea 
industry unable to make money, given the balance of costs as 
against prices. 
By contrast, the inshore fleets proved better able to cope. 
This was partly because of the kind of fish they caught. Deep-sea 
trawlers in both countries concentrated all their efforts on the 
so-called 'especes communs' or common species; many inshore 
vessels, particularly in France, were more interested in the 
'noble' species or 'especes fins'. The importance of this 
difference is that 'common' species, such as cod and haddock are 
very much more susceptible to competition from frozen imports than 
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are the fresh, 'noble' species, such as Norway lobster or sole. 
One effect of this variable degree of integration into the 
international market was that prices of the 'noble' species proved 
more resilient. The price difference can be verified in the 
French case by observing how the average prices of fish changed in 
the decade from 1971 to 1981 in the three top ports, Boulogne, 
Lorient and Concarneau. 62 At Boulogne, a predominantly deep-sea 
port, the average price per kilo rose from 1.45FF in 1971 to 
3.67FF in 19811 at Lorient and Concarneau, where the 'artisans' 
play a much more important role, the rises were respectively from 
2.17FF to 6.61FF and 2.5FF to 7.14FF per kilo. Thus not only were 
prices at a higher level in absolute terms in each year in the two 
Breton ports but the rate of increase between the two years was 
also higher: just above and just under 300% in the case of Lorient 
and Concarneau, 250% in the case of Boulogne. In ports like Le 
Guilvinec and Sables d' Olonne, exclusively inshore in character, 
average prices had improved even more reaching 9.92FF and 11.87FF 
per kilo in 1981. 
However, it was not just the mix of species caught that 
helped the inshore fleets. In Britain, in particular, inshore 
vessels were by no means invariably interested in valuable 
species: it was true of South West fishermen but not of most of 
those in Scotland, who were eager to go after the 'common' 
species, such as cod and haddock. What did bind together all 
inshoremen in both countries was their attitude towards work. The 
author was often told in Britain that deep-sea fishermen needed 
incentives to go to sea: the more such incentives were lowered by 
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reducing the scope for bonuses and decasualising the work, the 
less likely it was that men would be prepared to take the 
undoubted risks involved. 63 Certainly it is clear that the 
problem of incentives was less severe in the inshore industry 
where payment is by results and where there is far less of a gap 
between the vessel owner and the rest of the crew. This situation 
creates a set of shared values where: 
"the 'risk' involved in fishing is effectively 
shared between capital and labour, since the 
rewards of each are purely a function of the 
fish that is landed and sold. "64 
The members of the crew can see the possibility of themselves 
moving up to become boat-owning captains, as they gain in 
experience and save up. The result is that everyone on board 
works at rates which would be quite unacceptable in other walks of 
life and are indeed strongly resisted in the deep-sea industry. 
In both countries such an outlook protected the inshore industry 
in a way unmatched in the company owned vessels. 
However, the difficulties of the deep-sea industry were not 
universal. The case of the French tuna freezer vessels of the 
'grande peche' provide an important exception to the general 
picture presented: the particular conditions applicable to it 
themselves help to explain why this was so. To begin with, the 
owners were able to guarantee a working environment which was (and 
remains) the envy of the rest of the French fishing industry. 
High earnings (6,000FF per month), long holidays (4 months on, 2 
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months off), less risk (no fishing at night, for example) and more 
comfort (the boats are very large and very spacious) earn the 500 
French fishermen involved the title of the industry's aristocrats 
and contrast dramatically with the condition of those working in 
cold, northern waters. 
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Like the rest of the deep-sea industry in France, the tuna 
fleet was threatened by the changes of the middle 1970s. 
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drop in meat prices in the United States decreased the consumption 
of tuna and pushed the excess supply onto European markets, where 
prices fell as a result. However, the market recovered and after 
that, with demand outstripping supply, the level of prices rose 
steadily. At the same time, the companies continued to be able to 
make increased catches with roughly the same number of ships: in 
1975 33 vessels landed approximately 48,000t. while in 1981 31 
landed nearly 75,000t. In part this was because despite 
competition from other fleets, in particular the Spanish, there 
was not a problem of overfishing as there was in the North East 
Atlantic. The increasing sophistication of new vessels, many 
operating with helicopters, enabled the captains to take advantage 
of this favourable supply situation. In part, too, the prosperity 
of tuna fishing reflected the fact that whatever the theoretical 
impact of 200 mile EEZs, most West African states were not in a 
strong position to enforce their rights but were prepared to make 
a deal permitting the French ships to continue operating. As for 
fuel costs, there were less difficulties than might be supposed 
because the vessels operated from Dakar and Abidjan, returning to 
France only every third or fourth year. Moreover, from 1979 new 
62 
vessels were equipped to use heavy fuel oil costing 30% less than 
normal diesel fuel. 
The example of the tuna fleet illustrates that under certain 
conditions the deep-sea industry could avoid decline. These 
conditions were, however, not solely economic in character. In 
Chapter Five we shall return to the way in which the relationships 
between the industry and the government in the two countries also 
affected the way in which decline was managed. In the French case 
full advantage was taken of a favourable conjuncture of 
conditions; in the British case, the conditions were less 
favourable but little attempt was made to improve them. 
4.3 The mix of species 
The differential impact of change upon the two industries needs 
also to be set in the context of the different British and French 
fish consumption patterns. Traditionally, the British market has 
been dominated by demersal white fish, notably cod in England and 
Wales and haddock in Scotland, with a lesser role for the pelagic 
herring: thus in 1975, these three species alone accounted for 
nearly 55% by weight of all landings by UK vessels in the UK, 
467,000t. out of a total of 869,000t. 
67 France, by contrast, has 
always had a much more even spread of pelagic and demersal 
species, with shellfish (oysters and mussels) contributing the 
dominant share of the catch. In 1976, for example, no fish of the 
water column and seabed exceeded 11% of the total fresh fish catch 
by weight, whereas oysters and mussels made up over 22% of that 
same catch. 
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The years that followed were ones that were particularly 
difficult for the British to cope with and less difficult for the 
French market because of these different degrees of concentration. 
Cod landings, which were taken predominantly from the colder 
northern waters, inevitably declined in the late 1970s as access to 
these waters was reduced or eliminated, while over-exploitation of 
stocks led to a complete ban on herring fishing from 1978 to 1981. 
Ironically, the overall British catch actually rose in 1978 to 
over 950,000t69 But this increase was the result both of the 
deep-sea vessels, which were largely deprived of the opportunity 
of fishing for cod, and the herring fleet, unable to continue as 
before, turning their attention to mackerel stocks. This fish 
started to appear in unusually large quantities in the early 
autumn off the North West of Scotland and to migrate later in the 
year to the South West of England: the fishermen followed it. In 
1978 the mackerel catch shot up to 33% of all landings, while the 
combined demersal catch had fallen by nearly 100,000t. since 
1975.70 Though the latter catch remained steady over the 
following years, by 1982 the marked decline in the former catch 
brought with it an equivalent drop in the overall level of 
landings to under 800,000t. 
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What made these developments still more difficult for the 
fishermen concerned was that the mackerel catch was of very low 
value and was being caught in quantities far greater than the 
domestic market could assimilate. In 1978, for example, mackerel 
was fetching less than £100 per tonne as against the average of 
over £400 per tonne for the demersal species. 72 To get rid of the 
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fish, the fishermen transshipped it to Eastern European factory 
ships (entitled 'klondykers' because of the way they gathered in 
the catch from the British boats). They had been deprived of the 
right to fish themselves in British waters after 1977 but had a 
captive domestic market to which they could now supply mackerel. 
The British consumer, by contrast, was not obliged to eat this 
fish, despite the drop in the demersal catch: white fish imports 
increased so that demand could be met. By 1979 they had reached 
277,000t. as compared with 173,000t. in 1976.73 
Whereas in Britain domestic landings of the most commonly 
eaten species declined and were replaced by frozen imports of the 
same species, in France it proved possible to keep up the level 
and balance of national production of the fresh species preferred 
by the consumer. In 1982 shellfish still represented the most 
important category of catch at just over 190,000t74Amongst other 
species there remained no dominant contributor to total 
production: of the non-frozen catch, only one fish, saithe, 
contributed more than 10% of the catch, with seven other species 
contributing between 4% and 10%. The low value mackerel, for 
example, was one of these seven, but landings did not rise in the 
same dramatic way as they had done in Britain. Catches of higher 
value cod and haddock, remained greater in quantity, even though 
they, too, were nothing like as large as equivalent British 
catches. 75 
Overall, therefore, the contribution of the fresh fish sector 
changed little during the 1970s: it continued to represent 85% of 
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French production in 1979. This is not to say that patterns of 
consumption remained the same. 42% more in terms of processed 
products were consumed in 1979 than in 1970 with deep frozen fish 
up 114%. What's more the French catch contribution to the latter 
declined from 53% to 35% by weight: imports were up from 32,000 to 
89,000t. Despite the resilience of the fresh fish sector, there 
was still a growing fear that it might find increasing 
difficulties in selling its catch as the food companies increased 
their efforts to penetrate the French market. 76 However, the 
problem was a rather different one from that facing the British, 
where imports had already taken the place of fish which had once 
been caught by UK vessels. Both countries were certainly faced 
with the difficulty of devising a response to imports but the mix 
between species had helped to make it a more intractable one for 
Britain. 
4.4 The balance between ports 
In both countries the association of particular ports with 
particular kinds of fishing had an effect on the distribution of 
the costs of change between regions. Once again it was Britain 
that witnessed the greater upheaval but France, too, was not 
untouched, as the two countries witnessed the need for adjustment 
to the decline of the deep-sea industry. 
The fate of Hull has already been cited in this study (p 40 
above) but it is worth recording the way in which Hull slipped 
down the table of landings by value between 1976 and 1982. 
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Table 3 Top five British ports by value of UK vessel landings 
(Em) in 1976,1978 and 1982.77 
1976 1978 1982 
Hull 28.7 Peterhead 29.4 Peterhead 43.7 
Grimsby 26.6 Grimsby 28.2 Ullapool 24.9 
Aberdeen 16.9 Aberdeen 26.2 Grimsby 21.8 
Petershead 9.8 Hull 17.9 Aberdeen 21.2 
Mallaig 8.0 Lowestoft 13.9 Fraserburgh 8.9 
In 1976 Hull was still the premier British port by the value 
of her landings but six years later when the catch was down to 
just over 15,000t. she no longer figured in the leading group of 
ports by value. Her Humberside rival was still in the group, even 
if with a reduced catch, but this was thanks to a fleet of 200 
inshore vessels, concentrating their efforts on the North Sea. 
This partially made up for the decline of the big trawlers. 78 
Hull, by contrast, had never had an inshore tradition. At least 
80% of her catch had always come from Iceland, the Barents Sea and 
the Norwegian coast and she suffered accordingly when these waters 
were either closed or subject to strict quotas and licences. 79 
Not that her fate was unique - Fleetwood which depended 
predominantly on hake from Iceland suffered very badly too - but 
Hull was unique in the scale of its decline. 
However, what Table 3 also shows is the way in which the 
centre of gravity of the British industry moved from England to 
67 
Scotland, and in particular to the Scottish inshore fleet, 
concentrated north of Aberdeen. In the late 1970s, 'artisanal' 
Scots were already taking 50% of the total UK catch by weight but 
only 40% by value; in 1980 they had overtaken the fleets in the 
rest of Britain in value terms as well, catching 60% by weight and 
55% by value of the UK catch. 80 They had become the new centre of 
a reduced industry. 
The situation in France was subject to much less turmoil. 
Boulogne remained easily the first port of France in terms of the 
volume of fish landed (over 115,000 t. as against Lorient the 
second port's 70,000 t. ). 81 However, Table 4 shows that the 
changing relative value of species was to the disadvantage of 
Boulogne which ceased to be the most important port by catch 
value 
$2 By contrast the strictly inshore ports, like Le Cuilvinec 
and Sables d'Olonne, saw the size and value of their catch both 
rise. However, no ports experienced as dramatic a change in 
fortune as Hull or Fleetwood. In 1982 La Rochelle was still 
catching over 100 million FF of fish, even though its catch was 
under 10,000t. and Lorient's situation looked reasonably healthy 
despite contraction in the industrial fleet from 42 to 25 trawlers 
between 1975 and 1982.83 
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TABLE 4: Top five French ports by value of landings (million 
FF) in 1976 and 1982 
1976 1982 
Boulogne 273.0 
Lorient 267.7 
Concarneau 156.6 
La Rochelle 114.1 
Douarnenez 64,6 
Lorient 430.6 
Boulogne 426.0 
Concarneau 411.0 
Le Guilvinec 174.6 
Sables d'Olonne 122.5 
The French industry continued to gravitate around the twin 
poles of Boulogne and Brittany. As Figure 5 indicates, 84 in 1976, 
when France was divided into four 'Directions' for administrative 
and statistical purposes, the Nantes Directorate's area was by far 
the most important with just under half the total catch by weight 
and just under half the total number of ships but with more than 
half the catch by value and considerably more than half the 
tonnage of the French fishing fleet. However, the figures rather 
exaggerate the gap between Brittany and the Boulogne area. By 
1982, a sixfold division was introduced with the Nantes 
Directorate divided into three. As Table 5 indicates, the result 
showed a much clearer balance between the ports of Brittany and 
those of the North. What is more, it illustrates the even spread 
of fishing activity in France in contrast to the situation in 
Britain only ten years before when Hull's landings of over 
230,000t. per year amounted to more than the total of any of the 
six regions of France in 1982 and almost as much as the four 
smallest regions put together. 
FIGURE 5- The relative importance of the fishing areas of France 
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TABLE 5: Catch by volume and value in 1982 in the 6 French 
regions. 85 
North-Normandy 
Brittany North 
Brittany South 
Loire Atlantique/Vendee 
South West 
Mediterranean 
Volume (tonnes) 
224.932 
81,156 
168,778 
42,573 
78,412 
53,318 
Value (millions FF) 
1,200 
353 
1,592 
401 
568 
533 
Thus in terms of where they fished from, as well as in terms 
of what they fished, who fished and where, the two industries 
display distinct structural characteristics which were affected in 
different ways by the changes of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
5. Conclusion 
The importance of the discussion in this chapter for the study as 
a whole is threefold: it underlines the changing relationship 
between the catching sector and other sectors of the fishing 
industry; it illustrates the conflicts of interest within the 
catching sector, both inside and across national boundaries; and 
it points to the kinds of questions that governments in both 
countries were obliged to answer in managing economic change 
within the industry. 
First of all, fishermen emerged from economic isolation. 
Though they had always been linked to a whole network of other 
economic agents from the boat-builder to the fish shop via the 
fish merchant, the change in economic conditions underlined the 
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interdependence between them. What happened to one was likely to 
have an effect on the others. In Britain the failure of the 
deep-sea fleet to continue to provide regular supplies had the 
effect of cutting by half to 3,000 the number of fishmongers' 
shops and giving a dramatic boost to the fish van trade. 86 In 
both countries, shipyards witnessed a major break in the number of 
orders for vessels after 1975, which put many out of business and 
encouraged others to look abroad for business. 
87 
Fishermen, too, became more aware of the implications of 
their relationship with those closest to them in the economic 
chain. The turbulence of the market underlined that major 
differences in reward might come from the same amount of effort. 
Hence fishermen looked more critically at the activities of 
dockers, merchants and processors. As early as 1971 the bulk of 
the inshore vessels at Aberdeen moved to Petershead because they 
no longer wanted to have to pay for the unloading of their fish by 
so-called 'lumpers' but to do it themselves. At Lorient also, 
unloading charges were a major issue with inshore boats regularly 
threatening to go elsewhere, because they lost 15% of the value of 
their catch in labour charges. 
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As for the merchants, it became much clearer that they were 
competing with fishermen in the market for the margin between what 
the consumer would pay and what the trip to sea had cost and that 
they were not dependent for supplies on the fishermen of a 
particular region or even country. Hence the regular pressure 
from fishermen for import controls, despite the fact that the 
71 
processors, the major customers of the merchants, were themselves 
constantly closing down factories. In France, the number of 
processing plants was down from 175 in 1964 to 52 in 1978, and 
their future was unlikely to be improved by measures taken to 
protect the catching sector-89 The point was put more colourfully 
in 1976 by one of the Grimsby buyers when the British Fishing 
Federation (BFF) suspected their loyalty in accepting Icelandic 
fish: 
"They (i. e the BFF) are operating the most 
decrepit trawlers in Europe and if there is a 
ban on Icelandic trawlers coming down, then 
those trawlermen who are coming home to the 
dole queue won't get near the labour exchange 
for thousands of redundant lumpers, process 
workers, drivers, friers and merchants. "90 
However, it was not just a question of vulnerabilities 
between those inside and outside the catching sector. The second 
feature of the changing situation was the growth of 
vulnerabilities within the catching sector itself. In the 
deep-sea industry, the higher level of costs put increasing 
pressure on the owners to keep labour charges at a minimum and 
this brought them into conflict with their crews who resisted the 
attempt to impose the burden of change upon them. Even in the 
inshore industry escalating costs tempted some to tamper with the 
percentages used to calculate how much all on board should earn. 91 
In both sectors there was an increased awareness of the impact of 
the activities of one group of fishermen upon another. This might 
be a conflict between fishermen of the same nationality, for 
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example, pitting the South West boats against those from 
Humberside and Scotland on the mackerel grounds. Or it might be a 
dispute between fishermen of different nationality, be it British 
against French over access or the two of them against the Danes in 
the dispute over industrial fishing. The conflicts themselves 
were not new: there had always been disagreements between 
fishermen of one or more nationalities. What was new was their 
frequency, intensity and salience. 
Finally, this chapter raises questions as to the role that 
the respective governments could and should play. Given increased 
interdependence between the various sectors of the industry, how 
should state institutions respond? In particular, should they see 
it a, s their role to balance the interests involved or to impose a 
particular conception of how the interests in the industry should 
be interrelated? Given the divisions within the catching sector, 
how far could those institutions go in encouraging unity, how far 
should unity be seen as the task of the industry itself to 
achieve? And given the importance of the increasing integration of 
fishing into the international economy, how should the British and 
French states define their roles in defending a domestic industry 
against pressures from beyond their borders? To begin to answer 
these questions the next chapter will look not only at the way in 
which the fisheries issue assumed a different economic shape, but 
also at how it was thrown into a new political arena, whose 
character played an important part in channelling British and 
French responses to the impact of economic change. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE TO CHANGE 
1. Introduction 
One of the lessons of the previous chapter was that the 1970s 
witnessed an increasing integration of the fisheries sector into 
the international economy. The development of trade in fishery 
products, helped by the spread of freezing techniques and by the 
acceptance of EEZs for exclusive exploitation by coastal states, 
started to undermine the economic isolation of the fishing 
industry in Western Europe. Given the different structures of the 
industries in Britain and France, the impact was not the same in 
both but equally neither escaped the new pressures, and neither 
government was able to avoid devising some response to them. 
This chapter will suggest that the increasing 
internationalisation of the economics of fisheries was accompanied 
by pressures for an international political response. In the 
process a tension developed between the desire of the Western 
European states for autonomy and the need for closer cooperation 
between governments to cope effectively with the issue. The 
argument will be developed in three stages: first, that the old 
institutional framework, which contained debate on the fisheries 
issue at the international level in the 1960s, proved increasingly 
inadequate as the character of the issue changed; second, that the 
new framework, provided by the EEC, established a form of 
institutional interdependence which challenged the autonomy of 
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states to determine the frontier between the foreign and domestic 
aspects of their fishing policy; and third, that despite the 
common constraints that the EEC framework imposed, Britain and 
France still retained different conceptions of the policy 
implications of the revised character of the fisheries issue. 
2. The inadequacy of the old framework 
Before the 1970s Britain and France could treat the fisheries 
issue as a limited sectoral problem. This is not to say that 
considerable domestic efforts were not devoted to protecting the 
industry when gluts of fish appeared and prices tumbled. Nor is 
it to suggest that at the international level, there was no 
recognition of the interrelationship between national fishing 
fleets. But in that period it was possible to make a clear 
institutional distinction between the domestic and foreign aspects 
of fishing policy: the domestic aspect was one to be dealt with in 
discussion between the ministry responsible and the 
representatives of the industry; the foreign aspect was for 
bilateral negotiation with third countries or for multilateral 
discussion within the various international fishery commissions, 
such as NEAFC. Between the two environments the government could 
act as a kind of 'gatekeeper', protecting the interests of the 
industry at home in the foreign arena and implementing the results 
of international negotiation in the domestic arena. 
This institutional separation was bolstered by the generally 
accepted status of fish as a collective good, available to all 
with very little restriction. The states in the North East 
Atlantic area broadly agreed in the 1960s not to seek to impose 
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domestic costs on one another by limiting access to their waters, 
on the assumption that all could continue to make increasing 
catches under an 'open seas' regime. They recognised the need for 
a degree of international cooperation but only to the extent that 
it did not impinge seriously on domestic policy. Hence there was 
no serious challenge to the legitimacy of the governmental 
'gatekeeper' role. 
The fisheries commissions were the institutional expression 
of such governmental attitudes to the international arena. The 
most important from the point of view of this study was NEAFC. It 
was established to supervise the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention, signed in 1959, within the area indicated in Figure 1 
(see p 47 above) and continued to represent the chief forum of 
international collaboration on fisheries until the EEZ doctrine 
became a reality in the area of its jurisdiction in 1977. How 
little governments were prepared to be restricted in the exercise 
of their sovereignty by this institution can be seen by examining 
the nature of its operation and powers. 
Firstly, it was a body of very limited resources: for a long 
time its staff amounted to three people, the Secretary and two 
typists. As for the Secretary, he "had always been a British 
civil servant who spent three quarters of his time working in the 
British Ministry of Agriculture. "1 Though the delegates of the 
member states to the Commission (two for each of the 16 members) 
had the right to appoint such staff as they chose, they were not 
concerned to create a secretariat which might challenge their own 
right to manage fisheries. 
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Secondly, the meetings of the Commission were held in a 
political vacuum. The Commissioners from each country were civil 
servants - in the British case, the Fishery Secretaries from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS) so 
that outside the trade-related journals and newspapers there was 
next to no debate as to what was at stake. The containment of 
discussion in this way also meant that there was no possibility of 
generating political deals between this issue and other issue 
areas. 
2 Fishing remained strictly separate and even within the 
limits of the fisheries sector, the narrowness of the Commission's 
duties excluded any 'linkage politics'. Thus the Commission was 
not concerned with the extent of fishing limits, the prices 
obtained for fish, the aids given by governments to their own 
industries or the negotiation of agreements with non-member 
countries: these were either matters for individual countries to 
undertake themselves or as in the case of limits, matters to be 
settled by inter-state negotiation, such as that which had led to 
the London Convention of 1964. 
What, above all, restricted challenges to the sovereignty of 
member states, was the limited character of the Commission's 
powers. Its major task was "to consider... what measures may be 
required for the conservation of the fish stocks and for the 
rational exploitation of the fisheries in the area. "3 And yet the 
Commission's powers to carry out this task were only ones of 
recommendation. A straightforward procedure existed to enable a 
state to object to any recommendation and thereby escape the need 
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to implement it. Indeed once three states had objected, all the 
contracting parties were relieved of the obligation to heed the 
recommendation. 
4 
The arrangements did not, however, pose difficulties as long 
as the 'open seas' regime continued to operate and everybody's 
catches continued to rise. What started to undermine them was the 
increasing awareness of the importance of taking conservation 
seriously as stock levels began to drop at the beginning of the 
1970s. At that point the effects of the voluntary regime were 
clearly exposed. A system of mutual inspection, known as the 
Joint Enforcement Scheme, was introduced and it revealed that a 
number of states had been less than enthusiastic in enforcing 
regulations against their own nationals in earlier years. The 
percentage of inspections resulting in reports of violations of 
regulations against vessels of third states, compared with the 
percentage when those states were themselves responsible for 
inspection, rose considerably: in the French case from 6.7 to 
44.7; in the British case from 3.6 to 24.5. Even with the scheme, 
however, prosecution remained the prerogative of the port state 
and not the coastal state in whose waters the offence was 
committed. 
5 
In 1974 a further move was taken to improve conservation, 
when it was agreed to introduce quotas known as Total Allowable 
Catches (TACs). Here, it seemed, was a way of getting round the 
difficulty of enforcing regulations on the mesh sizes of nets, the 
traditional mechanism of control. But it proved impossible to 
establish levels of catch that would not mean significant hardship 
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for any of the member states. Whatever the recommendations of the 
non-governmental experts of the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Seas (ICES), the Commissioners would regularly 
increase the permitted catch so as to ensure agreement. Table 6, 
presented to the Trade and Industry Subcommittee, underlines the 
discrepancy between the two for 1976 and allows a comparison with 
what was declared as caught. 
6 
Of the 31 TACs recommended by ICES, 
the Commission increased the figure in 14 cases and in 6 of these 
14 cases, the actual catch exceeded even what the Commission 
proposed. In 16 cases where the Commission proposed no TAC on the 
basis of the ICES recommendation, the declared catch was higher 
than the recommended one on 11 occasions, often by very 
substantial amounts. The whole system was described as "the 
madness of NEAFC" by the editor of Fishing News who commented 
before the decisions for 1976 were taken: 
"Here we have supposedly responsible and 
intelligent delegates being advised by their 
scientists that herring stocks in the North 
Sea are on their last legs - yet it is almost 
certain that they will increase the amount of 
herring some countries can take to get a 
"7 working agreement. 
And what is more, there was widespread recognition that what 
states admitted they had caught was not what they actually caught. 
As one observer put it, if the TAC was 50,000t, the state would 
acknowledge a catch of 100,000t. but everyone knew the figure was 
really 150,000t. 
8 
TABLE 6 INTERNATIONAL CATCHES AND TACT RECOMMENDED BY ICES FOR FISHERIES IN TII[ NORTH 
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From another perspective the results of NEAFC's deliberations 
were an inevitable consequence of a voluntary form of 
international cooperation with no direction from any central 
authority. In such a system national authorities are necessarily 
very reluctant to relinquish any of their powers and thereby to 
suggest that they are giving up their role as the 'gatekeeper'. 
To do so is to suggest not only that the domestic and foreign 
arenas are no longer clearly separable but that the distinction 
lacks legitimacy and thereby gives the right for non-national 
authorities to intrude into the domestic sphere. 
However, whatever the behaviour of delegates within NEAFC, 
the passage of the 1970s revealed that the fisheries issue no 
longer enjoyed the status it had had before. Fish were still a 
'collective good' in that they remained potentially available to 
all but the nature of this availability had changed. 
9 
First of 
all, it ceased to be the case that the fish catch of one state did 
not subtract from the catch of another: it was clear that there 
were Maximum Sustainable Yields (MSYs) and that if they were 
exceeded, fish stocks were in danger of disappearing. Secondly, 
it became evident that it was possible to exclude states from the 
benefit of this collective good by altering property titles: the 
concept of the EEZ gave coastal states the possibility of 
preventing others from making fish catches in their waters. 
Thirdly, the conditions of availability of fish were seen to 
depend on more than fishing rights: the workings of the 
international market could render the use of national measures of 
conservation and exclusion largely irrelevant. As a result, as 
Chapter 2 showed, the industries had become both more vulnerable 
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to the action of others beyond their borders and the avoidance of 
vulnerability was impossible. Such interdependence necessarily 
created pressures for more concerted international action in 
Western Europe. 
However, NEAFC could not seriously hope to cope with this new 
interdependence. As already indicated, the weakness of its powers 
made the imposition of severe burdens on domestic fishing 
industries by the Commission, even when stocks were under severe 
pressure, politically impossible. Equally, it could have no role 
in the changing of limits, as it was the inheritor and not the 
formulator of this aspect of the ocean regime. And its limited 
remit excluded any intervention in the wider forms of economic 
interdependence to which national fishing industries found 
themselves subject. 
At the same time, the structural character of the industries 
of Britain and France increased the pressures for some kind of 
international response. Both depended heavily on stocks fished by 
other states in the North East Atlantic and needed some mechanism 
for controlling the level of catches. Both were subject to the 
effects of the international trade in fish and its accompanying 
threat of imports. Even in the case of the setting of limits, 
where Britain's concentration of fishing on waters close to her 
coast gave her a quite different perspective from that of France, 
it is by no means clear that she could have avoided an 
international response. Whatever the general opinions of the 
industry and its supporters, the importance of the migration of 
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stocks between zones made unilateral action, like that of Iceland, 
a hazardous prospect. 
As one survey of cod indicated (see Table 7) 
10 
there is a 
dramatic difference between the percentage of this fish found in 
British waters when they are three years old as opposed to when 
they are one year old. A change of fishing patterns could 
therefore have rendered British catches of her favourite fish 
vulnerable to a change in fishing habits by her neighbours, a 
threat to which Iceland was not subject when she took her 
unilateral position. 
TABLE 7 Distribution of cod caught in EEC waters (% by national 
zone) 
Denmark Cermany Netherlands UK 
One year olds 20.3 54.1 12.0 13.6 
Two year olds 8.4 37.9 15.2 38.4 
Three year olds 6.4 6.7 9.7 77.0 
The question of the kind of international response that the 
two countries should devise to cope with the structural 
characteristics of their industries was effectively answered by 
the fact that both were members of the EEC. Despite the distaste 
of many within Britain, not least inside the fishing industry, for 
the Community and the belief that better arrangements could have 
been devised outside it, 
11 
both countries found themselves in a 
situation where there was no serious alternative to the EEC as an 
international forum for coping with the new economic 
interdependence. 
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Though NEAFC continued to exist in a formal sense after the 
end of 1976 and though the CFP had emerged in its original form in 
1970, it was only in 1977 that the full importance of the EEC in 
the fisheries arena emerged. At the Hague in October 1976, 
i2 it 
was agreed by the foreign ministers of the Community countries 
that: 
a. the fishing limits of member states in the North Atlantic and 
North Sea be extended jointly to 200 miles from January 1, 
1977; 
b. the Commission of the EEC be given a mandate to negotiate all 
future fishing agreements with third countries as to 
reciprocal fishing rights; 
c. the Commission exercise an overall watchdog role over the 
level of stocks within the 200 mile boundary. 
Despite the uncertainties that this decision left, it 
radically changed the context and content of fishing policy for 
the member states. This fact was underlined by the contrast 
between the character of future negotiations with third countries 
and Britain's final 'Cod War' with Iceland, which was drawing to a 
close at the end of 1976. That dispute was to be the last example 
of the classical bilateral resolution of a fisheries dispute with 
the government taking the lead in the international area, on the 
basis of a broad domestic consensus. The maintenance of fishing 
rights off Iceland had been a foreign policy objective, where the 
government had played a clear 'gatekeeper' role. The objective 
was abandoned because of pressure from other governments. On the 
one hand, there was the spread of the legitimacy of the EEZ 
doctrine, on the other the advice of Britain's NATO partners, 
concerned to maintain the use of the Keflavik air base in Iceland. 
From the beginning of 1977 such a style of inter-state policy 
making became increasingly inappropriate, as the debate over the 
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status of fisheries moved firmly into the EEC area, with its very 
different set of processes and obligations. 
3. A new framework of institutional interdependence 
The difference between the old NEAFC forum and that provided by 
the EEC was enormous. The shift meant a dramatic widening of the 
range of institutions with an interest and a role in the making of 
policy on fishing. Instead of a small group of national civil 
servants, occasionally interrupted by their respective ministers, 
there was a mass of new actors, many of whom did not owe a 
specific loyalty to a national government and who were not 
therefore concerned to maintain the boundary between the foreign 
and domestic aspects of the fisheries issue. 
First of all, member states were confronted with a quite 
different creature than NEAFC in the European Commission. Here 
was a body with the specific tasks under the EEC Treaty (Article 
155) of initiating policy, influencing the decisions taken by 
national ministers, implementing those decisions and ensuring that 
member states abided by them. What made these powers particularly 
significant was that unlike the old Fisheries Commission, which 
could only issue recommendations with no binding force, the EEC 
Commission formed part of a policy process which could produce 
directives and regulations that had the force of law within all 
member states. It did not have the final power of decision - that 
belonged to the Council of Ministers, made up of the national 
ministers of the member states - but it could certainly influence 
those decisions. 
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At the same time it was not without a degree of independent 
skill and capacity. Rather than rely on a single Secretary and 
two typists, the Commission decided at the end of 1976 to 
establish a separate Directorate General (number XIV) with a staff 
of 50 or so, with a specific responsibility for fisheries. 
Moreover, this Directorate General was not without access to 
expertise and advice outside national governments, both through 
formal and informal channels. An Advisory Committee on Fisheries 
had been established back in 1973 with a wide range of 
representatives from the fishing industry in the member states. 
In 1979 a Scientific and Technical Committee was set up to provide 
the kind of detailed information that the Commission needed if it 
was seriously to contest national definitions of fishery problems. 
These formal channels of communication were supplemented by 
informal links. The fishing industry gave sufficient weight to 
the importance of the Commission that it established its own 
Brussels based, Community-wide pressure group entitled 
'Europeche'. This body helped the main representatives of the 
industry to coordinate their positions but also enabled the 
Commission to develop a wider understanding of the problems of the 
industry. 
The Commission was therefore organisationally and legally 
equipped to start to coax governments to make agreements as well 
as checking that they were abiding by them. During 1976, for 
example, the Commission proposed that all member countries should 
enjoy an exclusive zone of 12 miles around their coasts, as a way 
of offering a compromise between British demands for a much wider 
zone and the demands of other states, including the French, that 
85 
there be no such zone at all for the vessels of EEC member states. 
Despite the failure of the Council to agree to this proposal later 
in the same year at the Hague (and indeed disagreement within the 
Commission itself), this proposal did form the basis of the accord 
which was eventually reached in 1983.13 At the very least, the 
Commission had established the terms of the debate, long though 
the debate turned out to be. 
Similarly, the Commission was involved in checking up on the 
implementation of agreements. At the Hague, there was no 
agreement on precisely how to conserve stocks of fish. However, 
Annexe VI to the Hague Resolution stated that each state could 
adopt as an interim measure and in a form which avoided 
discrimination, appropriate measures to ensure the protection of 
resources situated in the fishing zones off their coasts. 
14 
All 
states were obliged to consult the Commission before introducing 
such measures and the Commission had the job of ensuring that 
there was no discrimination. The United Kingdom in particular, 
was the subject of a large number of investigations, after other 
states complained that her conservation measures discriminated 
against their own fishermen. 
15 
The Commission was sometimes 
satisfied that the measure was non-discriminatory but if not, it 
had the right under Article 169 of the Treaty to bring the state 
concerned before the Court of Justice, the second important 
institution in the EEC structure. 
The Rome Treaty gives the Court the specific role of ensuring 
that Community law is observed (Article 164) and imposes an 
obligation on member states to comply with what the Court decides 
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(Article 171). Thus the judges ruled that Britain had indeed 
acted in a discriminatory way by banning both fishing for Norway 
pout in the so-called 'Pout Box' in the North Sea from October 
1978 to March 1979 as well as fishing for herring off Northern 
Ireland and the Isle of Man. Though the Court itself has no 
mechanism for guaranteeing enforcement, states are generally 
unwilling to be seen to be overtly flouting its judgements. Thus 
in the 'Pout Box' case, Britain's response was to pursue 
negotiation with the Danish government, against whose industrial 
fishing the ban was directed, and to reach an agreement which 
enabled fishing to continue but in areas where the 'by-catch' of 
species for human consumption would be less. In other words the 
Court could act as "a catalyst for the political resolution of the 
conflict. "16 
Both the Commission and the Court have a rather technical 
flavour to them. However, the third Community institution of 
importance, the Assembly or Parliament, has a much more overtly 
political character, especially since its first election by direct 
universal suffrage in 1979. Though the Treaty only accords it 
limited "advisory and supervisory" powers (Article 137), it too 
plays its part in the blurring of the domestic and foreign policy 
arenas. As with the Commission this proved possible in part 
through institutional change. Thus the Agriculture Committee set 
up a fisheries working party of those members of the Parliament, 
who had a particular interest in or connection with the industry. 
The members of the committee were able to pick up pieces of 
information that came from the domestic industries and give them a 
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much wider airing, often designed to embarrass other member 
states. 
A good example of this political role came in March 1980, 
after ITV's 'World in Action' had transmitted a programme entitled 
'Spying for Survival'. In it a Hull trawler skipper visited 
Boulogne and claimed to have discovered large quantities of 
herring on the quayside, when there was supposed to be a complete 
ban on fishing for it. 
17 Immediately the Scottish MEP, Provan, 
set about showing the film in Strasbourg and writing a report to 
oblige the Commission to tighten up enforcement procedures. Nor 
were British MEPs the only ones who were active. During 1980 it 
emerged that Spanish vessels were registering in Britain and 
flying the British flag. 
18 
French fishermen alerted their own 
MEPs and Mrs. Le Roux,, a French Communist, invited the Commission 
to tell her what could be done about it. 
19 
Thus she and Provan 
could be seen to be representing fishing interests, the Commission 
could be obliged to take a position on national behaviour and the 
national governments could be forced to explain why such practices 
were permitted. 
However, the changes from the old NEAFC regime were not only 
visible in the role of the Commission, Court and Parliament: they 
were also seen in the more prominent role of national ministers. 
The Council, the body given the power by the Treaty to take 
decisions on the basis of Commission proposals (Article 145) 
brought the Fisheries Ministers of the member states together 
regularly from October 1976 onwards. Within the Council, under 
the so-called Luxembourg compromise of 1966, member states have 
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the right to veto any agreement which they see as contrary to 
their vital national interests. At the same time, it is important 
to recognise that the defence of those national interests takes 
place in a quite different environment from that provided by 
NEAFC. Ministers descend from meetings to explain how well they 
have defended their country's corner but they also know that next 
week or next month will see another meeting and that the pressure 
for some kind of agreement will increase: they are, if not 
'condemned to agree', at least obliged to think seriously of the 
consequences of failure to do so. This is all the more likely in 
an environment, where one state can withold something that another 
wants in a way that was not possible under the NEAFC arrangements. 
Such 'linkage politics' was particularly prevalent in the 
Council of Ministers in the context of the international 
agreements which the Commission was authorized to negotiate from 
1977 onwards. Throughout 1981, for example, Britain blocked a 
draft agreement with Canada for the period 1981-1986, which would 
allow Community vessels to catch a certain volume of fish off 
Canada in return for easier access of Canadian fish products to 
the Community. Though the agreement was critical for the German 
fleet, British fishermen saw in the agreement increased imports of 
cod from Canada which would undercut their own catch. Only 
through an improved system of protection against imports was it 
possible for the Community as a whole to sign the agreement and 
then it was once again endangered by an extraneous element: the 
Council adopted in March 1982 a ban on imports into the Community 
of seal pup skins, a measure originally urged by the European 
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Parliament. Canada bitterly resented the move and threatened to 
renege on the fishing agreement* 
20 
France, too, was aware of the possibilities of 'linkage 
politics'. She blocked an agreement with Norway, which was of 
particular importance to British fishermen, until her own desire 
to maintain access to the Faroes was granted. This in turn had 
been blocked by Britain, whose fishermen had effectively ceased to 
fish there and who saw an opportunity to exercise pressure on 
France to reach a more suitable settlement on the wider question 
of access to British waters. 
21 
However, it was not simply a question of the isolation of 
particular parts of the fisheries dossier. Other totally 
different issues could intrude, particularly at the apex of the 
Community's decision-making process, the thrice yearly meetings of 
Heads of State and Government in the European Council. To them 
the Council of Ministers regularly referred matters that it felt 
unable to resolve itself. In the Spring of 1980, the British 
government made a determined effort to settle the problem of 
Britain's budgetary contribution to the Community. At the 
European Council meeting, Mrs. Thatcher obtained an interim 
solution to the problem but the other leaders insisted as part of 
the bargain, on an agreement in principle to the establishment of 
a revised CFP by the end of the year. Though the UK government 
denied any link, on May 30 1980, the Council of Ministers did 
undertake to adopt "the decisions necessary to ensure that a 
common overall fisheries policy is put into effect at the latest 
on 1 January 1981. "22 The fact that the deadline was not met does 
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not detract from the fact that pressure for agreement was 
increased, following Britain's implicit acceptance of a 'package 
deal'. 
In sum, therefore, it was no longer possible for the 
fisheries issue to remain isolated as it had been under the NEAFC 
arrangements. A new set of institutions was prepared to challenge 
the role of governments as 'gatekeepers' between the domestic and 
foreign arenas and the right to autonomous decision that such a 
role implied. They delved into the domestic affairs of member 
states, allowing individuals and groups from one state to look at 
the behaviour of another without having to pass through 
governmental channels. Institutional interdependence had replaced 
sectoral politics as the environment for managing the issue. 
4. Britain and France within the EEC: divergent priorities 
Just as the economic changes that hit the fishing industry were 
not felt in precisely the same way by Britain and France, so the 
two countries responded rather differently to the abandonment of 
the old interstate arrangements and integration into the political 
processes of the EEC. Their interests in what an EEC policy could 
do for them and what they would have to do within such a policy 
were far from identical. To illustrate the point this section 
will look at the divergence in priorities of the two countries and 
the way in which that divergence developed from the inception of a 
Community policy in 1970 to the agreement on a revised policy in 
1983. 
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4.1 The initial phase 
Though the EEC was to become involved in a much wider management 
role than NEAFC in the fisheries arena, this did not happen right 
at the beginning of the Commmunity's development. Fish was 
defined as an agricultural product under Article 38(1) of the 
Treaty and was thus incorporated within the common market. 
However, during the 1960s this meant little more than a reduction 
in the tariffs existing between the original Six for trade in fish 
products. Only in 1966 did the Commission produce an initial 
report on a broader fishing policy and two more years passed 
before it presented any concrete proposals to the Council of 
Ministers. Even then there was substantial disagreement as to 
what a CFP should look like. 
How long the deadlock would have continued it is impossible 
to say. What is clear is that the prospect of four new states 
(Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom) - all of them 
with important fishing industries - applying to join the Community 
served as an important external spur to agreement. Though some 
countries, like Germany and Holland, wished to wait to discuss the 
matter with the prospective members, the view that prevailed was 
that expressed by the Dutch Commissioner, Mansholt: 
"the candidate countries have their own 
fishing policy; to discuss with them, the 
Community needs its own policy too. "23 
The result was an agreement on the basic principles of the 
CFP on June 30 1970, the very day before negotiations with the 
applicant states began. 
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British policy and attitudes towards the CFP were to be 
permanently marked by the character and timing of this agreement. 
Eight years later the British minister responsible for the 
negotiations on entry, Geoffrey Rippon, was to say that it was "an 
act of folly" on the part of the Community to confront Britain 
with the CFP in this way. 
24 
What made him and others so upset was 
that the original six had incorporated into Community law the 
principle of equality of access for all Community vessels into the 
waters of all Community countries. Thus as Article 2(1) of the 
relevant regulation put it: 
"The system applied by each Member State in 
respect of fishing in the maritime waters 
coming under its sovereignty or within its 
jurisdiction must not lead to differences in 
treatment with regard to other Member States. 
In particular, Member States shall ensure 
equal conditions of access to and exploitation 
of the fishing grounds situated in the waters 
referred to in the previous paragraph for all 
fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member 
State and registered in the Community 
territory. "25 
All of the applicant states were unhappy with this principle 
because they had much greater fishing interests than the Six: 
their total catch was three times higher, they had many more 
inshore fishermen in regionally sensitive areas and the fish 
stocks in their coastal waters were much larger. 
26 
It looked to 
the applicants like a piece of sharp practice on the part of the 
Six, guaranteeing them access to fish-rich waters, without being 
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obliged to take the interests of the coastal states concerned into 
account. 
As a result, all four of the applicants pressed for revision 
of the policy. A MAFF press release in September 1971 explained: 
'41MG consider it reasonable to ask the 
Community to recognise that the fisheries 
policy will require modification to meet the 
needs of an enlarged Community. "27 
However, along with the other applicant governments HMG was 
faced with a fait accompli which could not be modified 
substantially, if it was to be successful in gaining entry to the 
Community. There is little doubt that this dilemma was critical 
in determining the rejection of membership by Norway in a 
referendum in September 1972.28 There is also little doubt that 
the Heath government was determined not to allow the fisheries 
problem to block the conclusion of the Accession Treaty. 
Negotiations only began in June 1971 after all the other issues 
had been resolved and were not concluded until December, when the 
government had already in October received a parliamentary vote in 
favour of the terms of entry as presented in a White Paper 
produced the previous July. 
29 
The agreement that was reached on fisheries and incorporated 
in the Treaty of Accession (Articles 100-103) provided for 
'derogations' from the basic principle of equality of access until 
December 31 1982. Under this arrangement all member states could 
maintain a six mile fisheries limit around all of their coast, as 
well as a twelve mile limit in agreed areas, (which in Britain's 
94 
case covered 95% of her territorial fishing grounds), provided 
they allowed foreign fishermen with 'historic rights' to continue 
to exercise them. Though the government claimed a victory and 
maintained it would have a veto power in 1982, critics pointed out 
that it was in the nature of a derogation that it would lapse 
automatically and that the other members would have a veto over 
any arrangements to replace those agreed for the ten-year period 
up to 1983.30 As it transpired the situation changed dramatically 
before then but the events of 1970 and 1971 were to make the 
limits issue a critical one for Britain throughout the period of 
this study. 
For France, by contrast, the debate on limits was not one of 
such dispute. Certainly she pressed for agreement amongst the Six 
before the start of the enlargement negotiations. 
31 
But it is 
much less clear whether the idea of equality of access was central 
to that pressure. Her access to the fishing zones around Britain 
was in no way threatened by the existing narrow limits. Moreover, 
within France there was considerable argument as to whether 
equality of access might not conflict with the Treaty's provisions 
for non-discrimination. 
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Under such a regime fishermen operating 
in the waters of another state would be free from the constraints 
of that country's laws and therefore would enjoy a commercial 
advantage in as far as they escaped regulations on social security 
and conservation measures to which their competitors were subject. 
There was therefore support for the idea of freedom of 
establishment, whereby any ship could fish in the waters of any 
state, provided it registered in that state and accepted the 
constraints of national law that this implied. In the event, this 
95 
argument did not prevail but it underlines that equal access was 
not free from controversy, even amongst the Six, and that it could 
be challenged by the use of arguments couched in Community 
language. 
However, there is a further reason for supposing that access 
was not the central concern of France. She had been constantly 
worried about the effect of competition from other Community 
countries and was very eager to ensure that her fishing fleet 
would be guaranteed a degree of protection, particularly after 
February 1 1971, when the fish trade inside the Community was to 
be totally liberalised. It was pointed out that the French 
industry was poorly equipped to stand up to the other European 
industries, particularly that of Germany. Though the two 
industries were making roughly similar catches, France needed 
40,000 men to do it and Germany only 8,000. What is more, the 
Germans had a very modern fleet, while the French were desparately 
in need of finance to renew their ageing vessels. 
33 
The result was that she made it a condition of agreeing to a 
CFP that a system of market support be introduced. The system 
derived its inspiration from that operating in agriculture, with 
an interlinked set of withdrawal, guide, and reference prices. 
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It was designed to enable producers to be guaranteed a reasonable 
income and to be protected from low-priced imports from outside 
the Community. Under its provisions the Community provides 
compensation for a certain number of species if the market price 
falls below the withdrawal price and the fish have to be reduced 
to fish meal and oil. The withdrawal price itself is calculated 
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with reference to the guide price, a price established on the 
basis of what fish prices have been over the previous three years. 
Furthermore, if non-EEC imports fall below the reference price, 
they can be blocked to prevent loss of earnings by Community 
fishermen. 
In view of the difficulty of running such a scheme centrally, 
it was decided to adopt a procedure used in some sectors of EEC 
agricultural policy and to devolve responsibility to regional or 
local Producer Organisations (POs) within each of the member 
states. Their role is to manage the day-to-day operation of the 
price system and more generally, to ensure the orderly marketing 
of fish products. Again it was France that was most enthusiastic 
about the establishment of POs. As we shall see in Chapter 8, she 
already had equivalent institutions operating in the domestic 
arena and she pressed hard for the POs to be similarly structured 
and financed. The other states were by no means as keen - they 
feared an excessive degree of 'dirigisme' - but it was accepted 
that 50% of the money required to set up a PO would come from the 
Community, aid to be spread over the first three years of the 
organisation's existence. 
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At the same time, France was successful in getting agreement 
that money should become available from EEC funds to restructure 
national fishing fleets. Under these arrangements she was able to 
finance the conversion of her 'grande peche' fleet of salted 
cod and tuna ships into a predominantly freezer fleet. All 
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Community states, including France, were also authorised to grant 
national financial aids to the extent that they were necessary to 
achieve the aim of giving EEC fishermen "equal rights to carry out 
fishing operations. "36 
It is true that even at the time French observers were not 
unaware of the benefits of the equal access provision. As the 
President of the CCPM put it, 
"The entry of Britain into the Common Market 
will alter the status of its waters to our 
advantage, particularly after the ten year 
derogation period, when all its waters will 
become shared. "37 
However, 'equal access' was certainly not the dominant concern of 
French policy makers. Their main desire was to use the Community 
to protect French fishermen from the impact of market pressures. 
Within the United Kingdom, this aspect of EEC policy went largely 
unnoticed: the question of limits and access was seen as the 
important one and hence it was too easily considered to have been 
critical in the thinking of other member states. As a result the 
development of attitudes and policies were guided by very 
different logics over the years that followed: France saw the 
possibilities of gaining further economic support from the 
Community and pursued them very actively; Britain continued to 
believe that the policy had been biassed against her from the 
outset and sought to rectify that bias, adopting an essentially 
defensive posture. 
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4.2 The development of policy 
Though the regulations of 1970 established a base for Community 
policy development, important issues remained outside the EEC's 
sphere of competence. The EEC had no role from 1970 to 1977 in the 
agreement of conservation measures. These remained the preserve 
of NEAFC. Similarly, there was no question of the member states 
losing control of negotiations with third countries over fishing 
rights. In 1972 France negotiated a bilateral deal with Canada 
which offered guaranteed access for her cod fleet until 1986 and 
Britain pursued her conflict with Iceland in 1972-3 and 1975-6 to 
try to maintain access for her deep-sea fleet, both of them acting 
on a bilateral basis. Britain did use the Community forum to 
block a free trade agreement between the EEC and Iceland38 just as 
France obtained Community finance to renew the vessels sailing 
into Canadian waters. However, the Community remained for both a 
source of opportunities rather than constraints in their relations 
with third countries. 
At the same time, the two states continued to concentrate 
their attention on the aspects of Community policy which had been 
of most concern to them at the beginning of the 1970s: Britain on 
the issue of access, France on the question of markets. However, 
Britain found itself in a difficult situation because of the 
divided character of her interests in relation to the extent of 
fishing limits. The inshore industry was predominantly concerned 
to seek protection from the intrusion of foreign fishing vessels 
into British waters, and looked to the example of Norway which 
established a 50 mile limit after deciding not to join the EEC. 
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However, the deep-sea industry worked to maintain access to the 
waters of third states and saw Norway's non-membership as a severe 
blow to future fishing possibilities. As long as accepted 
international limits remained narrow, the conflict of interest 
between the two sections of the industry remained a potential one 
but from 1973 onwards the increasing acceptance at the UNCLOS III 
conference of 200 mile EEZs, and the Icelandic extension of limits 
to 200 miles in October 1975, combined to make the conflict an 
actual one. If individual countries had the right in 
international law to 200 mile EEZs, then the British deep-sea 
fleet had no right to continue to fish off Iceland whereas the 
inshore fleet could expect a wider zone free of foreign 
competition. 
The result was that Britain appeared to pursue different 
strategies in the EEC than in the wider international arena. In 
the latter, given her continuing conflict with Iceland, she could 
hardly abandon her traditional stance and she did not: 
"Until late in 1976 the UK followed the 
doctrine of customary international law that 
coastal states' exclusive rights to fisheries 
in the seas adjacent to their coasts should be 
confined to narrow limits, whether within a 
territorial sea or special fisheries zone, and 
that in the area of high seas beyond those 
limits freedom of fishing prevailed for all 
states. " 
39 
At the same time, negotiations were continuing in the Community on 
the proposal of the Commission, presented in February 1976, and 
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eventually agreed at the Hague in October, that there should be a 
joint extension of limits to 200 miles by EEC member states. That 
agreement effectively ended any chance of challenging the right of 
Iceland to claim a 200 mile limit and to exclude British deep-sea 
trawlers from her waters. 
However, at the same time as she was expelled from Icelandic 
waters, Britain found herself once again in difficulty over limits 
with her EEC partners because she was not in a position to claim a 
200 mile EEZ for herself. As she had agreed to the 'equal access' 
provision of the Treaty of Accession, subject to the ten-year 
derogation, it was politically impossible to take the kind of 
unilateral action that Iceland had taken. This was effectively 
recognised by the government when as early as May 4 1976, Roy 
Hattersley, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office called for 
EEC members to be given exclusive rights in zones varying in 
extent from 12 to 50 miles. 
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The effect was to reinforce 
concentration on the limits issue as well as the belief that 
Britain had been doubly penalised by expulsion from Iceland and 
membership of the EEC. 
The French, by contrast, never faced this same conflict over 
the question of limits. They quickly recognised the way 
developments were moving on the international stage. As early as 
1972 President Pompidou assured the leaders of the fishing 
industry that France would fight to ensure that the duties as well 
as the rights of coastal states would be considered at UNCLOS. 
41 
The leaders themselves acknowledged that France would have to 
agree to the establishment of EEZs but insisted that coastal 
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states be obliged to pay attention to 'droits acquis' or 
historic rights. 
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No effort was expended in fighting the spread 
of the EEZ idea but increasingly opinion hardened around the 
importance of maintaining access to British waters. After the 
Hague agreement Giscard d'Estaing made it quite clear that he 
favoured "the sharing of the resources of the sea" but not "the 
sharing of the sea" itself. 
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This position remained unchallenged 
in France throughout the years that followed. 
Despite the fact that the Community policy structure favoured 
France in the case of limits, it would be mistaken to suppose that 
French opinion was satisfied with the CFP in its pre-1977 form. 
The main interest remained, as it had been in 1970, the protection 
of the livelihood of French fishermen. In 1975 when economic 
change started to severely affect the fishing industry and to 
provoke the unrest that is to be discussed in Chapter 7, it was 
the EEC market arrangements which were widely condemned as 
inadequate. The three year reference period of the guide prices, 
for example, was seen as giving insufficient protection to the 
producer at a time of increasing inflation. At the same time, the 
protection against imports afforded by the reference price system 
was perceived as far too cumbersome. 
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Hence Cavaille, the 
Minister responsible, called strongly for the Community to take a 
more active stance in managing the fish market in the face of 
external disruption. 
45 
Though British fishermen were suffering 
many of the same effects, no major discussion took place in 
Britain as to the desirability of strengthening the EEC mechanism 
in this way: the opportunity was not perceived to exist. 
102 
4.3 The move towards a revised CFP 
After 1977 the debate broadened in that the Community was now 
responsible for negotiation with third countries and started to 
become involved in the establishment of conservation measures. The 
result was that attitudes towards the CFP became more variegated, 
but the basic themes of British and French thinking remained very 
much as they had been before. Whereas Britain wanted a lion's 
share of the fish available, France continued to favour the 
maintenance of the productive potential of her fishing fleet. 
In Britain it was recognised that joint Community action to 
exclude those states like the Soviet Union which refused to offer 
reciprocal access had been valuable. 
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However, the question of 
access to British waters by other Community countries continued to 
rankle. The Chairman of the WFA expressed a view which remained 
the dominant one: 
"Every mile that we were prepared to give up 
below 200 would represent a concession by 
Britain to all the partners. Here is the true 
test of the Community spirit. "47 
The result was that British demands changed only very gradually. 
By June 1977, John Silkin the Minister of Agriculture was calling 
for a twelve mile exclusive zone with 'dominant preference' in 
areas up to 50 miles from the coast. 
48 
and two years later in 
May 1979 when the Conservatives were returned to power the demand 
was vaguer but still insisted on an 'adequate' exclusive zone with 
a 'considerable' area of preferential access beyond. 
49 
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Moreover, the debate about limits became linked to a new one 
about Community conservation measures. During 1977 the EEC 
Commission took over the tasks of NEAFC and began to propose 
TACs for the species within the Community's 200 mile zone as a way 
of protecting the resource. It was faced with an initial British 
argument that because 60% of the Community catch came from British 
waters, Britain was entitled to 60% of the TACs. This was soon 
reduced to 45% but there was a major gap between the British claim 
and the first Commission offer of 31%. 
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Combined with her 
stance on 'dominant preference', Britain's position on quotas 
ensured that she was to remain in a minority of one until 1980, 
when movement towards a settlement started to be made. 
Throughout this period British opinion was almost universally 
obsessed with the inadequacy of the EEC's offers. There was a 
widespread feeling that TACs were quite useless as a mechanism for 
controlling catches. Over-fishing was attributed to the 
predations of the continental states and perceived as only 
controllable by the legal pressures of the coastal state. In the 
Trade and Industry Subcommittee, the Fisheries Secretary for 
Scotland argued that excessive catches were "something for which 
we can largely blame other countries"51and the Director-General of 
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the BFF commented that the behaviour of their fishermen made a 
mockery of the quota system: 
"... they find it to their advantage to evade 
the reporting system so that even if the 
Member State Government is anxious to produce 
accurate statistics, because evasion is 
practised, their figures are not even as 
accurate as they would like them to be .,, 
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Hence it was claimed that more than quotas was needed to control 
fishing. As only the coastal state had the resources to enforce 
rules, it should be the one to have the role of limiting catches 
through its own laws. As one report put it, "a pre-requisite for 
the conservation of fish is that self-denial must be rewarded or 
made compulsory. "53 TACs alone could not do this and hence the 
enthusiasm for the unilateral conservation measures which brought 
Britain into conflict with the European Court of Justice. 
Throughout this turmoil over limits and conservation, France 
maintained her position on the issue of 'historic rights', 
pointing out that Britain was claiming more than she had ever 
caught in the EEC zone and more than she had the ships to catch. 
"We, in France, cannot see how the British ... 
will be able to exploit all the resources they 
claim to monopolize. Why, moreover, exclude 
the French by arbitrary decision from these 
waters, when they have the men, the boats and 
all the essential know-how? Why not accept 
the real meaning of the Community? "54 
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However, French enthusiasm for 'equal access' was not without its 
inconsistencies during this period. The prospect that Spain 
might join the EEC was to provoke a defensive reaction which bore 
a distinct resemblance to the attitude of Britain towards the 
other member states. With French support, the Community 
negotiated an agreement with Spain which imposed increasingly 
severe limitations on the level of Spanish fishing activity in the 
Community zone, in particular, the Bay of Biscay. The hake quota 
which stood at 14,600 tonnes in 1977 fell to 8,300 tonnes in 1983, 
while the number of licences available to Spanish vessels declined 
over the same period from 266 to 123.55 
Even the Spanish issue, however, reflected the traditional 
French protectionist response which continued to permeate her 
attitudes towards the CFP. The conservation policy of the 
Community proved to be an area where the French were not eager to 
press for measures beyond the TACs. There was considerable dismay 
when in the summer of 1979 Walker, Silkin's successor at MAFF, 
introduced and enacted regulations on the mesh size of nets used 
for catching Norway lobster. The arrest of a number of Breton 
trawlers off the South Wales coast provoked considerable unrest in 
South Finistere and the Minister responsible, Le Theule, wrote to 
Walker complaining about the unilateral character of the measures 
taken. It was, though, more than simply a question of disliking 
unilateral action. 
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There was considerable suspicion in France 
about the effect on jobs of strict conservation measures, a 
suspicion reflected in this case by the willingness of the 
government to contribute to the costs of the vessels arrested. To 
put the matter another way, there was a general belief that 
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'biological criteria should not blind policy makers to 
socio-economic ones. '57 This was not to say that limits on 
catches could or should not be introduced but that they should be 
accompanied by financial help to keep the fishermen in business. 
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As we shall see in Chapter Five, this was to have a marked impact 
on the kind of aids that were considered legitimate as a form of 
government intervention. 
At the same time, the French continued to press for 
improvements in the market management arrangements. Following the 
outburst of protest by French fishermen in August 1980 (to be 
discussed in Chapter 7), Le Theule wrote to Gundelach, the Danish 
Commissioner responsible for fisheries, 'a memorandum on the 
common fisheries policy', in which he called for 
"a reshaping of the common market 
organisation, the mechanisms of which, agreed 
in 1970 at a time of relative plenty, have 
shown themselves to be less and less suited to 
cope with the situation of scarcity which now 
faces the Community's fishing industry .,, 
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The result of this pressure was that new arrangements were 
eventually adopted in December 1981. These included the 
possibility of an accelerated procedure for blocking imports, 
financial support for the stocking as well as the destruction of 
surpluses, and a new digressive subsidy for withdrawals, all of 
which were designed to bring about greater order to the market in 
fish as the French desired. 
60 
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Similarly, it was part of the deal which emerged between 1981 
and the beginning of 1983 that further help should be made 
available to assist in the restructuring of the Community's fleet. 
Again France was following the pattern which had been set in the 
early 1970s in seeking such support. Le Theule made it clear in 
1980 that he wanted the Community to have a stake in his country's 
efforts to redeploy the fishing fleet and about X10 million were 
found to support 'exploratory fishing' and 'joint ventures'. 
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This pattern of a deal which reflected the major concerns of 
the respective countries also proved accurate in the case of 
Britain. Despite some interest in the market arrangements, 
particularly when imports flooded in at the beginning of 1981, 
Britain's major efforts continued to be directed towards obtaining 
the best possible terms on access and conservation. Walker, with 
his Minister of State, Buchanan-Smith, was involved in an enormous 
number of meetings between 1979 and 1983 with the other states, and 
not just in Brussels. Over the period they had as many as 47 
bilateral meetings outside the formal Community framework in order 
to persuade the other governments to accord Britain a better 
deal. 
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The result of the ministers' efforts was that Britain 
obtained 37.3% of the stocks available in European waters, as 
compared with the 31% that she had been offered in 1977.63 On the 
question of access, an effective twelve mile limit, with the 
recognition of certain 'historic rights', was established. Other 
Community vessels could not fish 'up to the beaches' as the 1970 
accord allowed but preferential arrangements beyond the zone of 
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exclusive access were not very substantial. They were restricted 
to a licensing system to be applied in a box extending about 30 
miles out from the Orkney and Shetland islands. 
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As for 
conservation measures other than the quotas, the desire to 
strengthen enforcement procedures was reflected in agreement on a 
British proposal to set up a Community inspectorate. 
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Thus 
Britain, too, had some reason to be satisfied with the deal, even 
if Peter Walker's description of it as 'superb' was not 
universally appreciated. 
5. Conclusion 
It has been suggested in this chapter that economic change in the 
fisheries sector was accompanied by three developments: the 
breakdown of the pre-existing structure for managing the issue; 
the acceptance of a new structure posing particular problems for 
state autonomy; and the formulation of different responses to 
change within that structure. Management of the fisheries sector 
ceased to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial and 
became a much more complex task where the interrelated aspects of 
the problem were clearly visible and the source of extensive 
political pressure. At the same time, Britain and France 
responded in quite distinct ways to the new forum into which the 
issue was cast. For the former, the issues of access and later, 
conservation were uppermost, for the latter, the system for 
managing the market and structuring the industry was the dominant 
concern. Though the issue acquired increased importance in both 
countries, it did so for different reasons, determined by the 
aspect of the new status of the issue which was central to 
thinking in the country concerned. 
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However, the existence of these different responses raises 
the question of why they occurred and what prevented a 
reorientation. Why did Britain not take a greater interest in 
market and structural issues and what made France give them such a 
high priority? It will be argued in the following chapters that 
the answers lie within the entities 'Britain' and 'France', and 
can be found by considering the character of the relations that 
developed between government and fishing industry over the period 
of this study. Political interdependence and economic change 
generated the conditions for the choices to be made but they 
cannot themselves explain them: for this an understanding of the 
interaction between state and society is necessary. To start to 
achieve this understanding, the next chapter will consider the 
organisational framework linking governments and industry in the 
fishing arena in both countries and the evolution of that 
framework in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that both France and 
Britain were subject to certain constraints in the development of 
their fishing policies as a result of membership of the EEC but 
that these constraints did not lead to them pursuing the same 
policies. The differences between them remained at least as 
apparent as the similarities in the way they devoted their 
energies to contrasting priorities. 
As a prelude to understanding these differences the present 
chapter will look at the character of the relations existing 
between goverment and fishing industry in the two countries. The 
first section will outline the basic characteristics of the 
relationship between the state and the fishing industry in the two 
countries and the different institutional forms that that 
relationship took. The second section will consider the nature of 
the criticisms that were directed at the existing framework during 
the 1970s and the ways in which the basic framework was adapted to 
take account of those criticisms. The general conclusion will be 
that contrasting pluralist and corporatist logics operated in 
Britain and France and that these logics were critical in 
determining the range of possibilities within which responses to 
change could take place. 
L11 
2. The basic framework 
The difficulties that the fishing industries in Britain and France 
encountered during the 1970s were mediated by very different 
organisational arrangements. In France the state had always 
exercised a tight form of supervision or 'tutelle', which served 
both to separate the fishing industry from the rest of society and 
to act as an important force for homogeneity inside the industry. 
The system in Britain, by contrast, was marked by a more 
fragmented type of state involvement, which did not involve an 
active attempt to set a boundary between the industry and society 
in general or to limit its heterogeneity. To illustrate the 
difference this section will look in turn at the general character 
of the state's role in the two countries and the impact of that 
role on the particular institutions, which were designed to 
represent the interests of the industry. 
2.1 The role of the state 
The origins of the French tradition of supervision of the fishing 
industry can be traced back to the latter part of the 17th 
century. 
' At that time Colbert, the Chief Minister to Louis XIV 
was short of men for the navy. Instead of using the press-gang, 
as in Britain, he decided to establish a system of conscription, 
entitled 'inscription maritime'. Under the system, any 'marin', 
whether he was a fisherman or on a merchant ship, could be 
enlisted as and when he was needed to man the king's ships. The 
impact of the establishment of such a link between state and 
fishermen extended well beyond the navy's requirements for 
manpower. Fishermen were clearly separated from the rest of 
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society by what Colbert did: they were all registered by the state 
receiving a number and record card ('fiche matriculaire'), which 
followed them throughout their working lives. Over time the 
obligations of service in the navy grew less important but the 
system became firmly associated in the minds of fishermen with the 
help that the navy could offer in case of difficulty at sea. So 
favourable was the industry's view of the system that when in the 
1960s it was argued that the character of modern fighting ships 
made 'inscription maritime' outdated and unnecessary, there was 
uproar and De Gaulle himself was invited to intervene. He quashed 
government plans to abolish the time-honoured arrangements and 
allowed them to continue in an only slightly modified form. 
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However, there is more to the state's role than that of the 
registration of 'marins'. Every fisherman has to go through a 
training course before he can be registered. These courses are 
run by special technical colleges which are managed centrally by 
the state-sponsored Association de Gerance des Ecoles 
d'Apprentisage Maritime (AGEAM). The combination of a particular 
regime under state supervision is repeated in the nature of the 
benefits that all fishermen receive once they are registered. As 
early as 1709 a public body, the Etablissement National des 
Invalides de la Marine (ENIM) was set up to provide social support 
for all 'marins'. ENIM has survived to this day and continues to 
guarantee special treatment for fishermen. Under ENIM rules, for 
example, it became possible for a fisherman to get a pension at 
55, when the age under general social security legislation was 
65.3 At sea, too, fishermen have been aware of the benefits of 
close ties with the state. Vessels sailing far afield were 
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regularly guaranteed medical and other help from support ships, 
organised by the industry but backed out of public finance. 
Ironically, British ships were regularly obliged to turn to these 
vessels for assistance in that they were rarely accompanied by 
support ships, except in the special circumstances of the 'Cod 
Wars' with Iceland. 
4 
British arrangements in all these areas have been much more 
decentralised with much less stress on the separateness of the 
fisheries arena. Medical provision at sea, for example, has been 
based on the principle of someone on board having responsibility 
for the treatment of injuries. Education, too, has seen only 
limited attempts at central direction: the level and character of 
provision depends chiefly on local and regional initiative, at the 
prompting of the semi-public, White Fish Authority (WFA), rather 
than the central Ministry. 
Similarly, the notion that fishermen should be subject to a 
common system of social benefits distinct from those of the rest 
of the population is very underdeveloped in Britain. Fishermen in 
the inshore and deep-sea industries, for example, have never been 
considered as directly comparable in terms of the character of 
their employment. The former are categorized as self-employed, 
while the latter, always employed on a casual basis, have been 
placed on to a special register of the Department of Employment, 
from which they are removed if they do not go to sea for six 
months. 
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It is true that inshore men have certain privileges: 
they are allowed to stamp their own national insurance cards and 
pay a special social security rate between that of the 
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self -employed and the employed. 
6 
However, these remain 
derogations from a general regime applicable to all rather than 
the embodiment of a self-contained set of rights and duties for a 
particular professional category. In this sense the establishment 
and maintenance of the system of 'inscription maritime' underlines 
the French state's effort to separate the fishing industry from 
the rest of society in a way which has found no echo in Britain. 
The situation becomes still clearer if we look at the way in 
which the state's relationship with fishermen has been channelled 
through governmental institutions. The fragmented character of 
the treatment of fishermen in Britain is underlined by the way in 
which responsibility is split between departments. Within England 
and Wales it is the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF) that is responsible, in Scotland the Department of 
Agriculture and Food in Scotland (DAFS) and in Northern Ireland 
the Department for Agriculture in Northern Ireland (DANI). The 
fact that each of these institutions is concerned to enforce 
legislation in the waters adjoining its own areas of 
responsibility means that fishermen can be faced with different 
sets of civil servants depending on where they are fishing. The 
Scottish boats that fished for mackerel off the Cornish coast, for 
example, were obliged to deal with MAFF as well as their parent 
department, DAFS. The very fact that two ministries were 
involved, ministries with different . priorities, traditions and 
reputations, illustrates how hard it is for British fishermen to 
conceive of the state as anything other than fragmented. 
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Such a fragmented view is out of the question in France where 
fisheries have always been under the umbrella of a single 
ministry, in general, the Ministry of Transport. More 
importantly, within the Ministry, fisheries has traditionally been 
part of a separate set of maritime-related sections. Three 
directorates concerned with the commercial fleet, the 
administration of all 'marins' and ENIM functioned alongside the 
Fisheries Directorate in a structure entitled until 1978, the 
General Secretariat of the Merchant Marine (SGMM). 
7 
Moreover, 
within the SGMM a separate cadre of civil servants was developed 
with their own equivalent of the 'grandes ecoles', the Ecole des 
Administrateurs Maritimes (EAM), based in Bordeaux. The shifting 
pattern of administrators in Britain is quite alien to France 
where the products of EAM may move between the maritime sectors 
but few outsiders come to disturb the privileged link between them 
and the sectors, including the fishing industry, for which they 
are responsible. 
The importance of the maritime administrators becomes still 
clearer when one goes from Paris to the regions. As the Economic 
and Social Council (CES) pointed out in its study of the fishing 
industry in 1976, the prefects traditionally had no authority over 
or responsibility for the work of these officials. Just as the 
fishermen themselves were linked to the navy by the system of 
'inscription maritime', so the maritime administrators had a 
quasi-military status, which put them outside the reach of the 
prefects. 
8 
They enjoyed considerable independence both at the 
regional level, implementing their own division of France into 
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four and then six directorates (cf p 68 above) and at the port 
level dealing directly with 'marins' through the committee 
structure to be discussed below. 
The comparison between the local maritime administrators 
and port-based fisheries inspectors in Britain is useful in 
elucidating very different conceptions of the state's relations 
with a sector of society. In both cases, there is close contact 
with fishermen based on shared maritime backgrounds but the nature 
of that contact is very different. The main concern of the 
British inspectors is to collect fishing statistics and to 
administer laws on quotas, net sizes, licences, etc., in other 
words, to deal with fishermen in their capacity as catchers of 
fish. 
9 
By contrast, the French administrators are dealing with 
fishermen both in a wider context and over a wider range of 
issues. They are responsible for law enforcement in respect of 
all maritime matters, including merchant shipping and pleasure 
craft as well as fishing vessels. At the same time, they are 
concerned with more than the catching side of the fisherman's 
life. They issue and manage the 'fiches matriculaires' for 
enrolling 'marins', they look after their training, they act as 
arbitrators in disputes, they even have the job of informing wives 
when their husbands are lost at sea. 
' 
In other words, they come 
to represent an integral part of the fisherman's life and to 
personify the state's 'tutelle' over it. The British fishery 
inspector has a much less wide-ranging role, the other aspects of 
the fisherman's life being the concern of separate departments 
like the Departments of Employment and Social Security or other 
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non-state bodies like technical colleges. The British state 
within the fisheries sector is therefore confirmed as much more 
fragmented, and much less concerned to establish a corporate 
identity for this sector of society, than its French counterpart. 
2.2 Representative institutions 
The institutional mechanisms which have been developed for 
representing the interests of the industry in the two states are 
also quite different. Whereas in France those interests have been 
channelled through a set of state-sponsored institutions, in 
Britain diversity of interest has been allowed full expression 
with minimal state interference. 
The representative structure in France took shape in the 
1930s at a time of severe economic difficulty for the industry. 
It turned to the government for help and the result was the 
creation of a series of port-based fisheries committees. During 
the Second World War, under the Vichy regime, the arrangements 
were extended and then, after the Liberation, suitably amended and 
codified under Decree No. 45.1813 of 14 August 1945.11 The '1945 
Decree', as it is still regularly referred to, formed the basis of 
the representation of the fisheries' interests throughout the 
post-war period. Under it, the state established a whole series 
of committees covering the local, regional and national arenas 
each designed both to consult the industry and to help to manage 
the fisheries sector. However, the industry was not left free to 
determine how these roles should be carried out. The decree laid 
down as basic principles that membership be compulsory, 
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'interprofessionel' i. e covering all sectors of the industry and 
'syndicale' i. e involving the unions active in the industry. At 
the same time, the state was guaranteed access to the 
deliberations of this consultative structure. 
In Britain, by contrast, similar economic pressures produced 
a very different state response: a clear distinction between the 
representative and management functions was maintained. Two 
statutory, semi-public bodies, the Herring Industry Board (HIB) 
and the White Fish Authority (WFA), set up in 1935 and 1951 
respectively, were established to deal with the economic 
difficulties of the industry, while the mechanisms of consultation 
within the industry were left untouched. No attempt was made to 
integrate the range of interests involved, nor to give the state a 
direct role in the deliberations of those interests. The contrast 
becomes still clearer by looking more closely at what the 
structures look like in the two countries. 
In France the peak of the consultative structure is the 
Central Committee for Sea Fisheries (CCPM). 12 Within this 
committee there are currently 75 voting members made up as 
follows: 40 from the catching sector, 31 from the processing and 
distribution sectors and 4 from_the shellfish industry. It is 
specifically laid down that all parts of the catching sector be 
represented: inshore and deep-sea industries, as well as owners, 
officers and crews. 
13 
In addition, 11 civil servants have the 
right to attend, though not the right to vote: they come from the 
ministry directly concerned with fisheries as well as those with 
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an interest in the sector, including the Ministries of Finance, 
Supply and Industrial Production. 
14 
The President of the 
Committee may himself be a civil servant, like Dubreuil, who took 
office in the autumn of 1974 and was still in post at the end of 
the period of this study. If not from the industry, the President 
too has no vote. 
This lack of voting rights does not mean a lack of state 
influence. The civil servants on the committee do have the right 
of veto, while the Minister responsible for the industry can play 
an important role. He is responsible for the annual appointment 
or reappointment of the President and he must also formally 
confirm the decisions that the whole committee takes. If he takes 
exception to its actions, he has the power to modify its reports 
or even to suspend its operations. 
15 
The powers of the CCPM are more those of consultation and 
coordination than of direct management. It has the task of 
watching over the activities of the local and regional committees, 
of proposing ways to improve the standard quality of fishing 
vessels, methods of fishing and marketing and more generally, of 
investigating any measures that could benefit the industry as a 
whole. However, it does have the right to propose the level of an 
'ad valorem' duty payable by all those selling fish to cover the 
costs of administration of the various committees, as well as the 
maintenance of a fund for promoting the consumption of fish. 
16 
120 
This last point offers a direct comparison with the WFA and 
HIB. 17 All members of the UK industry, catchers, merchants and 
processors, were obliged from the outset to contribute to the 
running of these bodies and to the encouragement of fish 
consumption by means of a levy on fish, equivalent to that payable 
in France. However, there was no membership link established 
between the WFA and HIB, on the one hand, and the industry on the 
other. Indeed industry representatives were specifically excluded 
from belonging to their governing boards on the grounds that this 
would undermine the independence of such semi-public bodies. By 
the same token, no state representatives could sit on the boards, 
thus isolating their members from the two forces (i. e state and 
industry) around which the French structure revolves. 
However, the two British bodies were given major financial 
powers 'to reorganize, develop and regulate the industry' which 
went beyond anything available to the CCPM. They were responsible 
for the award of grants and loans for the construction or 
improvement of vessels, transmitting money coming from the 
Treasury at a slightly higher rate than that requested by the 
Treasury for repayments. 
18 To do this, they established a set of 
regional officers whose job it was to adjudicate on the requests 
made by individual catchers. Such requests in France remained 
outside the purview of the CCPM and firmly under ministerial 
control, every dossier having to be submitted to Paris for a 
decision. 19 
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However, the HIB and WFA were given no role in the day-to-day 
management of the fishery: like the CCPM, they could study ways of 
improving fishing but they could not establish, even at regional 
level, rules by which fishermen were legally bound in the pursuit 
of their livelihood. By contrast, beneath the CCPM in France, the 
1945 Decree set up bodies which reflected the national committee 
in composition, but were given formal powers to establish 
legally-binding rules. 
Thus at the national level, a set of nine Interprofessional 
Committees (comites interprofessionels) was established to cover 
each of the sea products gathered by French fishermen. 
20 These 
committes are structured similarly to the CCPM: there are 
representatives from all the different sections of the industry; 
there is a Ministry representative who has a right of veto, though 
not the right to vote; and there is also a President, appointed by 
the management board rather than the Minister, as in the case of 
the CCPM. 
Despite being organised nationally, many of these committees 
have a strong regional orientation. In the case of herring, for 
example, it is only ports on the North coast that are involved and 
even when more than one region is concerned, as in the case of 
sardines or demersal fish, there are subcommittes for each of 
those regions. As a result, they are more directly concerned with 
the specific problems of sections of the industry than the CCPM 
and this closer link is confirmed in the powers that they 
possess* 
21 
They were empowered by the 1945 Decree to fix the 
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opening and closing dates of fishing seasons, to determine the 
number of vessels allowed to fish, to regulate the number of 
voyages, to establish minimum quality standards and to set up any 
other bodies that might help vessels to operate more effectively. 
The same kind of stress on direct management, though not 
through legally-binding rules, can be seen in the provisions 
relating to Local Committees (comites locaux) or Regional 
Committees (comites regionaux), where there is a grouping of Local 
Committees. 
22 They were given the task of creating and managing 
collective services, such as cooperatives and auctions as well as 
organising the share-out of fuel and supplies for vessels. In the 
tradition of 'inscription maritime', they were also invited to 
take initiatives in the training of 'marins', and more generally, 
to seek improvements in social conditions. The state's commitment 
to such a role extending beyond consultation is confirmed even at 
this local level by the right of the maritime administrator in 
the area to attend and to exercise a veto, should he choose. 
In Britain, by contrast, the presence of the state at 
regional or local level is confined to the fishery inspectors, who 
as indicated above (p116) have a less wide-ranging set of links 
with the industry than their counterparts in France. At the same 
time, their task is to implement regulations and not to devise new 
ones. The only British bodies that could be remotely compared to 
the Interprofessional, Regional and Local Committees are the Sea 
Fisheries Committees which exist in England and Wales, though not 
in Scotland. They are committees of one or more County Councils, 
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who have the power to make bye-laws, subject to ministerial 
approval, prohibiting fishing in coastal waters and imposing 
limits on the size of fish caught. However, they have never 
formed as integral a link between state and industry as the 1945 
Decree institutions have done in France. 
23 
To understand more fully the importance of the 1945 
institutions in France and the extent of the contrast with 
Britain, it is necessary to return to the principles of membership 
mentioned earlier, namely that the French structure is 
'interprofessionel' and 'syndicale'. It is part of the philosophy 
of the 1945 institutions that all sections of the fishing industry 
should be obliged to sit around the same table. This unitary 
conception of the industry is absent in Britain, not because the 
characteristics of the industry are different but because there 
has been no concerted attempt on the part of the state to overcome 
the problem of differential access of groups within society to the 
state apparatus. Within France the recognition of this kind of 
problem was what led to the establishment of the CES in 1925, 
following the demand of the General Confederation of Labour (CCT) 
to have direct links with government. 
24 
Thus the CCPM structure 
formed part of a wider tradition, a tradition totally absent in 
Britain. 
Apart from obliging the catching sector to sit down with 
merchants and processors, the 1945 Decree was directed, to 
ensuring access for both the inshore industry and the unions. In 
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both countries the deep-sea sector with its company-owned boats 
has always enjoyed natural advantages of scale and concentration. 
Thus in France, even after 1945, the owners of 'la peche 
industrielle' maintained their own separate organization, based in 
Paris, the Union of French Fishing Boat Owners (UAP), which was 
never matched by an equivalent body for 'la peche artisanale'. 
For the inshore boats, the 1945 institutions guaranteed formal 
parity, with their 20 seats matching the 20 of the deep-sea 
industry even if, as some argue, the deep-sea industry maintained 
its effective dominance, without appearing to. 
25 
In Britain, by contrast, until the 1970s, the dominance of 
the deep-sea industry was in no way concealed. It grouped 
together the owners not on a national basis but in bodies which 
reflected the governmental split between MAFF and DAFS. In 
England and Wales, it was the British Trawlers' Federation (BTF), 
based in Hull, which represented the owner interest and in 
Scotland, it was the Aberdeen-based Scottish Trawlers' Federation 
(STF). As for the inshore industry, it remained completely 
fragmented, rarely able to transcend the differences between 
individual ports or regions. In Scotland, there had been a 
national grouping in the post-war period but it broke down in 1948 
in the face of divergent interests* 
26 
In England and Wales, the 
only wider form of association was the Fisheries Organisation 
Society Ltd., a body almost entirely financed by the government. 
27 
However, it was not strictly a representative of the inshore 
interest but an institution set up in 1914 by the government 'to 
foster the propagation of cooperative principles amongst inshore 
125 
fishermen'. In other words, no specific attempt was made by the 
state in Britain to overcome the low level of access of the 
inshore industry to the policy process as happened in 1945 in 
France: the whole framework of consultation was much less formal, 
much more haphazard. As one Fisheries Secretary at DAFS put it: 
"we tended to follow the line of consulting everybody who we 
thought had something to say. "28 
A similarly detached attitude can be observed in British 
attitudes towards union involvement in representation of the 
industry. As there was no prescribed right to consultation but 
only consultation by invitation, it was possible for 
representatives of the Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU), the only union with members in the catching sector, to 
feel excluded, even if not actually to be so. 
29 
It is true that 
membership was never high and did not extend outside the deep-sea 
industry. Even amongst deep-sea employees, there was a clear 
division between the crews, on the one hand, and the officers and 
captains, on the other. The latter were generally represented by 
port-based Trawler Officer Guilds (TOGs). As for the inshore 
industry, it remained firmly opposed to any union encroachment: in 
Scotland, as we have seen (see p 70 above), the fishermen went so 
far as to move their operations from Aberdeen to Peterhead to 
avoid having to pay for the unloading of their ships by union 
labour. 
At first sight, the unions in France would appear to suffer 
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from at least as many handicaps as the TGWU. Their membership has 
also never been high and been very much concentrated in particular 
ports and regions. What is more, there is not one but three 
unions competing for membership: the CGT, the French Democratic 
Confederation of Labour (CFDT) and the French Federation of 
Professional Maritime Unions (FFSPM). In theory, the wider 
conflict between the two leftist unions in France, the 
Communist-inclined CGT and the Socialist-inclined CFDT is 
reproduced in the fisheries sector and complicated by the 
involvement of an independent union, the FFSPM. However, the 1945 
Decree wished to rectify the arrangements established under the 
Vichy regime, where only one union was permitted to represent the 
employees in the industry. This overtly corporatist practice was 
modified by introducing union competition but in effect, the three 
unions mentioned were given the monopoly right to nominate the 20 
employee representatives of the industry (10 for the deep-sea, 10 
for the inshore) on the basis of their relative strengths in 
work-place elections. In this way, whatever their membership 
levels, the unions were firmly incorporated into the consultative 
structure and given a direct stake in its maintenance. Such were 
the consequences of the French state shaping the representative 
institutions in the fisheries sector, a process without parallel 
in the British context. 
3. The effects of a changing environment 
In both countries, economic change in the 1970s provoked 
dissatisfaction with the basic institutions available for 
representing the interests of the industry. The criticisms had 
two main elements, one questioning the effectiveness of the 
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existing institutions to cope with new challenges, the other 
drawing attention to the overall institutional strength of the 
fisheries sector in relation to other sectors of the economy. The 
different traditions which had prevailed hitherto meant, however, 
that the content of the criticisms was very different in the two 
countries as indeed was the response that they evoked. In Britain 
the moves forward were firmly in the pluralist tradition with its 
stress on the development of competing, voluntary organisations, 
restricted to the transmission of grievances; in France, the 
corporatist ideology of a unified sector was extended by the 
creation of new bodies expressing that unity, with an emphasis on 
the economic protection of the industry. Here the two countries 
will be considered in turn. 
3.1 The British experience 
As the 1970s progressed, there was a growing recognition of the 
disadvantages of the fragmentation of the fishing industry in 
Britain. From a governmental point of view, the process of 
consultation became increasingly difficult and compared very 
unfavourably with other sectors in its complexity. Whereas, the 
food and drink industry, for example, has 18 branches but 
represents its views through a single body, in fishing practically 
the reverse is true, with one branch, the catching sector, 
sprouting a plethora of representative institutions. 
30 
Hence 
civil servants openly favoured closer links between the various 
institutions. Kelsey, the Fisheries Secretary at MAFF from 
1976-1980, commented to the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee: 
"there is scope for shortening lines of communication; concerting 
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a line of action would certainly make them more quickly effective 
in these days of fast-moving decisions .,, 
31 
And when the Committee 
reported, it went as far as the voluntarist tradition would 
permit, in backing Kelsey's line: "we think that the industry 
should be encouraged to consolidate its representative 
"32 institutions to the greatest extent that it finds practicable. 
The industry itself did respond to this kind of urging: it 
recognised the need for increased political strength through 
greater unity. As early as 1973, six local associations in 
Scotland combined to form the Scottish Fishermen's Federation 
(SFF) and it expanded during the 1970s to include nearly all the 
inshore boats in Scotland. With earnings of about £50,000 per 
year, it was able to set up an office in Edinburgh with a small 
full-time staff and to start producing a newsletter, informing 
members of its lobbying activities. Despite strong disputes 
between the constituent members, the SFF remained a permanent 
feature throughout the period of this study. 
Even within the deep-sea industry the threat of expulsion 
from Icelandic waters led to the merger of the BTF and the STF in 
September 1976. The British Fishermen's Federation (BFF) 
incorporated the high level of organisation and professionalism of 
its predecessors, as epitomised by its Director-General Austen 
Laing. However, it was faced with the prospect of decline, as the 
deep-sea fleet itself shrank. In May 1979 the newspaper of the 
Federation, Trawling Times was wound up and in 1983 Laing himself 
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retired. Finally, in March 1984, the Federation was disbanded, 
when there were hardly any interests left to represent. 
Within the inshore industry in England and Wales, the 
difficulties encountered at the beginning of 1975 led to pressure 
for a single voice. The search was complicated by the existence 
of the FOS, which claimed already to be doing this job. However, 
quite apart from its financial dependence upon government, its 
members were concentrated regionally in the South West, even 
though its headquarters were in Surrey. In the North, in 
particular there was no confidence in the FOS and in May 1977, the 
National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations (NFFO) was set 
up, covering England north of a line from Grimsby to Fleetwood. It 
slowly increased its influence at the expense of the FOS and by 
1979 it was actively considering joining the SFF and BFF in the 
European pressure group'Europeche at a cost of £1,333 per year, a 
clear indication of the relative health of its finances. 
33 
By 
1983 its full-time officials had become regular attenders at the 
Council meetings in Brussels, even though it remained overshadowed 
by the larger Scottish body, the SFF. By contrast, the FOS failed 
to survive the cutting of the government grant in 1980 and went 
out of existence in May 1982.34 
However, it was not simply a question of how best to unite to 
transmit the views of the industry to government. There was also 
considerable debate as to the quality of the governmental 
institutions and their capacity to defend the industry adequately. 
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This debate revolved around the ministries responsible for 
fisheries and the role of the WFA and HIB. 
Criticism of the governmental apparatus concentrated, in 
particular, on MAFF in London: DAFS in Edinburgh received a better 
press, being seen as closer to the fishermen geographically and in 
spirit. The two fishery divisions of MAFF, by contrast, drew fire 
from every quarter for their level of competence, the nature of 
their allegiances and their ability to defend the industry. There 
was a general feeling that these divisions were weak both in 
number and quality, summed up in the Commons by John Nott, the 
Conservative member for St. Ives: 
"Having had ten years' experience of trying to 
help the fishing industry in my constituency, 
I know of no more feeble department in 
Whitehall than the fisheries side of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food" 
However hard one tries, one experiences 
difficulty in getting positive and 
', 35 constructive action out of that department. 
This jaundiced view of MAFF was compounded by a feeling that 
the department was biassed in favour of the owners: its officials 
were described to the author as 'the lackeys of the English 
deep-sea companies', 
36 
a charge which underlines the geographical 
as well as the functional fissures in the British industry. 
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Perhaps most persistent was criticism of the ability of the 
MAFF fishery divisions to defend the industry. In part this was 
linked to the traditional British complaint of the lack of 
continuity in the civil service, where fish can be just an 
interlude between the Treasury and tourism. 
37 
More important was 
the question of the relative weight of the fisheries interest 
within MAFF. Johnson, the Hull West MP, argued in the Commons in 
1975 that "fishing is the Cinderella in comparison with its 
massive partner agriculture in that office in Whitehall. "38 For 
him this was confirmed by the fact that at the Dublin Summit of 
EEC Heads of Government of March 1975, which agreed on the 
renegotiated terms of British membership of the Community, fishing 
was not even on the agenda. 
The result of this final criticism, in particular, was to 
create some pressure for a separate Ministry of Marine Resources, 
within which it was thought that the fishing interest would not be 
swamped. However, it never became a major issue. Silkin, the 
Minister responsible for MAFF, dismissed it as irrelevant, 
maintaining that the important thing was the "very large 
expertise", built up over many years by the Ministry. 
39 
Thereafter the issue effectively disappeared, though this is not 
to say that there were no institutional changes within the 
government machine. By 1979 the number of fisheries divisions 
within MAFF had expanded from 2 to 4, reflecting the concerns of 
the government as stressed in the previous chapter. Thus new 
divisions were set up to deal with the Law of the Sea and fishery 
limits as well as fishery protection and quota management. 
40 
The 
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fishing industry, however, remained firmly anchored within MAFF. 
The final area of criticism and change was the activities of 
the WFA and HIB. These bodies had always been the subject of some 
dispute within the industry. Fish merchants, in particular, were 
dissatisified with having to contribute to the running of bodies 
whose spending was concentrated on the activities of the catching 
sector. 
41 
Indeed even within government there was uncertainty as 
to whether they were the appropriate institutions for the job. As 
long ago as 1961 the Fleck report had recommended that they should 
at least be merged and in the early 1970s, Prior, the Minister of 
Agriculture, had wanted to go further and to dismantle them 
altogether. 
42 
These difficulties assumed larger proportions as the problems 
of the industry increased. The two bodies were caught between 
their clients, the industry and their creators, the government. 
They found it hard to develop a new role in the context of 
economic change, particularly as the provision by them of grants 
and loans for boat building and improvement was undermined by a 
drastic reduction in government money. In his evidence to the 
Trade and Industry Sub-Committee, Meek, the Chairman of the WFA, 
suggested that by the late 1970s, the most important functions of 
the Authority were research and development, the development of 
fish farming and publicity, arguing that these were jobs that "the 
industry cannot do very well for itself. "43 He implicitly 
acknowledged the limited nature of these functions by favouring an 
increased role for the Authority, including larger funds for 
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financing advertising and the devolution of licensing powers to it 
from the government. 
The problem with developing the powers of the WFA and HIB 
was the fishermen themselves. They resented any notion of 
excessive independence on the part of the two bodies. When the 
Chairman of the HIB suggested in 1975 that the fishermen should 
not press for an exclusive 50 mile limit until the resolution of 
the EEZ issue at UNCLOS III, he was roundly condemned. As one 
fisherman put it: 
"We feel that a chairman of the HIB should be 
a liaison officer between the Government and 
the fishermen and as such, his opinion should 
represent the trade as a whole. He should 
never be placed in the position where he is 
obliged only to speak of the Government's 
policy. " 
44 
Perceived as 'liaison officers', the WFA and HIB could hardly 
expect the fishermen to favour an increase in their powers. The 
incentive for such an increase was in any case lacking. More 
publicity, for example, could only come if the levy on landed fish 
was higher but that levy could only be higher if the fishermen 
themselves increased their contribution, something they were not 
enthusiastic to do. 
Furthermore, the fishermen themselves were given the 
opportunity under EEC legislation to extend their own powers by 
establishing producer organizations (POs) (cf p 96 above): these 
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effectively weakened the WFA and HIB by allowing producers to take 
unto themselves day-to-day marketing and management. 
45 
Very 
quickly some POs were able to develop an organisational 
sophistication that made the ordinary representative institutions 
look very primitive. The £50,000 per year earnings of the SFF 
with its full time complement of two (one man and his secretary) 
were rather insignificant when set against the plush opulence of 
the biggest PO in Britain, the Scottish Fishermen's Organisation 
Ltd (SFO). In 1979 it had earnings of £300,000 with 12 full-time 
employees in its Edinburgh office and 18 port officers. Such 
earnings were similar to the total publicity budget of the WFA for 
the whole country. 
46 
Fishermen were still contributing to the WFA 
by paying the levy on landings but the role of the SFO in 
supporting prices offered a more tangible benefit than the rewards 
of advertising, offered by the WFA. 
Eventually the merger of the WFA and HIB, mooted 20 years 
earlier, took place when on 1 October 1981, the Sea Fish Industry 
Authority (SFIA) came into existence. It was not, however, a body 
that was given major new powers over the industry in general, or 
the POs in particular. Rather it introduced a new kind of mood, 
epitomised by the replacement of the ex-colonial servant, Charles 
Meek, with the former sales director of Raleigh bikes, Peter 
Seales. The Board structure was modified with industry interests 
allowed to join and the ethic of business enterprise was developed 
with an advertising campaign transported around the country by 
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train. Not all were happy with this break with the past: indeed 
after mass sackings of staff, Seales himself resigned in 1983 
amidst a general feeling that the removal of the old institutions 
had been far from an unqualified success. Britain seemed better 
able to find fault with existing institutions than to imbue new 
ones with a clear sense of purpose: this was not the case in 
France. 
3.2 The French experience 
In contrast to British complaints about the fragmented 
representation of the fishing industry, the debate in France 
revolved around the ability of the 1945 institutions and the 
ministry that exercised supervision over them to respond to 
economic change. The problem was not one of how best to transmit 
the views of the industry but of how to modify the structure to 
make it more dynamic. The institutional separation of the 
industry from the rest of society no longer appeared as a 
guarantee of privilege but of isolation and neglect. 
The thrust of the main criticisms was contained in the 
report prepared for the Economic and Social Council (CES) by J. 
Martray, following the unrest in the industry at the beginning of 
1975. The CES underlined the isolation of the fishing industry by 
noting that it was producing a report on that industry, despite 
the absence of any fishing representative on the Council. 
47 
it 
went on to argue that the 1945 institutions were not just isolated 
from the mainstream of political life but were quite incapable of 
coping with the new pressures with which they were faced. The 
CCPM had, according to Martray, been "paralyzed" by the 1975 
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disturbances, serving only as "a platform for the often 
conflicting demands of the various groups represented on it. "48 
At the same time, the report criticised the SGMM as a relatively 
ineffective defender of the fishing interest, especially when 
compared with its equivalent in other countries. It rejected the 
idea of integrating fisheries into the agriculture ministry, 
arguing that the problems were different and that the larger 
interest was likely to swamp the smaller one. However, it did 
favour the establishment of a Ministry of the Sea, thus putting 
the idea on to the political agenda for the years that followed. 
49 
The response of the government in institutional terms was an 
implicit acknowledgement of the validity of the CES criticisms 
concerning the capacities of the 1945 institutions. As early as 
February 1975 the industry was pressing for a national 
organisation to control the fish market, comparable to that 
existing for agriculture, and at the beginning of the following 
year, the Prime Minister, Chirac, announced the creation of the 
Market Intervention and Organisation Fund for Sea Fisheries and 
Shellfish Culture (FIOM). 
50 
FIOM was given two main tasks, the 
first of which was to intervene and to help to manage the fish 
market. 
51 
This meant support for prices, control of surpluses to 
avoid their destruction, encouragement of deals between producers 
and processors, help in the search for export markets and backing 
for fish publicity. Its second task was to direct fishing towards 
new zones and species by backing experimental voyages. The 
exercise of these two roles will be considered in more detail in 
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Chapters 5 and 8 but here it is necessary to consider the 
character of the relationship existing between FIOM and the other 
institutions in government and the industry. 
First of all, FIOM is not a semi-public body like the SFIA 
but firmly under the 'tutelle' of the ministry. Thus in a manner 
reminiscent of the CCPM the 26 members of its Management Council 
include 6 civil servants as well as 18 representatives of the 
industry. Its establishment was partly seen as gaining the 
benefits of such a 'tutelle', whilst avoiding the bureaucratic 
rigidities of the Ministry. Thus from the outset it received a 
large state subsidy (about 57 million FF in 1976), whilst being 
able to spend that money through relatively uncomplicated 
budgetary procedures. 
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Secondly, again unlike the SFIA or its predecessors, FIOM 
came to establish close links with the producer organisations 
provided for under EEC legislation. In France the system of POs 
had already assumed an important level of coherence before the 
establishment of FLOM. In April 1975,15 inshore and 3 deep-sea 
POs, covering 90% of the industry had decided to get together to 
form a National Association of Producer Organisations, (ANOP). 
53 
In October 1976, the French state gave exclusive recognition to 
ANOP and thereafter the ties between the POs and FIOM developed 
strongly. Both sides shared a common interest in market 
conditions and the existence of FIOM created the opportunity for 
further strengthening the role of the POs. As the Director of the 
Fisheries Directorate in the Ministry put it: 
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"The action of FIOM embodies an impetus, a 
support, a will, at the local level, to 
establish a system of guarantees in the face 
"54 of the uncertainties of fish catches. 
However, both FIOM, and the POs, did face a problem, namely, 
their relations with the 1945 institutions. Although the 
President of the CCPM also chairs the Management Council of FIOM, 
sources of conflict were clear from the outset. Part of FIOM's 
income comes from a share of the levy raised by the CCPM and as a 
result the CCPM effectively supported the encroachment by FIOM 
upon its prerogatives. The advertising activities of the National 
Committee for the Support of Consumption of Sea Products (PROMER), 
for example, came under FIOM's aegis, although PROMER had 
traditionally been financed and supervised by the CCPM. 
Within the CCPM there was a recognition that its legal 
framework and mode of operation made it more suitable to act as a 
forum for discussion, where "the major choices ripen", than as an 
executive body, 
55 
but there was considerable suspicion as to what 
kind of role FIOM might play. Would it simply guarantee the 
losses of the deep-sea companies when they were in trouble leaving 
them free to reap profits when times were good? Or would it seek 
to guarantee an increasing level of income for only one category, 
notably, the 'patrons' of the inshore industry? 
56 
Such criticisms were especially strong amongst the union 
representatives, who had a legally-guaranteed position in the 1945 
structure but lacked an equivalent strength in FIOM, despite a 
presence on the Management Council. They observed, in particular, 
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that membership of the POs, in contrast to the local committees, 
is restricted to producers, i. e owners: crews, whether in the 
deep-sea or the inshore industries, are not represented. 
57 
As a 
result, they were eager to bolster the 1945 structure: a CGT 
initiative, for example, led to the setting up within that 
structure of a National Committee on the Fishing Fleet, designed 
to voice union grievances over the decline in the number of 
ships. 
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However, there was little scope for the 1945 institutions 
actively to resist FIOM and the POs. Even the Interprofessional 
Committees did not have the kind of direct powers of market 
management possessed by the POs. Hence from June 1981 the new 
French government made increased efforts to integrate the two 
structures. There was no question of abolishing the CCPM and its 
attendant committees: Le Pensec, the Socialist Minister, could not 
contemplate the uproar that would have followed. Hence a more 
pragmatic solution was devised whereby the head of ANOP became a 
member of the CCPM and representatives of the individual POs 
joined the local committees. In this way, the old structure was 
maintained and the union received the satisfaction of gaining a 
say in the running of the POs. 
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The end result is summarized in 
Figure 6, which underlines the link between the two structures. 
As in Britain, however, there was also concern about the 
weight given to fishing within the counsels of the government. At 
the time of the CES report with its call for a new Sea Ministry, 
fisheries was simply one directorate within the SGMM, which in 
turn depended upon the Ministry of Transport, whose minister was 
FIGURE 6- Organisation plan of the French fishing industry 
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then not of Cabinet rank. Such junior status had already provoked 
comment before the Martray report60 and it continued to do so 
afterwards. 
Barre, Prime Minister from September 1976, responded to the 
criticism by establishing an Interministerial Mission for the Sea 
and by upgrading the SGMM into a Directorate-General (DGMM) 
61 
but 
these moves did not serve to placate the industry. The upgrading 
of the SGMM to the status of the other Directorates-General of the 
Ministry of Transport was seen as undermining the specificity of 
the industry, especially as it also involvedthe suppression of the 
separate Directorate concerned with the administration of all 
'matins', the 'Direction des Gens de Merl. 
62 
However, the issue did not disappear but re-emerged in still 
sharper terms during the 1980 dispute, to be discussed in Chapter 
Seven, and afterwards in the run-up to the Presidential and 
legislative elections of May and June 1981. The result of the 
Socialist victory in these elections was the creation of a new 
Ministry of the Sea under the Breton, Le Pensec. As the 
organisation plan of the ministry indicates (see Figure 7) it was 
not particularly radical in conception. The 'Direction des Gens 
de Merl was reinstated and the Interministerial Mission was 
integrated into it but there was no question of defining its 
responsibilities more widely. Pollution and oil prospecting, for 
example, were not included within its competences. Nevertheless, 
FIGURE 7- Organisation plan of the Ministry of the Sea 
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it had a powerul psychological effect within the fishing industry. 
The CCPM commented: 
"Everyone sees in it the long-nurtured hope of 
at last being listened to, understood and 
noticed by attentive, open and accessible 
authorities. This innovation is the promise 
of all the improvements awaited since 1975, 
the promise of fishing that is profitable once 
again, the promise that this essential 
economic activity and its human environment 
will not be sacrificed to statistical, 
technocratic and economic considerations, 
without any link to reality. " 
63 
Le Pensec proved a very popular minister in his efforts to 
fulfil these hopes. He made it his business to attend the annual 
general assemblies of the CCPM and of ANOP held in October 1981, 
and was still receiving glowing reviews after a year in office. 
64 
Indeed in March 1983 when the Ministry was downgraded and put back 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport, Le Pensec's 
resignation was greeted with considerable disappointment and a 
feeling that the government had taken something of a step 
backwards in its defence of the industry. 
65 
Nevertheless, the 
various directorates, including that for fisheries, remained 
intact under a Secretary of State responsible for the Sea 
(Lengagne, the mayor of Boulogne). Over the period from 1978 to 
1983 the precise institutional context within which the fisheries 
issue was handled had changed considerably (more so than in 
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Britain) but it still reflected the basic French concern to 
differentiate 'matins' from the rest of society, a concern dating 
back to Colbert. 
4. Conclusion 
What this chapter has demonstrated is that economic change 
generated demands for institutional change but that the demands 
were different in character and effect in the two countries. In 
Britain it was the fragmentation of the representative 
institutions that attracted attention. The industry itself made 
some efforts to remedy the situation but it received little more 
than encouragement from the state, which did not seek to exercise 
a tighter form of institutional supervision over the fisheries 
sector. Hence a broadly pluralist system prevailed with 
continuing competition between freely constituted, voluntary 
bodies. 
In France such competition was dampened within a more 
corporatist set of arrangements, where membership was compulsory 
and the institutions state-sponsored. Though it was the 
ineffectiveness of these arrangements which provoked criticism, 
the state remained central in determining the shape of change and 
continued to channel the economic and political energies of 
fishermen. Hence it is not surprising that the expression of 
support for the industry, provided by a separate ministry, emerged 
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in France rather than Britain, despite similar feelings of 
isolation on the part of the industry in the two countries. 
This pluralist/corporatist dichotomy has pointed ahead to further 
contrasts between the two countries to be developed in the four 
chapters which follow. It has emerged, first of all, that the 
institutions reflected different economic priorities. The 
creation and development of FIOM illustrates how much importance 
the French state placed on the control of the internal market as a 
way of protecting the industry. None of the initiatives in 
Britain indicated a desire to move beyond establishing a framework 
within which the industry could pursue its economic activities. 
The nature and level of the state's intervention in the economic 
workings of the industry will be pursued in the next chapter. 
Secondly, this chapter has suggested that there were 
different amounts of room for manoeuvre available to the fishing 
interest. In Britain the freedom allowed by the state to create 
institutions or not, as one chose, carried with it the possibility 
of a wide set of strategies of influence. In France the state's 
'tutelle' limited the industry's scope for manoeuvre, by 
channelling its energies through officially-approved bodies. This 
issue of how the demands of the interest were mediated by its 
representatives will be taken up in Chapter Six. 
Thirdly, this chapter has pointed towards a variable 
potential for opposition betwen the state and this sector of 
society. The tightness of the link between the two in the French 
context left little margin for error, should the structure fail to 
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contain the demands made by the industry. By contrast, the 
'distance' of the British state from the industry offered more 
opportunities to prevent relations with the industry from 
deteriorating and getting out of hand. The character of direct 
action taken by fishermen in opposing the state will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven. 
Finally, this chapter has indicated one aspect of the 
industry's efforts to organise its own affairs, the PO structure. 
In Britain that structure developed erratically but in France it 
became almost a mirror image of the 1945 institutions thanks to 
FIOM's encouragement. A more detailed look at the different 
facets of self-help will be taken in Chapter Eight. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERVENTIONIST PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
The present chapter will consider the first of the perspectives 
outlined in the initial chapter and examine the nature and extent 
of the state's intervention in the fishing industry in Britain and 
France. The material will be used to see whether the nature of 
the changes in the issue area and the general character of 
relations between state and society in the two countries 
influenced intervention in the way we might expect. It will be 
recalled that we started with two assumptions, first that "the 
industry would demand increased intervention from government to 
protect it from the effects of the changing environment and that 
the government would feel itself obliged to cater for these 
demands" and second "that the 'dirigiste' French tradition and 
the British aversion to intervention would mean that government 
efforts to determine the shape of the industry were more developed 
in France than in Britain" (cf p 30 above). Both assumptions will 
be found to be confirmed by the evidence presented in this 
chapter. 
The chapter is divided into three sections: the first will 
suggest that increased levels of support to the fishing industry 
cannot be compared in purely quantitative terms but need to be 
understood in terms of the different philosophies of assistance 
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prevailing in the two countries; the second will, look at the kind 
of subsidies that were considered appropriate to deal with the 
increased costs of the catching sector and the nature of the 
debate that those subsidies provoked, and the third will examine 
the response of the two states to their progressive exclusion from 
the waters of third countries. The main thrust of the argument 
will be that the behaviour of the state institutions and of the 
industry in France confirm the view that there, unlike in Britain, 
"the public interest is not reducible to some compromise between 
private interests". 
I The political and economic strands of the 
French state tradition combined in the case of the fishing 
industry to generate a policy impetus, unmatched in the British 
context. 
2. The basic character of intervention in the industry 
There is no doubt that during the 1970s and early 80s, the level 
of economic support given by Western governments to their fishing 
industries increased markedly. OECD commented drily in 1981 in 
its annual review of the fishing sector: 
"In several OECD countries, it is normal for 
the fishing industry to receive financial aids 
from the state. However, it should be noted 
that these aids have become more numerous in 
recent years. "2 
Both France and Britain werecountries that had 'normally' given 
such aids to their industries. In Britain cyclical depression in 
the market had led to the introduction of operating subsidies at 
various times during the 1950s and 1960x3 and throughout that 
period the WFA had maintained a generous policy on grants and 
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loans for the building of new ships. Indeed in 1970 one French 
observer saw the £4 million annual budget of the WFA as 
guaranteeing a rosy future for the British industry for the rest 
of the decade. 
4 
In France, too, there had been significant help 
with the construction of new boats, whose value to the industry 
was only voiced openly when they were being phased out in 1973.5 
Furthermore, the social benefits available to fishermen under the 
ENIK regime (cf p 112 above) had always provided a significant 
hidden subsidy which knew no parallel in Britain. 
However, the oil crisis of 1973 and its consequences provoked 
a major increase in demands for state assistance. Meek, the 
Chairman of the WFA, even used the fact that the industry had 
always been subsidised as an argument for extra support now in the 
face of its 
"sharp 
reversal in fortune. "6 French reaction was 
equally strongly in favour of state aids, with particular stress 
being laid on the relative position of fisheries in the economy. 
A figure of 30 million FF in the budget for fisheries was 
contrasted with the 800 milllion FF available to help the 
shipyards. 
7 
Whether such comparisons were justified is less 
important than the fact that they were made and that governments 
responded with fresh subsidies. 
There was a marked increase in government expenditure in 
support for the fishing industry in 1975 and 1976. In Britain, 
the figure rose from £20.5 million in 1974-75 to £37.1 million in 
1975-76, while in France there was a more dramatic rise from 84MF 
148 
in 1975 to 223 MF in 1976, the latter figure including 57MF for 
the setting up of FIOM. 
8 Thereafter the figures dropped again, 
though not to the pre-1976 level, until 1980 when the governments 
of both countries were faced with renewed demands for assistance 
from the industry. In 1980, the French government accorded aids 
amounting to 202 MF, while in Britain successive supplementary 
subsidies of £3 million and £14 million were annnounced in March 
and August. 
9 
Moreover, this trend of increased assistance 
continued in the two subsequent years preceding the EEC 
settlement. In the Spring of 1981, the British government granted 
a further £25 million, followed up in October 1982 by another 
package of £15 million. 
10 In France the advent of the new team at 
the Ministry of the Sea, under Le Pensec, led to a still more 
marked increase in support. The 1981 figure totalling 389 MF was 
almost double that of 1980 and the 1982 figure of 350 MF amounted 
to a sevenfold increase in constant prices over the level of aids 
accorded in 1970.11 
The political importance of these figures lay in their 
relative rather than their absolute size. For one thing, it is 
notoriously difficult to calculate what is to count as an aid to 
the industry. Thus in the French case, do the figures quoted 
above include the deficit caused to the state by the financing of 
the social benefits of ENIM, a deficit said to match that incurred 
indirect aids to the fishing fleet? 
12 
The source used offers no 
guidance on the matter. However, in political terms, the 
reliability of any statistics was much less important than their 
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availability. The institutional interdependence, outlined in 
Chapter Three, fostered the feeling of fishermen in each EEC 
country that their counterparts abroad were being guaranteed a 
higher level of support than they were. Thus when the Commission 
answered questions of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on 
the relative costs of fuel for fishermen in the member states, 
they were inevitably providing ammunition for the debate at 
national level. 
13 
During the 1980 dispute, Le Theule, the 
Minister of Transport, could use the argument that fuel for French 
fishermen was the cheapest in Europe to try to quell the 
protests. 
14 
At the same time, Buchanan-Smith, Minister of State 
at MAFF, could take a total figure for French and British aids 
(£23m and £18m respectively) to support the view that the 
industry's demand for an extra £35m was "extremely large" and by 
implication, out of all proportion. 
15 
What the political debate over relative levels of subsidy 
obscured, however, was the basis upon which subsidies in the 
various EEC countries were being granted. Thus whatever the 
amounts of money being provided by the British and French 
governments, the aids were premised on very different philosophies 
as to their purpose and the shape that they should take. The fact 
of intervention on an increased scale in the 1970s is not at 
issue, what will be discussed here is the character of that 
intervention. Before the two specific areas, presented at the 
outset, are examined, the general basis of thinking about the 
development of the fishing industry in Britain and France will be 
outlined. 
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French thinking has been heavily guided by the twin 
imperatives of national production and modernisation. There has 
certainly been a debate as to how best these two goals can be 
pursued but there has been a strong consensus that they should be 
pursued. This consensus has been buttressed by the way in which 
the alternatives facing policy-makers have been presented. In 
1976, for example, the Martray report argued that France had a 
clear choice between maintaining national production and producers 
as an expression of 'a national and european maritime vocation' or 
buying increasing quantities of fish abroad and changing the use 
of the coast to other activities. The tone of the report left 
little doubt that the second alternative was effectively being 
offered as a way of reaffirming the first. Four years later in 
the 'Sea and Coast' document prepared for the 1981-85 Eighth Plan, 
there was no question of pursuing a conscious rundown of the 
industry. 
"France must have the specific means available 
to allow her to satisfy the demand for a 
quality product (fresh fish), at the level of 
production as well as of distribution. , 
16 
It was acknowledged that she could never be self-sufficient but it 
was argued that "the maintenance of an adequate level of activity 
at sea must play a role in limiting the deficit of the balance of 
17 
trade. " 
Though the Eighth Plan was scrapped, following the 1981 
Socialist victory, the difference between the new government and 
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the old was one of tactics, rather than strategy. The Socialist 
Party had underlined before the elections that fishing is "an 
indispensable part of the employment and regional development 
policies for coastal regions" and represents "an important link in 
our food resource", views which remained the 'leitmotif' under Le 
Pensec. 
18 
The ministry subsequently introduced a brochure 
entitled 'Investir ä la Peche', which underlined the state's firm 
support for the modernisation of the fleet and the development of 
production. It explained carefully the precise character of the 
aids that would now be available for the different parts of the 
industry and stressed, in particular, investment in the productive 
potential of new boats. 
In Britain, by contrast, there was a far less developed sense 
of the role that fishing could or should play in the economy. 
Rather the concentration was upon the way in which the framework 
of the industry needed to be adapted for it to become economically 
viable. Thus modernisation of the fleet was not linked to the 
idea of maintaining production and cutting imports. It could only 
be contemplated in conjunction with a recognition of the problem 
of overcapacity, itself requiring a controlled running down of an 
artificially large fleet. 
"Surplus capacity should be trimmed away at 
the same time as the fleets are modernised and 
adapted for the future. "19 
In other words, the notion of encouraging a slimming down of the 
industry was officially acceptable in a way that it never 
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was in France. By the same token, the idea of national production 
as a virtue in itself was never a strong one. It was no 
coincidence that a 1975 White Paper entitled 'Food from our own 
resources' failed to mention fish, annoying the BTF intensely. 
20 
One good reason for this failure was that in Britain, as 
compared with France, there was a much more ambivalent attitude 
towards imports in official circles. Both in 1975 and 1980/81, 
there were strong demands for import controls but there was 
bipartisan resistance to such a move from government ministers. 
The Labour Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Brown, made it 
clear that "a ban on imports would be against our worldwide trade 
relations", 
21 
while Walker, under similar pressure, maintained that 
such a bias was a complete nonsense, given the importance of 
maintaining supplies to the British market. 
22 
Though no-one in 
Britain would have admitted openly to supporting the second 
Martray alternative of boosting imports and reorientating the 
coast to other economic uses, the fact that trading interests were 
given such stress underlines the lesser British enthusiasm for 
support of national production as a primary goal. 
It would be mistaken to infer from this that the British 
government was generally less inclined to intervene in the 
fisheries sector. In conservation matters, for example, 
governments of both parties were encouraged by the industry to 
introduce strict measures of control, limiting mesh sizes, fishing 
areas and particular kinds of net with a unilateral determination 
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that provoked the ECJ in Luxembourg to condemn them on more than 
one occasion (cf p 86 above). By contrast, French conservation 
measures were less than enthusiastically received by the 
profession. In April 1978, for example, the CCPM immediately 
pressed for socio-economic assistance to help fishermen to survive 
whilst the resource was being reestablished. 
23 
What this contrast underlines, however, is the same general 
concern in France about maintaining productive potential which was 
that much less well developed in Britain. The possibility of 
exclusive zones, from which foreign fishermen would be excluded, 
certainly helped to limit concern about the impact of restrictions 
on British fishermen, but even without that possibility it was 
widely assumed that adequate conservation measures and agreed 
quotas would provide the necessary framework for the industry to 
prosper. 
"There will be from year to year a 
sufficiently clear picture of the catch which 
will be available to the British fleets so 
that the catching power can in turn be 
tailored to suit the available stocks". 
24 
For the French either the stocks would have to be related to the 
existing fleet or new stocks would have to be found to stop the 
fleet from dwindling. It was quite a different kind of 
philosophy. 
Finally, in this section, it should be underlined that these 
general ideas on intervention remained substantially unaffected by 
the growing pressures of the period on public expenditure. In 
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Britain from 1976 onwards there was a decline in the level of 
public expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP): the era of 'cuts' had arrived. 
25 In France, in the same 
year, Barre took over as Prime Minister from Chirac, promising a 
less profligate, tighter use of public money. The former made his 
position clear, on a visit to the fishermen of La Rochelle in June 
1977: "I am not Father Christmas and I have nothing in my sack". 
26 
A similarly restrictive attitude to public expenditure in general 
emanated from the Thatcher government which took office in 1979. 
Nevertheless, the actual level of financial support to the 
industry did not go into irreversible decline as we have seen. 
The editor of Fishing News congratulated Walker for squeezing so 
much money out of the government in 1980: "(he) can only have done 
a magnificent persuasive job in what must have been a hostile 
cabinet environment. "27 In France, even though the level of 
support rose substantially after the 1981 elections, there had 
already been a marked increase between 1977 and 1980 (80MF rising 
to 202NF), which was well in excess of the rate of inflation. 
28 
It is true that the aid for 1980 provoked terrific unrest in the 
industry but this was less because of its volume than because it 
involved an attempt to alter the basis of intervention by the 
state. Instead of extending the fuel subsidy which Chirac had 
introduced and which Le Pensec was to increase further, the 
government sought to introduce the idea of extra efficiency as a 
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condition for granting aid. Its resistance to a rise in the fuel 
subsidy succeeded in generating a dramatic level of unity in the 
industry around this symbol of the productivist ethic. 
As the next section indicates, such a symbol was lacking in 
Britain where the nature of government aid reflected a different 
attitude as to what sort of intervention was appropriate. How much 
aid would be given depended either on the skill with which 
individual ministers operated in a difficult economic climate or 
on the different political persuasions of governments. What kind 
of aid would be given was the product of the particular national 
tradition within which those ministers and governments were 
operating. 
3. The nature of state subsidies 
One of the three main changes in the fishing industry outlined in 
the opening chapter was the increased costs involved in pursuing 
the resource. What has emerged in the previous section is that 
the state in both Britain and France intervened to assist the 
industry to meet this increase in costs. However, the general 
philosophies of intervention operating in the two countries were 
reflected in the particulars of the debate over subsidies. 
First of all, the two countries resorted to quite different 
kinds of aid. The French introduced aid to reduce the cost of 
fuel; in this way the expense of going to sea was automatically 
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reduced for all fishermen. The British concentrated their subsidy 
on lump sum payments to owners; the amounts were calculated on 
the basis of vessel length, irrespective of the time spent at sea. 
Thus whereas in France, the subsidy was related to future 
activity, in Britain it was more a question of making good past 
losses. One Fleetwood deep-sea owner put the point as follows, 
when asked what he would do with his share: "all we can do is pay 
aid money into the bank to fill up the hole (of debt). "29 This 
was simply not an option for French fishermen, who could only 
benefit from state support by continuing fishing. 
The second important difference between the two countries was 
the level of continuity involved in the aids given. In Britain 
they provided occasional moments of relief for the industry, in 
France they became a permanent feature of the environment. The 
French began at the beginning of 1974, when the Finance Ministry 
agreed to a total of 20MF towards the cost of fuel. 
30 
Thereafter 
no year passed without a fuel subsidy of some kind. In 1975, the 
pressure of the industry was sufficient to guarantee a drop in 
price of between 4 and 5 centimes per litre. 
31 
In April 1976 
Chirac proved even more generous agreeing to a rise in the subsidy 
for the year from 23 to 100MF, a sum worth about 15 centimes per 
litre. 
32 After Barre became Prime Minister, the level of fuel 
aid was cut but it remained at 10.5 centimes per litre from 1977 
to 1980.33 What was at issue in the latter year was the 
industry's demand for an increase to take account of the petrol 
price rises of 1979. For this it had to wait until 1981, when Le 
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Pensec doubled the subsidy from 10.5 to 21 centimes per litre. 
What made him still more popular was his agreement in March 1982 
that the cost of fuel should be directly linked to the cost of 
living, with the state paying any excess to the distributors. 
Here was a 'veritable lifeline' for the industry, which eliminated 
an important uncertainty for it. 
34 
This level of continuity was not visible in Britain. Peart, 
the Minister of Agriculture, made no promises that the £6m 
allocated to the industry in March 1975 would be extended beyond 
the end of June and when it was extended to the end of September 
at a value of £2.25m, it was made clear that it was "a temporary 
measure to help the industry to face and adjust to changing 
circumstances". 
35 
A final £1m was found for the last quarter of 
the year but thereafter there were no more operating subsidies 
provided until 1980.36 When the industry asked for more, the 
Ministry pointed out that prices were on the increase, as indeed 
they were for the inshore industry at least in the final part of 
the 1970s. 
37 
When subsidies were restarted in 1980, the first package of 
£3m was split between support for the POs and exploratory voyages 
(E2 and Elm respectively). However, the payments that followed in 
the autumn of 1980 and then in 1981 and 1982 were like those of 
1975 in that they were given to boat owners to spend as they 
thought fit. 
38 
They remained, however, ad hoc responses to the 
presssure of the industry without becoming part of a concerted 
government response to its difficulties. Certainly some in the 
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industry wanted petrol subsidies: the SFF, for example, pointed 
out how the cost of fuel had risen in Aberdeen between January 
1980 and January 1982 from 55.7p to 78.5p per gallon while the 
price of cod had fallen from E482 to £456 per tonne over the same 
period. 
39 
And yet such calls for more durable help found no echo 
in government policy. 
A third aspect of the aid offered by governments to meet 
increased costs was the attitude of the industry towards it. 
The character of governmental intervention needs to be seen as 
much in terms of how subsidies were conceived of by the industry 
as in terms of the government's own policy stance. Whereas in 
France, there was no hesitation about turning to the state for 
help, the British attitude was much more reticent. 
As early as 1971, when petrol prices began to rise, there was 
no mistaking the nature of the French industry's response: "the 
initial reflex of the owners was to turn to the state 
authorities". 
40 
Subsequently, when the difficulties became much 
more severe, it was the deep-sea owners who presented the most 
eloquent description of the crisis and the clearest indication 
that they expected the state to take the lead: "only the public 
powers have the authority to relaunch the maritime sector as they 
have done in other sectors - to protect employment and productive 
capacity. "41 Nor were they alone in their expectations: during the 
comparative calm of 1977, they kept up the pressure with the 
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inshore industry's cooperative representatives for the maintenance 
of fuel aid at its 1976 level. 
42 
Even after a month of severe 
protests against the government in August 1980, it was the 
unanimous view of all in the CCPM, owners as well as unions, 
deep-sea as well as inshore representatives, that the proposals of 
the Minister, Le Theule, for resolving the dispute were too little 
and too late, not least because they failed to address the issue 
of rising costs by a commensurate rise in the petrol subsidy. 
43 
Subsequently when the new government of the Left came to power in 
1981, it is noteworthy that all, whatever their political 
persuasion, were delighted that their expectations of help were 
fulfilled. 
44 
The atmosphere in Britain was completely different. However 
much it might be argued that the subsidy offered was not enough, 
there was a widespread feeling that to ask for a subsidy was a 
last resort tactic, lacking legitimacy. When asked whether he 
would extend the subsidy, Peart replied: "I can make no comment. 
There are people in the industry who would like to see an end to 
the subsidy - and to stand on their own feet. "45 Nor was this 
ideology of independence something that the Minister imagined. 
After the initial aid package of 1980, one manager put the point 
very clearly: "the industry does not like handouts like this. We 
can survive on our own if we are given a fair crack of the 
whip. "46 The justification for aid came not from a reference to 
the inherent duties of the state but to the actions of other 
governments in giving help and thereby distorting the principles 
of equal competition. 
47 
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One consequence of this limited view of state intervention 
was that the issue did not escape from the party political arena, 
as 1n France. On the Left of the political spectrum there was 
strong suspicion about the idea of helping out the big trawler 
owners. In Parliament, the pressure of TGWU opposition to the 
owners made itself felt in Labour resistance to BTF calls for 
subsidies. All three of the Hull MPs (Prescott, McNamara and 
Johnson) argued that no public money should be provided without a 
corresponding public benefit, which meant in particular a 
challenge to the casual character of labour recruitment in the 
deep-sea industry. 
48 
By 1980, as this part of the industry was 
rapidly diminishing to vanishing point, Labour's attitude to aids 
was rather different. Strong, the Shadow spokesman on fisheries, 
described the August 1980 package as a "fair response", offering 
an "urgent and necessary lifeline" . 
49 
The small business 
character of the inshore industry was not something with which the 
British Left easily identified but it was seen as a more worthy 
candidate for public money than the deep-sea companies. 
50 
A second consequence of a limited state role was that 
governments were drawn into the invidious task of differentiating 
between the claims of different parts of the industry. When in 
1975 all boats under 40 feet were excluded from the operating 
subsidy, the small-scale Cornish fishermen were furious arguing 
that there was a bias in favour of the big companies. 
51 
The same 
kind of bias was detected in 1980. Boats under 40 feet were 
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included but the inshore industry pointed out that the deep-sea 
owners were still getting money, even though their ships were 
fishing for very limited periods, if at all. 
52 
This problem of distribution was partly solved in France by 
the character of the aid: a fuel subsidy was effectively 
distributed to all in accordance with the amount they used. 
However, the industry was agreed that the effect of an increase in 
fuel costs was felt more greatly by the inshore than by the 
deep-sea industry. The latter might need more fuel but the extent 
of its other costs, notably crews, made energy a smaller part of 
its overheads. Thus in 1974 the CCPM pointed out that fuel 
represented about 16 to 18% of the costs of the 'artisans' and 
only 11-12% of those of 'industrial' companies. Moreover, the 
company boats made much bigger catches per litre of fuel: they 
needed between 1 and 2 litres to catch a kilo of fish, while the 
inshore vessels would use up only 0.5 to 1 litre to catch the same 
amount. Despite the fact that the value of the inshore species is 
greater, it proved possible to agree, within the CCPM framework, 
that the initial aid given to the industry in 1974 be handed out 
differentially: 6 centimes per litre for the inshore boats, 4 
centimes for the deep-sea vessels. 
53 Such an arrangement was out 
of the question in Britain: the institutions and the appropriate 
consensus were not there. 
This section has suggested that the state aid given in the 
two countries to cope with increased costs differed in three 
important respects: the purpose for which it was intended, the 
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degree of continuity in its provision and the attitudes of those 
in the industry towards it. A similarly divergent pattern can be 
seen if we consider the efforts of the two countries to establish 
or maintain fishing opportunities beyond the boundaries of NEAFC. 
4. Fishing in distant waters 
The spread of the EEZ doctrine in the second part of the 1970s 
presented Britain and France with a threat and an opportunity. On 
the one hand, they were faced with the prospect that their 
fishermen would be permanently excluded from the waters of non-EEC 
states that decided to apply an exclusive zone (EEZ); on the other 
hand, they were handed the chance to benefit from a similar zone 
around the island possessions that belonged to both countries 
throughout the world. 
The creation of 200 mile EEZs posed special problems for the 
deep-sea industry. In the French case, this meant, in particular, 
the trawlers sailing to Canada and the seiners plying the coasts 
of Western Africa, 'la grande peche' and 'la peche thoniere'. In 
the British case, it meant, above all, the distant-water fleet, 
with its activity concentrated around Iceland, Norway, the Soviet 
Union and Canada (cf Chapter Two, pp 42-3). By the end of 1976 
all three categories found themselves in a very difficult 
situation. 'La grande peche' which had had 30 boats in 1970 was 
now down to 17. Thanks to the 1972 agreement with Canada, it was 
assured a quota of 20,000 t. per year until 1986 but after that 
there was little chance of an extension, thus putting at risk 6% 
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of national fish production. 
54 'La peche thoniere' was taking 95% 
of its catch within 200 miles of the African countries between 
Mauretania and Angola. Its fleet of 30 ships was theoretically 
subject to a large degree of control by the coastal states under 
the new international regime, thus endangering the most profitable 
section of the French fishing industry. 
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As for the British 
deep-sea fleet, it was in even deeper trouble. Even at Grimsby, 
less hard-hit than Hull, there were 60 trawlers which were now 
excluded from Icelandic waters, and could hope for access to the 
other traditional non-EEC grounds only on the basis of 
Community-negotiated agreements. 
56 
4.1 Distinctive responses 
The distinctive responses of the two countries to this situation 
can only be understood in the context of the general attitudes 
towards intervention outlined above. In particular, the French 
enthusiasm for national production and the British concentration 
on national supply meant that they did not adopt similar stances. 
Whereas France directed its efforts towards the maximum posssible 
exploitation of distant waters as a way of preserving national 
economic independence, Britain was prepared to accept a major 
withdrawal from third country waters, without seeking very 
actively to establish an equivalent presence elsewhere. 
The most obvious sign of this marked difference in emphasis 
was the extent of their EEZ declarations. At the beginning of 
1977 both countries extended their fishery limits to 200 miles in 
164 
the Atlantic in accordance with the agreement at the Hague (cf p 
82 above). However France also subsequently declared a 200 mile 
EEZ round its overseas departments and territories, the so-called 
DOM-TOM. 
57 To this day (July 1984) Britain has not followed the 
French example. The reasons for this certainly extend beyond the 
fishing arena. In the French case, the DOM-TOM have consistently 
been treated as an integral part of the French state with their 
own government ministry and in the case of the departments, their 
own representatives in the French Assembly. The British 
relationship with its overseas territories and possessions has 
been looser: they have no parliamentary representation, no 
separate ministry and a status distinct from mainland Britain 
within the EEC. Furthermore, the link between the fisheries sector 
and other maritime activities cannot be ignored. The very idea of 
extended limits was one that British official opinion resisted 
until late in 1976 (cf p 99 above). This was partly due to the 
conflict with Iceland but can also be attributed to Britain's 
traditional determination to guarantee a secure position for 
commercial and military shipping. By contrast, such ideas played 
a much less prominent role in France: the stress was on ensuring 
that coastal states were obliged to accept duties to accompany new 
rights, rather than continuing to insist on the broadest free use 
of the oceans. 
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This wider background was, however, duly reflected in 
attitudes within the two countries to the challenges offered by 
the possibility of a 200 mile zone outside the NEAFC area. Even 
before France had formally established an EEZ around the DOM-TOM, 
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Giscard d'Estaing was pointing to the impact of the de facto 
change in international law: 
"France has under her jurisdiction 11 million 
square kilometres of sea, which puts her in 
third place in the world... The sea is a new 
frontier of France. "59 
In this total, only 341,000 km2 were contributed by metropolitan 
France and even the DOM, the overseas departments (St. Pierre et 
Miquelon, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and La Reunion) added no 
more than 668,300 km2. The vast bulk of the President's claim, 
10,172,315 km2, came from the waters around the fourteen overseas 
territories or TOM (Juan de Nova, Bossas da India, Europa (all 
three in the Mozambique Channel), Tromelin, Nouvelle-Caledonie, 
Loyaute, Chesterfield, Polynesie Francaise, Clipperton, Crozet, 
Kerguelen, St. Paul et Amsterdam, Terre Adelte, and the 
'collectivite territoriale' of Mayote). 
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In Britain, by contrast, there were no equivalent ideas of 
establishing an extended 'maritime domain', no attempts to 
calculate the amount of sea to which Britain could lay claim. 
Indeed it was a French observer who claimed to see the full 
potential of the change in international law for Britain. He 
discussed the future in terms of the development of fishing around 
UK possessions, like the Falklands, and in joint ventures based on 
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Britain's special position in the Commonwealth, summing up as 
follows: 
"The 200 miles offer the United Kingdom the 
possibility of controlling enormous tracts of 
sea and of redeploying her distant water fleet 
over several oceans. " 
61 
As it transpired, the only service that deep-sea trawlers saw 
around British possessions outside NEAFC in the period of this 
study was as minesweepers in the 1982 Falklands war. Five Hull 
freezers (Junella, Cordella, Northella, Farnella and Pict) were 
requisitioned for the purpose by the Ministry of Defence and 
dispatched to the South Atlantic after being refitted at Rosyth. 
62 
Neither country could hope to benefit from all its overseas 
possessions for the purposes of fishing. In only a relatively few 
cases is there a continental shelf of sufficient proportions to 
guarantee substantial stocks of fish. Nevertheless, both 
countries had the advantage of knowing where other countries, 
notably those of the Eastern bloc, had found it worthwhile to 
direct their efforts. Off the Kerguelens, deep in the Indian 
Ocean there had been a substantial effort made by the Eastern 
European factory ships for several years since the beginning of 
the 1970s. As many as 40 ships at a time were involved with an 
annual catch reaching as high as 250,000 t. 
63 
Similarly, around 
the Falklands and its dependency of South Georgia, there had been 
and has continued to be a significant effort by ships, notably 
from Poland, Germany, Japan and Spain, searching for hake, squid 
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and blue whiting. The potential catch in the area was estimated 
at 4-5 million t. a year. 
64 
The close proximity of Argentina does not make the Falklands 
a direct parallel with the remote Kerguelens. However, concern 
over Argentine feelings alone cannot explain why Britain made no 
move to exercise some form of jurisdiction over the waters around 
the Falklands. After all, France claimed a 200 mile zone around 
the islands of St. Pierre et Miquelon, even though it generated a 
considerable degree of conflict with Canada over the position of 
the median line between French and Canadian waters. 
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And even if 
Britain had not wanted to fish off the Falklands herself, she 
could have demanded payment of others for the right to do so. A 
more complete answer involves taking a closer look at the very 
different nature of the British state's intervention in the 
fishing industry in this area; it contrasts markedly with that of 
the state in France. Though the nature of the incentive for 
distant voyages was acknowledged in similar fashion, the 
mechanisms available to turn thoughts into action were different 
as were the attitudes of the participants, both on the 
government's and the industry's side. 
The possibilities of redeploying at least some of the British 
deep-sea fleet were certainly recognised. The Trade and Industry 
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Sub-Committee specifically recommended that money should be spent 
on distant water trials in the South Atlantic: 
"We do not want to underrate the difficulties, 
but in a situation as serious as that which 
confronts the UK with the loss of so many 
traditional fishing grounds, drastic action is 
called for and we recommend that all 
concerned, both in Government and in the 
industry, should refuse to be daunted by the 
difficulties and should make an all-out effort 
to explore and exploit whatever resources 
distant waters new to them may hold. " 
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In the same year the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission urged 
Silkin to get the WFA to commit £1,500,000 to exploratory voyages 
off the Falklands to match the £6 million invested in the area by 
the West Germans. 
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Four years later, the Shackleton report on 
the Falklands called for the estabishment of a 200 mile fisheries 
limit around the islands, the spending of £20 million on an 
exploratory fishing project over five years and the extension of 
fishing rights to the Poles on the basis of an information 
exchange. 
68 
And yet in 1984, on a visit to South Atlantic, 
Battersby, MEP for Humberside, was only able to say: "The position 
is most encouraging .... There is scope for up to six 60ft 
trawlers working in inshore waters. "69 There was still no British 
activity in the area, despite the fact that as part of the EEC 
agreement of January 1983,18 million ECUs had been made available 
to support state schemes for 'exploratory fishing' and 'joint 
ventures'* 
70 
169 
4.2 The Kerguelen experiment 
The French recognition of the need to search for new grounds can 
be traced back as early as 1974 when the CCPM discussed the likely 
outcome of UNCLOS III and agreed that new grounds would have to be 
sought, mentioning, in particular, the Indian Ocean. 
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Hence it 
was hardly a surprise when FLOM was given the job, at its 
inception in 1976, of encouraging measures of redeployment or 
experimental campaigns (cf p 136 above). That relatively little 
took place until 1979 can be attributed in part to the newness of 
the organisation but also to the formidable difficulties that such 
measures had to overcome. The main centre of interest, the 
Kerguelens, sometimes referred to as the 'Islands of Desolation' 
offer anything but an hospitable environment for fishing. They 
are very remote: not just 13,000 km. from mainland France but six 
days sailing in a southerly direction from La Reunion, the French 
island east of Malagasay, which acted as the last staging port for 
the ships involved. Lying on the 48th parallel, they are also 
subject to severe weather conditions. The 'roaring forties' blow 
for long periods of the year and there is little in the way of 
natural protection or shore-based, man-made installations for use 
in an emergency. Nor is the cost of sailing there insubstantial: 
one trip requires 600t. of petrol or three times the amount needed 
for the traditional, long-distance voyages in the Atlantic to 
Canada. 
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Despite these difficulties, in 1979 one of the firms engaged 
in fishing off Canada, the Societe Nouvelle des Peches Lointaines 
(SNPL) did organise a trial off the Kerguelens with a 5MF grant 
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from FIOM. In August of that year, the freezer trawler 'Jutland' 
left its home port of Bordeaux and after an initial fishing sortie 
off Africa, made its way to the Kerguelens, arriving in October 
and staying for four weeks. From one point of view, the voyage 
confirmed Le Monde's verdict of it as "rather disappointing". 
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Only 78t. of fish were caught, suggesting that the voyage took 
place at the wrong time of year, when fish were scarce and the 
weather deteriorating. Nevertheless, from another point of view 
the very fact that the attempt had been made and that FIOM had 
provided financial support, showed that it was no ordinary 
venture: 
"Whatever else, the experience of the Jutland 
has a somewhat symbolic aspect. In fact it 
testifies to the will of the French fishing 
industry to face up to the limitations on 
access to the resource. It also marks the 
will of the public authorities to assist the 
initiatives taken by the profession. " 
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Certainly there was no slackening of interest on either side. 
In 1980 FIOH reserved over a sixth of its total budget (22.5MF) 
for distant-water trials, while the navy expressed its willingness 
in principle to extend the help it offered off Canada to the 
depths of the Indian Ocean. 
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In the spring of 1981, fishing 
companies from Boulogne and La Reunion combined to form PROMERSUD 
with the specific aim of developing fishing capacity in the 
Southern hemisphere "to guarantee the independence of the French 
fishing industry. "76 PROMERSUD then based two ships, the 
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'Austral' and the 'Sydero', at La Reunion and from there they made 
one and two voyages respectively during the summer of 1981. As 
for SNPL, she maintained her interest by sending out the 'Z6lande' 
to fish during June and July. This time the result was much more 
successful. The 'Zelande' caught nearly ten times as much as its 
predecessor, unloading 700t. on its return to Bordeaux in August. 
The atmosphere was that much brighter that now the talk was of 
"the Kerguelen treasure. "77 All the owners were starting to 
establish a much clearer picture of what to catch, when and where, 
given that the three main species concerned are abundant at 
different times of the year. 
Once again, however, the importance of state finance 
channelled through FIOM cannot be over-emphasized. It is most 
unlikely that even with the better prospects for 1981, the owners 
would have taken the risks involved without the promise of 
financial aid. In the event, not all the 15MF available was 
claimed but the reassuring thought that such sums would continue 
was important in their calculations. Dezeustre, the Head of SNPL, 
saw financial aid from the state as a long-term necessity: "the 
pump must remain primed for the day when the whole fleet (of 
Canadian freezers) is deployed around the Kerguelens". 
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In 1982 
the state continued its support and the 'Zelande' set off again in 
April for the Indian Ocean suggesting that the trips were becoming 
routine. 
However, state aid by itself was not enough. Despite the 
active efforts of FIOM to market the product, it proved very 
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difficult to find buyers anywhere in the world for the unusual 
species on offer. By the end of 1982, SNPL was saying it would 
not return to the Kerguelens in the following year and was worried 
even about continued access to Canadian waters, following the EEC 
ban on the import of baby seal skins. 
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By the spring of 1983, it 
was not the companies but the state that was maintaining an 
interest in the islands. The French navy bought one of the 
freezer trawlers, the 'Neve'; and proposed to convert it so as to 
be able to keep an eye on the Russian trawlers still operating in 
the area. 
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The 1981 prediction that by the middle of the decade 
annual French production would reach 40-50,000t. at a value of 100 
to 125MF guaranteeing the viability of the nine remaining ships of 
'la grande pe"che', looked decidedly unlikely* 
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4.3 The tuna fleet 
The difficulties that the Kerguelen trials met should not conceal 
the determination that was shown in France to take advantage of 
the new 200 mile zones. It was a concerted strategy to maintain 
national production which was by no means restricted to this one 
case. The tuna fleet also received important state support, both 
via FIOM and through direct diplomatic backing. As a result, the 
owners were looking forward in 1982 to an important level of 
expansion: over 30 ships in 1987 compared to 23 in 1981 and a 
catch of 55,000t. rising to 90,000t. over the same period. 
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Although no-one saw this part of the deep-water fleet as 
being as severely threatened as the freezers of the Northern 
waters by the creation of 200 mile EEZs, there was a recognition 
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that it could not stand still. The companies themselves started 
modifying the catching areas of their boats, so that by 1983 
around 40% of their catch was being taken outside the 200 mile 
zones of the African states, compared to only 3% in 1973.83 
However, this still meant that the bulk of their activity was 
within the zones and there was increasing pressure from at least 
some African states, like Senegal, for the French to pay for the 
privilege of fishing. 
The possibilities of fishing further afield, in the Pacific, 
were discussed in 1979 at a meeting in New Caledonia, attended by 
the Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM and the Chairman of the 
Interministerial Mission-on the Sea. It was suggested that 
15,000t. could be caught off New Caledonia and as much as 
40,000t. off French Polynesia. The owners argued that the 
distances and costs involved were excessive but the idea of 
redeployment was on the agenda. 
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The industry set up a 
consortium called COFREPECHE at the beginning of 1981 with the 
explicit intention of diversifying the activities of the tuna 
fleet. The first overt evidence of its activities was an 
experimental voyage at the end of the year in the Indian Ocean by 
the 'Yves de Kerguelen', which was able to have 580t. of fish 
shipped back to France. 
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Here too a close relationship developed between the state and 
the industry. In financial terms, FIOM provided 8MF out of the 
14MF that the voyage cost, while scientific help came from the 
Office for Overseas Technical and Scientific Research (ORSTOM), a 
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government sponsored body with particular responsibility for 
research in the intertropical zones. 
86 The arrangement was 
repeated at the end of 1982, when four ships sailed and FIOM again 
provided 1.6MF to cover any losses, money without which the owners 
maintained that they would not have gone ahead. 
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However, it was not simply a question of financial and 
technical support: there was no shortage of diplomatic effort to 
guarantee maximum access to the main grounds off western Africa. 
Despite the formal change in 1977 to Community-negotiated 
agreements with third countries and the interest of other EEC 
states in these grounds, notably Italy and Greece, France did not 
give up all bilateral contacts with African states. Le Pensec, for 
example, invited the President of Equatorial Guinea to Concarneau 
in the autumn of 1982, after the latter had banned tuna fishng off 
his coasts the previous year. They came to an agreement by 
linking the re-establishment of fishing rights to the acceptance 
by the tuna fleet to supply salt to an impoverished island off the 
Guinean coast. 
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After a little local difficulty - the ship 
delivering the salt was arrested -a formal accord between the EEC 
and Equatorial Guinea was subsequently reached in June 1983. This 
supplemented Community agreements that had already been made with 
Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea (Conakry). 
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4.4 Contrasting policy styles 
It would be naive to make a direct comparison between France and 
Britain and to chide the latter for failing to support her 
deep-sea industry as the French did. For one thing, there was no 
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tradition of fishing in tropical waters or indeed anywhere outside 
the cold Northern waters; for another, bilateral deals with the 
coastal states familiar to the British industry were immensely 
complicated not simply by EEC membership but by the number of 
other supplicants and the strength of the domestic fishing 
industries of the coastal states concerned. Canada and Norway are 
a very different proposition from Senegal and Equatorial Guinea. 
Rather it is necessary to seek an explanation for Britain's 
failure to act like France in the kinds of attitudes that both 
government and industry had about each other's role. However 
close individuals from the industry might come to the policy 
process, there remained a strong conviction on the part of 
government that it was up to the industry to manage its economic 
future and on the industry's part that it should be left to get on 
with making a living. 
The different British policy style was illustrated in the 
exploratory voyages that were undertaken by or on behalf of the 
industry. Already before the clash with Iceland major efforts 
were made to search for alternative species for the deep-sea 
industry. Excitement was considerable about the possibilities of 
blue whiting, which was known to exist in large volumes near 
Rockall. In March 1975, for example, MAFF and the WFA coordinated 
to hire the Hull trawler 'Arctic Privateer' for a 50 day voyage 
which proved very successful with a catch of 400t. 
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However, 
there was all the difference in the world between this kind of 
experiment and the owners themselves deciding to go in search of 
the blue whiting. One Fleetwood fishing manager pointed to the 
176 
price of £30 per ton in the auction and insisted that it was not 
worth his company's while: "we're not desparate". 
91 
From a 
market-orientated position, his position was completely rational: 
after all, what chance did the blue whiting have when Birds Eye 
were spending £1Om per year on encouraging people to eat cod 
fillets? 
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The only way that such logic could be modified would be 
through conscious state attempts to manipulate the market, as FIOM 
was effectively doing in France. However, there was no question 
of this in the British context even after the deep-sea fleet had 
started to contract dramatically. In January 1980, for example, 
the government put up £443,000 to finance four freezers to look 
for scad (horse mackerel) in the Bay of Biscay and placed 
scientists on board each ship to monitor what happened. At the 
same time, it made it clear that all responsibility for marketing 
the catch was the owners'. Hence the fact that the value of a 
large catch was undermined by the import surge of that year was 
seen as an unavoidable accident, not a condition to be 
combatted. 
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The aid that the government subsequently gave in March 1980 
followed in this 'non-directive' tradition. One million pounds 
were made availabrle for exploratory voyages but the money was 
declared 'open for tender' with anyone free to apply and no 
attempt made to determine with the industry as a whole where and 
what was to be fished, other than specifying 'under-utilised 
species'. By the time the next package of aid came along, all 
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further exploratory voyages had been cancelled because there was 
no more money and no market for any fish caught was perceived to 
exist. 
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Within government there was a tendency to argue that much of 
the problem lay with the owners themselves. When questioned by 
the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee about why there had not been 
more attention on distant waters outside NEAFC, Kelsey, the 
Fisheries Secretary at MAFF, replied: "I am bound to say ... that 
the British industry has not shown much interest in these more 
widespread, long-ranging possibilities". 
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However, to say this 
was to acknowledge that it was not considered appropriate to 
exercise undue influence over the industry's perceptions of the 
possible. Nor was it entirely accurate in that there were 
attempts to escape the growing level of inactivity but none of 
them enjoyed the kind of supervision exercised by FIOM. 
One early independent initiative came in 1977 when the Boston 
Group and J. Marr sent three and two ships respectively on trials 
in the waters between Greenland and Canada. The results were 
disastrous with large quantities of the catch not sold and both 
firms suffering heavy losses: £60,000 in the case of the Boston 
Group; £29,000 in the case of J. Marr. As a consequence, three 
more trawlers were laid up. 
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Then in 1978/9, three British 
United Trawlers (BUT) vessels, the 'Othello', 'Cassio' and 'Orsis' 
were sent to fish off Western Australia. BUT had taken a 50% 
share in an Australian company, Southern Ocean Fish Processors 
Ltd., and wanted to develop a catching and processing centre in 
178 
Albany. However, the company found that the substantial mix of 
species in these sub-tropical waters made sorting and grading 
difficult and resulted in too small a catch of commercially-viable 
fish. The Australians, for their part, thought that BUT had not 
done enough on the marketing side and so the experiment came to an 
abrupt end* 
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What both these examples underline is that within Britain, 
the industry generally preferred to go its own way and the state 
had no institutional mechanism by which to channel the energies of 
the owners, even if a desire to do so had existed. FIOM, by 
contrast, was the expresson of the French industry's willingness 
to have its preferences manipulated and of the state's intent to 
engage in such manipulation. It is true that FIOM's role did 
arouse controversy: for some time after its birth, the owners 
looked upon it with suspicion as yet another bureaucratic block to 
progress. In one notable article, the UAP took a phrase from a 
popular analysis of the basic weakness of French society, to draw 
attention to what it saw as wrong with the workings of FIOM. 
"The technocrat's dream is to fix the future 
on paper, coldly deciding what is suitable for 
the administered. " 
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However, it then emerged that the owners' main complaint was not 
that FIOM was doing too little but rather that it was not giving 
enough backing for distant water fishing. 
99 
In an important 
sense, the owners did not want to go their own way. 
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It does not follow from this that there was automatic 
agreement in France on all issues. There was certainly not 
unanimity, for example, about the financing of the Kerguelen 
voyages. When the discussion for the 1981-3 period was underway, 
5 members of the Management Council abstained in the vote, 
doubtful whether it was worth spending the money and feeling that 
the other main company with a deep-sea interest was being 
discriminated against. 
100 What FIOM permitted, however, was the 
possibility of such sectional squabbles being overcome. 
A similar process of interest aggregation was visible in the 
way the demands of the unions were treated. The leaders 
recognized the difficulties that they were obliging their men to 
face around the Kerguelens. The sailors would be forced to stand 
up to very severe weather conditions with poor communications and 
little assistance available. And given the lower wage rates 
applicable in La Reunion, they could not be sure that in the 
longer term, they would keep their jobs. Furthermore, their 
present earnings were at risk in that they could not know whether 
the 20% of the value of fish disembarked that the crew received 
would bring them their normal level of earnings. 
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As a result, the CFDT, for example, resolutely opposed 
voyages exceeding 135 days and demanded that state support be 
provided to pay for reserve crews to be flown out. 
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Such 
demands were generally regarded as reflecting a recognition by the 
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unions (and that includes the usually uncompromising CGT) that 
they needed to avoid excessive demands, if the trials were to have 
any chance of succeeding. 
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Indeed they achieved a partial 
satisfaction for those demands. Though not realised, the plans 
for 1983 included an agreement that the crew would be sent home by 
air for 15 days between each of the three 75 day voyages that the 
'Zelande' was to make from La Reunion. 
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Such moderation on the part of the union and the agreement of 
the owners can be seen as the product of the recognition that 
there was no alternative. Yet the perception of alternatives is a 
relative thing. However much individuals or committees might 
encourage distant water voyages in Britain, nothing was done, and 
this inactivity was for reasons that might equally well have been 
used in France. The men were said not to be prepared to go and be 
away from their families for such long periods of time, while the 
owners complained that the nearest available dry dock facilities 
in South Africa were far too distant. 
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It is clear that the logic of the policy process worked in 
very different ways in the two states. In France, there was 
plenty of hard bargaining, with the owners arguing that it was 
really all too expensive, the government maintaining that it could 
not possibly cover all the risks and the unions insisting that the 
conditions for the men on the ships were intolerable. 
Nevertheless, these stances formed part of a ritual where 
"everybody played the game x, 
106 
and where a common committment to 
boosting national production ensured that an agreement would 
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eventually be reached. In Britain, by contrast, there was not 
this same underlying consensus about what the purpose of such 
trips would be and hence the disagreements between the partners 
served as a force for fragmentation, with the state not able or 
willing to act to aggregate the various interests involved. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has indicated "that the industry would demand 
increased intervention to protect it from the effects of the 
changing environment and that the government would feel itself 
obliged to cater for these demands". However, it has been found 
that the extent of the intervention demanded and the nature of 
that intervention varied greatly in the two states. The evidence 
confirms our assumption "that the 'dirigiste' French tradition and 
the British aversion to intervention would mean that government 
efforts to determine the shape of the industry were more developed 
in France than in Britain". 
The material has not suggested that the French state, unlike 
its British counterpart, will always act innovatively or impose a 
central direction. Rather it confims the view that there is in 
the former: 
"a capacity for policy initiative, a potential 
for far-sighted planning and a propensity to 
impose its will when this is necessary to 
"107 obtain public objectives. 
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This readiness to use such a political will seems to be 
particularly relevant in the context of the economic objectives of 
national production and modernisation, where a broad consensus 
exists anyway and to which the state can appeal with powerful 
effect. In Britain, where the concept of market supply is more 
powerful than that of production, such an appeal is not available 
to overcome divergent private objectives. Instead the British 
state responded to calls for intervention in a way which reflected 
a limited desire to establish a clear ordering of priorities 
within the fisheries sector: the public interest was no more than 
the sum of individual interests. 
Finally, the chapter has not provided an easy answer to the 
issue of the comparative success enjoyed by the two fishing 
industries. The breakdown of the Kerguelen experiment underlines 
the difficulties involved in seeking to manage the fish market and 
to find international outlets for national production. Similarly, 
it is not obvious that any more widespread fishing by British 
deep-sea trawlers in distant waters would have had a major impact 
on their declining fortunes. Rather the chapter shows how the two 
states pursued different strategies to cope with decline, which 
operated on the basis of very different premises as to what both 
the ends and means of policy should be. Judgement on the success 
of the industries cannot therefore be separated from a judgement 
of the wider merits of more liberal as against more protectionist 
economic philosophies. We shall return to this issue in the final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MEDIATORY PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will broaden the discussion of the relationship 
between state and society in the fisheries sector, by considering 
the importance of the actors outside the immediate circle provided 
by the government and the industry. As in the previous chapter, 
the material will revolve around the two assumptions linked to the 
perspective, which were introduced at the beginning of this study 
(p 30 above). It was suggested, first, that "the representatives 
of the industry would be obliged to transmit the views of the 
industry through a much wider set of channels because of the 
disgruntlement of their members at the effects of the changing 
environment". The second suggestion was "that higher French 
acceptance of the legitimacy of public action and the greater 
elasticity of British political life would make such developments 
more widespread in Britain than in France. " Here it will be 
claimed that the broader ventilation of discontent was a central 
aspect of the behaviour of the British industry. However, the 
French industry showed little interest in actively pursuing the 
support of actors outside the traditional institutional framework. 
This challenge to the first assumption will be explained in terms 
of the importance of the parliamentary arena in the British 
context and its relative weakness in the French setting. The same 
contrast also helps to explain why private interests within the 
industry were able to flourish in Britain in a way that they could 
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not in France, thus underlining the validity of the distinction 
contained in the second assumption. 
To develop the argument, the chapter is divided into two 
parts. In the first, it will be claimed that the political 
salience of the issue increased in both countries but in different 
ways. Whereas in Britain, the industry consciously sought to 
influence government through Parliament by regular appeals to a 
wider opinion, outside interest in the fisheries issue in France 
was much' more sporadic and developed without direct pressure 
from the industry. The second section will suggest that these 
contrasting patterns in the mediation of grievances had different 
effects on the relative cohesion of the two industries. In 
Britain, divisions within the industry generated strong 
centrifugal pressures, with the state's role being limited to that 
of a broker, reliant on consultation and consent. In France, a 
centripetal process was at work. The importance of the state's 
role in aggregating individual interests meant that separate 
groups within the industry were restrained from seeking 
preferential treatment vis-a-vis other groups by canvassing for 
support in the political arena. 
The chapter should be seen as closely linked to the previous 
one. It develops the idea of a tension between the aggregation 
and the articulation of societal interests and the contrasting 
ways in which that tension was resolved in Britain and France. 
Just as the previous chapter concentrated on the French system 
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with its capacities for aggregation, so the present chapter will 
lean more towards the British experience with its stress upon the 
fullest articulation of interests in the relations between state 
and society. 
2. Divergent patterns of political salience 
One of the paradoxes of this study is the gap between the economic 
and political importance of the fishing industry. Whatever the 
industry's difficulties, it was and remains, in a relative sense, 
of minute economic importance. In none of the present members of 
the Community do fishermen represent more than 1% of the total 
workforce, in most the figure is much lower. In 1979 it was 
estimated that the percentage in Britain was 0.09 and in France 
0.11.1 Similarly, the contribution of landings to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the present EEC states is well under 1% 
in every case; in 1976 it was put at 0.17% in both France and 
Britain. 
2 
A comparison with the agricultural sector underlines 
the point. In 1977, for example, there were over 2 million people 
employed in agriculture in France, just under 10% of the 
workforce, contributing nearly 5% of GDP; in Britain in the same 
year there were many fewer - just under three quarters of a 
million - but that still represented 2.8% of the workforce and the 
same percentage of GDP. 
3 
At the same time, the fisheries issue assumed a much greater 
political importance in both countries. The change was epitomised 
by Foreign Secretary Crosland's comment that British foreign 
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policy had been reduced to "fish and bloody Rhodesia", while in 
France, the issue reached a highpoint of resonance when it figured 
in the debate between Mitterand and Giscard d'Estaing before the 
1981 Presidential election, the former accusing the latter of a 
'lack of tenacity' in the CFP negotiations. 
4 
Such comments would 
have been unthinkable even five years earlier. The French Council 
of Ministers only had its first overview of the problems of the 
sea at its meeting on December 15 1976, while the debate on 
fisheries in the British Parliament on June 30 1975 was the first 
to be called for by the Opposition front bench rather than 
individual backbenchers. 
However, the extent of this new political salience and the 
processes through which it was brought about were very different 
in the two countries. Whereas the issue rarely disappeared from 
view in Britain, it was only in 1975 and then again in 1980-1 that 
the case of the French fishermen emerged from obscurity. This 
contrast was in part due to the two industries being surrounded by 
very different political environments and in part the result of 
their conceiving of their relationship with the state in divergent 
ways. 
It has already been shown in Chapter Four how the fishery 
sector's relationship with the state had developed very 
differently in the two countries. From the time of Colbert there 
had been in France a close identification between the two, 
maintained through a set of state-sponsored institutions. In 
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Britain the ties had been much looser, with little attempt to mark 
out fishermen as a group from the rest of the population. These 
differences were to be one reason why in France the industry did 
not actively seek to ventilate its grievances through a wider set 
of channels, whereas in Britain the opportunity existed and was 
eagerly grasped by the industry. 
However, there was a further reason for the different levels 
of political salience which relates to the contrasting political 
arrangements in the two countries. The Fifth Republic's 
Constitution produced in 1958 was a reaction against what were 
seen as the deficiencies of its predecessor, in particular the 
role of political parties in undermining the stability of 
government through the Assembly. 
5 
This assault on the 
'gouvernement d'assemblee' resulted in a clear institutional 
separation of the executive and the legislature combined with a 
marked downgrading of the powers of the legislature. In Britain, 
by contrast, whatever the actual limits on Parliament's power, the 
political system continued to revolve around the principle of the 
sovereignty of Parliament with the executive integrated into and 
working through the legislature. Furthermore, the long-running 
coherence and discipline of the British two party system was 
unmatched in the French context. The 'revitalisation' of the 
parties in France in the 1970s was a matter for surprised comment, 
rather than a basic feature of political life. 
6 
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These two elements help to explain what happened when the 
difficulties of the fishing industry grew in the 1970s. In 
France, as we have seen (cf p135 above) the feeling spread that 
the CCPM structure was inadequate as a way of protecting the 
economic interests of the industry. Hence the creation of FIOM at 
the beginning of 1976 and the continuous pressure for a Ministry 
of the Sea. However, it is important not to misunderstand the 
character of this dissatisfaction. There was still a very strong 
residue of feeling that the old structure remained the central 
element for transmitting the views of the industry to the state. 
Never was this feeling more evident than when outsiders sought to 
challenge that structure. In 1981 the head of a small 
independent research body, dealing with fishery matters, the 
Centre d'Etude et d'Action Sociales Maritimes (CEASM) wrote a 
scathing attack on the organisation of the maritime sector: 
"Attached to the Transport Ministry between 
Concorde and the Airbus, the maritime 
profession are, in the eyes of the 
administration that supervises them, sailors 
rather than producers. The CCPM, born under 
Vichy, provides the sector with a corporatist 
professional organisation. The unions are up 
to their necks in it, stuck between the 
owners, the merchants, the fishmongers and the 
administration. ,7 
The response was immediate and powerful. Not only did the CCPM's 
President deny the link with Vichy but its Bureau, with 
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representatives from all sides of the industry, passed a unanimous 
resolution disapproving of the attack and reaffirming the value of 
the 1945 institutions. 
8 
This restatement of faith did not mean that the CCPM was 
considered, even by those within it, as the only channel of 
communication with the government. The representatives of the 
companies, in particular, stressed the importance of direct links 
with the Ministry and regarded the CCPM as a safety valve rather 
than as a way of influencing government policy. For them it has 
remained a structure which helps to counterbalance the privileged 
access of the employers to the Ministry but which can do no more 
than allow the administration to hear the industry's response to 
decisions taken elsewhere. 
9 
The unions, for their part, were well 
aware of the limited role of the CCPM, notably in the exclusion of 
discussion on issues where there was a major lack of consensus. 
As one of their leaders put it, "life would be intolerable" if 
issues such as the size of crews or the level of salaries were 
raised in the central or local committees. Such issues had to be 
dealt with directly with the employers while support for the union 
view was sought directly from the government, particularly after 
the 1981 elections. 
10 
However, these reservations were not new ones, nor were they 
substantially affected by the changes of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
owners did not consider boycotting the 1945 institutions, however 
much they might question privately its overall importance. The 
unions also continued to see the benefits of a formal, 
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legally-defined set of arrangements, which provided them with a 
guaranteed means of making their views known to government. For 
their different reasons, neither side had a strong incentive to 
look beyond the existing framework as a way of exerting more 
pressure on the state apparatus. 
In Britain, by contrast, the pattern of relations saw 
considerable development in the 1970s. The industry devoted an 
increasing amount of time and money to bringing indirect pressure 
on the government. Far from stressing direct contacts, like their 
French counterparts, British fishermen sought to influence policy 
by obtaining maximum exposure for their grievances outside the 
narrow confines of the Whitehall ministries. Above all, the 
parliamentary arena became the focus of the fishermen's defence of 
their interests in a way which had no parallel in France. 
There had always been close relations between the fishing 
industry and individual constituency MPs. For many years these 
MPs had met within the framework of the All Party Fisheries Group 
to discuss the difficulties of the industry and had used debates 
in the Commons to prod the government into action. In 1971, at 
the time of negotiation on accession to the EEC, it was the 20 to 
30 Conservative members representing the constituencies of the 
inshore industry who had made the most fuss, pressing for a 
revision of the CFP agreed by the Six the year before. 
" 
Similarly, during the three 'Cod Wars' (1958-61,1972-3 and 
1975-6), it was the mainly Labour members of the deep-sea ports of 
Hull, Grimsby and Aberdeen who had spoken most frequently on the 
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floor of the House to bolster anti-Icelandic opinion and to try to 
stop the government from any back-sliding. 
12 
There was therefore already a basic framework of contacts 
between the industry and Parliament, upon which it was possible to 
build. This was in marked contrast with the situation in France, 
where attitudes to the members of the Assembly had never been 
particularly positive. With one or two exceptions, notably Le 
Pensec, a deputy for many years in Finistere before he became 
Minister for the Sea in 1981, the bulk of deputies were considered 
to lack "le fibre maritime" i. e either major feeling for or 
expertise in the issue at stake. 
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The British industry, for its 
part was unanimous in believing in the importance of Parliament as 
a way of influencing governments. Though the SFF and TGWU would 
probably agree on little else, their Chief Executive and National 
Fishing Officer respectively gave very similar appreciations. The 
former described Parliament as 'the best road', while the latter 
called it 'the best tool', perhaps the only tool when an 
individual or group did not have the ear of a minister. 
14 
Thus 
the activities of the industry in the period between 1975 and 1983 
remained predominantly within the parliamentary framework. 
However, the range of strategies used by British fishermen 
extended far beyond anything that had been known in the past. 
Both at Westminster itself and beyond they devised techniques to 
make life as uncomfortable as possible for any minister who was 
prepared to sacrifice this sectional group in the interests of 
some wider objective. Lobbying expanded from a port-based 
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activity onto a much wider scale, reflecting the increase in 
organisational coherence of the industry. The development of the 
SFF, for example, made it possible to coordinate the descent of 
fishermen from all over Scotland onto Westminster in February, 
1979 to keep up pressure on the government. As the newsletter of 
the SFF put it: "the delegation lobbied MPs of all parties. MPs 
and passers-by were given parcels of haddock and told 'have some 
while there's still some left'. " 
15 
Similarly, over 300 fishermen 
from the South West came up to London in March 1981, fearful that 
an EEC agreement might fail to protect them adequately. 
"Exclusive limit or we're on the dole" was the cry. 
16 Again such 
concerted action between ports would have been quite out of the 
question in earlier years. 
Within Parliament this kind of pressure was reflected in the 
increased volume of debate and the care that the government took 
to placate the fisheries lobby. Following the major debate of 
June 30,1975, the issue was rarely out of the pages of Hansard 
for more than a few months. 
17 In particular, every time there was 
an EEC Council meeting, Ministers would make an appearance in the 
Commons before, after or both. If it was before the meeting, 
they could follow the fullest airing of the industry's case with a 
promise that they would not ignore what had been said. As Silkin 
put it in June 1978: 
"I shall go to Luxembourg on Monday in the 
knowledge that the House is behind me in 
demanding a fair deal for British 
fishermen. "18 
193 
On their return, Ministers would be able to explain how such a 
fair deal had eluded them or as occurred in January 1983, how 
success had been achieved. Even in this latter case, though, 
Walker was mindful that he was not just talking to the assembled 
MPs: 
"I would like to record my gratitude to the 
leaders of the fishing industry who have 
attended every meeting with me and who have 
discussed and agreed what we have 
negotiated. "19 
Such overt use of the French Assembly as a medium for the 
grievances of the industry was out of the question. Only once a 
year was the fisheries issue even formally discussed and that was 
in the context of a debate on the budget of the Merchant Marine as 
a whole. On one occasion in June 1977 there was a specific debate 
on the sea but it aroused little enthusiasm. The government had 
already put it off several times and attendance was poor. It 
seemed difficult to believe that 150 people claimed to belong to 
the Parliamentary Group for the Sea. 
20 
In general, the members 
within the Assembly were seen as not very concerned with the 
issue. The uproar of August 1980, when suddenly everyone was 
active in the fishermen's cause, was contrasted with the annual 
Merchant Marine debates where the emptiness of the chamber is broken 
only by a dozen deputies or senators struggling against the 
sandman. " 
21 
What made the situation so different in Britain was the 
existence of two dominant and relatively well-disciplined parties, 
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alternating in office. The industry was aware that getting its 
view accepted in Parliament meant obtaining influence over the 
present government or the alternative to it. In fact it was 
remarkably successful in extending support for its position over 
both parties, generating a high degree of consensus over the need 
to protect fishermen, particularly in the context of the EEC 
negotiations. Within debates the result was that nearly everyone 
seemed to be saying pretty much the same thing. As Hamish Watt 
commented: "There is such a degree of unanimity on this question 
that it is difficult to avoid repetition. "22 It also meant that 
there was an awareness that going outside the consensus might be 
expensive electorally. In 1978, for example, it was calculated 
that among the 22 fishing constituencies, the percentage of 
marginal seats was three times the national average with the 
Conservatives in particular vulnerable to any swing. 
23 
The industry, for its part, was careful not to upset this 
consensus by lining up with any of the minority parties. This was 
particularly noticeable in Scotland where the Scottish Nationalist 
Party (SNP) took up the fishing issue with great vigour: indeed it 
was very much thanks to its member, Hamish Watt, that the Trade 
and Industry Sub-Committee's enquiry into the fishing industry was 
set up. However, the Scottish fishermen's representatives were 
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careful not to get too closely involved with the SNP. As Hay, the 
President of the SFF, put it: 
"We are grateful 
Scottish Natior 
industry but we 
tool. "24 
Thus when in 1979 the 
for the interest and help the 
alists have shown in our 
won't be used as a political 
SNP lost the four Grampian fishing 
constituencies of East Aberdeenshire, Banffshire, Moray and Nairn 
and South Angus, it was not difficult for the SFF to carry on its 
efforts through the new Conservative members. 
25 
The party structure in France was quite different and did not 
offer the French industry the same opportunities, even if they had 
wished to take advantage of them. It was not that they were 
totally unaware of the grievances of the fishermen but rather that 
like the SNP, they sought to use those grievances to develop their 
own overall political profile in the eyes of the electorate. This 
was particularly true of the two parties of the Left, who were in 
opposition until 1981, the Socialists (PSF) and the Communists 
(PCF). Both set out to establish a distinctive policy approach 
for an issue that they had not given much, if any, thought to in 
earlier years. For the PCF, this meant tabling draft laws in 
October 1976 and May 1980, which were based on themes familiar 
from other parts of the party's programme, such as the inadequacy 
of state support and the increasing grip of the multinational 
trusts upon French production. 
26 
For the PSF, a first study day 
on fisheries in 1976 was followed by the development of a number 
of policy proposals which were put together into a book for the 
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1981 elections. 
27 
La Mer Retrouvee reflected the wider thinking of 
the party with its stress on the need for investment and for a 
more developed social policy. In this way both parties were able 
to confront their adversaries in the 1981 election with a set of 
distinctive proposals for this issue and to give a political 
dimension to the fisheries' issue that it had not had before. 
Indeed it appeared to be a notably successful strategy in 
combatting Giscard d'Estaing. When the second round of the 
Presidential elections took place in May 1981, it emerged that in 
Brittany in particular, the fishing ports turned markedly against 
the outgoing President. 
28 
Once the elections were over, however, 
the issue returned very much to the obscurity from which the 
political parties had raised it. 
In Britain, by contrast, the issue retained much greater 
salience throughout the period of this study. This was because 
the industry's efforts extended beyond the direct links that were 
forged with individual MPs and political parties. The use of 
lobbying at Westminster was by no means the only way in which the 
catching sector sought to influence opinion there. What occurred 
was a proliferation of contacts, all designed to keep the pressure 
on and make life difficult for the government. It was a 
development which knew no parallel in France. 
The most obvious indicator of the change was the way in which 
the media became a central element in the defence of the industry. 
The wealthier sections of the industry, notably the BTF, had 
traditionally employed a public relations consultant to present 
197 
their case but now an effort was made to coordinate the industry's 
position. On July 20 1976 the inshore and deep-sea industries 
launched an advertising campaign in the national press at a cost 
of E35,000, urging their case for exclusive limits of at least 50 
miles. 
29 Therafter it was never difficult for the industry to 
obtain a hearing, whether in the newspapers on televison or on the 
radio. The voice of Austen Laing, for example, was regularly 
heard on the 'Today' programme, commenting from Hull on the latest 
failure to achieve an EEC agreement. 
Moreover, there was no problem in using the media to get 
across a particular version of events. Reference has already been 
made (p 87 above) to the March 1980 'World in Action' programme 
when a Hull trawler skipper claimed to have found illegally caught 
herring on the quayside in Boulogne. A conspicuous feature of the 
programme was that the viewer was hardly given a chance to assess 
the validity of the charge. What he was given was the opportunity 
to share in and subscribe to the intense suspicion felt by the 
British fishing industry towards the industry in other countries. 
This vision of the world also made its way into the 
parliamentary arena via the press. When Fishing News reported 
similar illegal landings of herring later in the year, it was 
immediately picked up by MPs in the Commons. Johnson, one of the 
Labour MPs for Hull, waved his copy of the paper furiously at the 
government and demanded action against the culprits, the French. 
30 
Nor should it be supposed that what appeared in such a paper was 
treated as of no account by government ministers. Buchanan-Smith, 
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Minister of State at MAFF after 1979, accused Fishing News of 
disreputable journalism when it put out a banner headline: "We 
must give way" i. e in the EEC negotiations. While he denied 
having said anything of the kind, the paper retorted that this was 
certainly the tenor of his remarks. 
31 
There was an implicit 
recognition on both sides that what the paper had to say was 
influential and could make life very difficult for the government. 
The contrast with France could not be more marked. The 
sister paper of Fishing News, Le Marin, often mirrored the British 
paper's coverage but it remained very much a trade journal, 
without any wider political significance. After reporting the 
herring catch story from Fishing News, it did turn to the 
offensive itself. It pointed to the way in which Spanish vessels 
were registering in Britain and fishing under the British flag. 
The claim was that this was a deliberate tactic because there were 
not enough native ships to catch the level of quotas that Britain 
was demanding in the EEC negotiations. 
32 
Within the French 
industry this story provoked considerable uproar but there was no 
wider arena domestically into which it could be projected 
for the purpose of exerting influence. The French Parliament 
simply did not offer an arena for the ventilation of grievances in 
the way that Westminster did. 
More generally, the link between the media and the industry 
in France remained very underdeveloped. There were certainly 
plenty of stories about the hardship of the fishermen's life and 
at times, long articles on why the industry was in the state it 
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was, but the relationship remained a distant one. 
33 
Even with its 
base in Paris, the UAP was lucky to get one request a year from 
radio and television to present its view. 
34 
Nor was it 
necessarily easy to persuade the media to take a greater interest. 
Dubreuil, President of the CCPM, tried to get the television 
channels interested in a programme concerning the effects of the 
ban on the import of baby seal skins on the fishermen of 'la 
grande peche'. They were simply not interested and he did not 
pursue the matter. 
35 
In Britain nothing seemed easier than to attract media 
attention and the fishermen proved markedly adept at it. They 
developed a further tactic to increase their salience in the 
public eye, which was unmatched by the fishermen of any other EEC 
country. Though a few members of the French fishing industry 
had traditionally gone to Brussels to give their delegation 
support, it was nothing compared with the trips that the British 
industry made every time the Council of Fishery Ministers met. 
From 1977 onwards from 15 to 40 representatives would fly off to 
Brussels or Luxembourg and stay there for the duration of the 
meeting. To some this looked like an enormous amount of time, 
effort and money for very little reward, when the important 
consultations had already taken place in London before the 
meeting. 
36 It can be seen, however, as much more of a public 
relations exercise, designed to convince the men hack home that a 
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good job was being done with their subscriptions and to make sure 
that any concessions in the Council chamber got as much 
ventilation as possible after the meeting. The Minister might 
have his own version of events but the fishermen's presence 
ensured that the journalists could be guaranteed an immediate 
industry quote on the official version. 
This final example of the strategy of British fishermen 
underlines again how the nature of their relations with the state 
and the character of the political system as a whole encouraged 
behaviour which was quite out of the question in France. It 
should, however, be said that the resonance of the issue was 
accentuated by other factors, which made it a rather special one 
in British eyes. For one thing, whereas France has never had a 
highly-developed 'esprit maritime', for Britain the sea has always 
had a very strong symbolic content. Canetti has pointed to the 
way in which all the triumphs and disasters of English history are 
bound up with the sea, and suggested that it remains a distinctive 
'crowd symbol': 
"The Englishmen sees himself as a captain on 
board a ship with a small group of people, the 
sea around and beneath him. He is almost 
alone; as captain he is in many ways isolated 
even from his crew., 
37 
Though this link with the sea necessarily remains difficult to 
quantify, there can be little doubt that it helped to generate a 
strong sense of admiration for the fishing community. Once that 
community was under threat, support for it assumed an emotional 
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aspect which it could never have in the French context with 
traditions much more closely associated with the land. 
There is also a second sense in which the nature of the issue 
was a rather special one for Britain. It cannot be forgotten that 
for most people in the British fishing industry a basic problem of 
the CFP was that it had been agreed in June 1970 on the day before 
the negotiations with the applicant states began: for them it 
lacked legitimacy. France, by contrast, had put her name to that 
agreement and subsequently insisted that it was and must be the 
legal starting point for any further discussion. Hence the British 
were seeking to challenge the whole basis of the debate on the 
CFP, while the French worked to restrict negotiation to matters 
which did not put that basis in doubt. Britain's isolation in the 
EEC and the bias in the policy process generated by the attitude 
of the other member states help further to explain the increased 
politicisation of the issue. 
38 
These arguments do not, however, run counter to the main 
contention of this section. Rather they offer a wider setting for 
the basic distinction offered between an intermittent salience in 
France to which the industry contributed little, and a regular 
salience in Britain which the industry did all it could to 
develop. The effects of this distinction will be considered in 
the next section. 
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3. The relative cohesion of the two industries 
In the previous section the strategies of the industry were 
discussed in unitary terms. However, it should be clear from 
Chapters Two and Four that the industry in both countries is a 
very varied one. Leaving aside the division between the catching 
sector and those outside it, there are significant distinctions 
amongst the catchers between inshore and deep-sea interests, 
employer and employee interests and different regional interests. 
It is these distinctions which will be considered in turn in this 
section. In France they were contained reasonably well within the 
existing structure of consultation, whereas in Britain the greater 
ventilation of the issue served not only to increase its general 
political salience but also to underline the divergent priorities 
of the various sections of the industry. 
It will also be argued that the mediatory process cannot be 
understood without reference to the role of the state and the 
issues raised in the previous chapter. The nature of the economic 
intervention that was considered legitimate both by the state and 
by the industry was itself important in determining the way in 
which demands were formulated, pursued and resolved within the 
political arena. The greater British reluctance to prognosticate 
on the desirable economic shape of the industry left wider scope 
for debate and offered less common ground around which all 
fishermen could coalesce. There was therefore a centrifugal 
process at work, which contrasted with the centripetal politics 
that predominated in the French context. 
39 
There was much less 
discussion in France precisely because there was much more common 
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agreement on what the economic objectives of the industry should 
be. This did not mean that there were no differences of opinion - 
there were and often very bitter ones, as will emerge in the next 
chapter - but these differences revolved around how best the 
state's accepted role as protector of the whole industry should be 
developed. The result of the contrast was a marked difference in 
the way in which national interests, were conceived and pursued in 
the two countries. Whereas in Britain there was great stress on 
as 
the importance of consultation and consent/the only way of uniting 
a cacophony of voices, in France the procedures were much more 
institutionalised, with the industry itself able to play a part in 
devising a national response under the supervision of the 
'tutellary' state. These contrasting roles will be considered in 
the final part of this section. 
3.1 Deep-sea and inshore interests 
One of the major questions thrown up by the history of the fishing 
industry in recent years is why Britain accepted the terms of the 
CFP, as agreed in 1970. It seems remarkable that whatever the 
enthusiasm of the Heath government for joining the Community, it 
was possible to reach an agreement which was to pose so many 
problems. What is often forgotten is that the shape of the 
industry at the beginning of the 1970s was quite different from 
what it was ten years later. By 1980 it was the Scottish inshore 
ports that were at the centre of the industry, whereas in 1970 it 
was the deep-sea industry concentrated in Hull and Grimsby which 
predominated. The importance of this change lies not just in terms 
of the industry's structure but also in terms of the character of 
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the message that the interests in the industry transmitted to 
government. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the inshore and deep-sea 
sectors "made no serious attempt to coordinate their positions in 
the face of the prospect of British membership of the EEC. The 
inshore industry was worried at the prospect of fishing 'up to the 
beaches' which the 'equal access' provision of the 1970 agreement 
appeared to promise. In October 1971, for example, they dropped 
in on the Brighton Conference of the Conservative Party from 20 or 
so boats "with anti-EEC slogans and Very pistols. "40 The owners 
of the deep-sea companies, for their part, saw little reason to 
join forces with their small-scale colleagues. The prospect of 
Norway joining the EEC made them far from unenthusiastic about a 
policy which prejudiced the chances of any member state creating 
exclusive limits. Norwegian waters offered a very attractive 
proposition to the men of the BTF and STF. 
41 
They both had good reason for making their different 
perspectives known but there was no kind of pressure put upon them 
by the state to seek to reconcile those differences. The emphasis 
was on divergent economic interests being fully expressed rather 
than on mechanisms for fitting such divergences into a wider 
economic framework. The climate in France, protectionist in both 
an economic and a political sense, meant that it was possible to 
go some way towards transcending this division of interest in the 
industry. There was an early acknowledgement that 200 mile EEZs 
were soon to come 
42 
and the 1972 agreement with Canada reflected 
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the state's determination to seek to adjust to that change 
whatever the preferences of the firms involved. Similarly, the 
CCPM was able to vary fuel aid as between deep-sea and inshore 
interests, even agreeing to exclude the largest vessels of 'la 
grande peche', who could pass on the increase in price thanks to 
the fixed contracts with fish processors that were a central part 
of their operations. 
43 
In Britain, continued resistance to the idea of 200 mile EEZs 
meant that when the final 'Cod War' blew up in 1975, the deep-sea 
industry was once again able to give full expression to its desire 
to maintain access to Icelandic fishing grounds. Despite the fact 
that the government was engaged in negotiations with the EEC over 
the extension of limits around Britain's own coasts, it used Royal 
Navy ships in a very costly defence of the right of trawlers to 
operate around Iceland. What is more, it was one that proved a 
disastrous failure. After Icelandic offers of 65,000t. and then 
40,000t. a year were rejected, an agreement was reached in Oslo in 
June 1976 allowing access to the end of the year at a level 
equivalent to an annual catch of 30,000t. There was no further 
accord: British trawlers were suddenly debarred from waters that 
they had frequented since the 1880s. 
As with the debate on the CFP, this remarkable chapter in 
fisheries history prompted a major inquest. Many felt that an 
opportunity had been missed and the chance of maintaining some 
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distant-water operations around Iceland needlessly thrown away. A 
former ambassador to Iceland commented: 
"It is my belief that if we had made the best 
settlement possible ..., we would still (1978) 
be fishing in Icelandic waters today on a 
quota basis of about 40,000 tons .,, 
44 
His own explanation for the conspicuous failure to reach such an 
agreement was set at a high level of generality. He suggested 
that the government's constant reiteration of the strength of her 
claim in international law was a reflection of a total lack of 
awareness of how the world was changing, with Britain's role in it 
undergoing remorseless decline. 
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Others were prepared to argue 
that it was the fault of individuals: Hattersley, Minister of 
State at the Foreign Office, responsible for the negotiations, and 
Austen Laing, Director-General of the BFF, were favourite 
scapegoats. 
46 
However, an explanation can be found at an intermediate 
level. What was critical was the relationship between the state 
and this section of society. While for the British state it was 
important to be seen to respond to the calls of the industry, 
amplified in the parliamentary arena, the deep-sea owners were 
defending their economic interests as they saw fit. Almost no-one 
at the time contested what was being done, except to say that the 
government was not using its military muscle as effectively as it 
could. Certainly the state made no attempt to impose itself by 
arguing that it would be better to bow to political reality, make 
the best deal possible and seek other ways of redeploying the 
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fleet. At the same time, the rest of the industry stood on the 
sidelines as it could see no good reason for becoming involved. 
That the situation was of this kind is not something for which any 
individual can be blamed, it was a necessary productof apolitical 
process where an instrumental view of interests plays such a 
predominant role (cf p 20 above). 
The same centrifugal pressures can be detected in what 
occurred as the deep-sea industry progressively disintegrated. 
There was very little love lost between the old and new centres of 
power of the industry. The inshore men did not forget the disdain 
with which the big owners had treated them in the past and now 
argued that it was ridiculous to give subsidies to owners who were 
no longer going to send their ships to sea (cf pp 160-1). The 
company men, for their part, went out to cut their losses as best 
they could. Even within the deep-sea industry there was a feeling 
that what was happening reflected its inability to continue to 
protect its own interests and that its disappearance was an 
inevitable consequence of that inability. As Trawling Times, the 
paper of the BFF, put it in the final issue in May 1979: 
"In the tradition of this industry there are 
no crocodile tears ... We can no longer earn 
our keep. So we go. "47 
The state for its part, whether in the guise of a Conservative or 
Labour government, was not concerned to modify that tradition. If 
the deep-sea vessels were to disappear no British government, nor 
indeed anyone else in the industry, was going to prevent that 
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disappearance out of a desire to maintain the existing shape or 
productive potential of the fishing industry. 
3.2 Employer and employee interests 
The apparent unity of the British industry was not only breached 
by the divide between the inshore and the deep-sea sectors. There 
was also a very bitter conflict between employer and employee 
interests, dominated by the TGWU's concern, to obtain the 
decasualisation of the industry. Relations between the owners and 
the union were anything but cordial. Cairns, the National Fishing 
Officer of the TGWU argued that the employers were the worst he 
had ever encountered: "the last bastion of reaction" was his 
phrase. 
48 
The owners returned the compliment and went out of 
their way to snub the union. Before a meeting of the Sea 
Fisheries Training Council, set up by the Manpower Services 
Commission, the Grimsby owners let it be known that they would not 
attend because Cairns was going to be there. 
49 
The result of this niggling between the two sides was that 
even under the difficult conditions of the late 1970s, it proved 
very hard to get any kind of common stance from this section of 
the industry. The stress was on ventilating grievances not 
seeking to resolve them. It was something of a minor triumph when 
the Humberside County Council, in a report on the state of the 
fishing industry in the region, managed to incorporate a paragraph 
arguing that the hiring of fishermen was a throwback to the 
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Victorian era, and that they needed to be given the same 
protection as other workers. While Cairns insisted upon it, the 
owners only agreed under protest. 
50 
At a more general level, the two sides became deadlocked over 
the issue of the casual recruitment of labour. The TGWU got the 
three Hull MPs to ask MAFF to draw up plans on decasualisation 
right at the beginning of the Labour government in 1974 but little 
headway was made. The immediate response was that the issue was 
one for the industry to sort out and not the government. 
51 Given 
the attitude of the owners, there was little to be done and, once 
the Conservatives returned to office in 1979, still less. Even 
within the union, however, the issue was one that did not command 
unanimity. There were those who feared that the introduction of a 
national basic wage would encourage trawler owners to concentrate 
their activities on Hull and Grimsby. Bernstone, the TGWU 
District Officer for North Shields, for example, argued that "the 
Transport and General Workers' Union policy, if it was applied 
"52 absolutely to North Shields, would be the death knell. 
At the same time, there was no question of the decline of the 
deep-sea industry being accompanied by closer links between the 
TGWU and the inshore industry. Their differences of opinion were 
openly expressed and no attempt made to contain them. Further to 
an EEC proposal for improvements in social benefits, including the 
right to a pension at the age of 55 (as in France) and limits on 
excessive periods of continuous working, a union official went up 
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to Peterhead to distribute a leaflet outlining the proposals and 
to debate the matter: 
"Most crew members and many skippers expressed 
an immediate interest in the pension proposal. 
A number of skippers also expressed an 
immediate interest in throwing me in the dock. 
Most skippers and indeed a number of crewmen 
felt that any regulation applying to working 
hours would be impracticable. " 
53 
This union involvement in the affairs of the inshore industry was 
resented by the SFF. Its Chief Executive replied that the union 
was misrepresenting its views and confusing two points: 
"The one which envisages the eligibility of a 
fisherman to a pension at age 55 and the other 
which represents an attempt on the part of the 
trade union movement in Europe to impose upon 
the shore-operated sector of the fishing 
industry a set of working conditions which are 
totally at variance with the whole concept of 
share fishing and co-adventureship. "54 
Whereas the SFF strongly favoured the early pension proposal, it 
could not possibly accept the idea of any restrictions on working 
hours. Such limits constituted a challenge to the whole ideology 
of the inshore sector, which had no desire to be fettered by the 
restraints applicable in other sectors of the economy (cf p 60 
above). 
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Such a level of friction and such isolation of the unions was 
less marked in France. It is true that membership was not 
extensive and that rivalries between unions, notably the CFDT and 
CGT, undermined the common front of the employees but nevertheless 
the atmosphere was very different. In part, this was because the 
maritime sections of the unions were firmly incorporated within the 
framework of the 1945 institutions and saw them as an effective 
means of furthering their interests. Thus it was at the 
initiative of the chief CGT representative on the CCPM Bureau that 
a special committee was established to watch over the evolution of 
the number of ships in the fishing fleet, the Commission Nationale 
de la Flotte de Peche (cf p139 above). This offered a channel 
within the existing framework for union anxieties about the 
industry as a whole to be expressed. Similarly, the CFDT was 
concerned to use its position inside FIOM to point to the overall 
distributive effects of the aid policy of the government. Despite 
its own low membership amongst the 'artisans', it argued that far 
too much money (7,239 FF per man) was going to the deep-sea 
industry, when it was compared with 215 FF per man being paid out 
to the inshore industry. 
55 
However, tension was also less because the unions recognised 
that fishermen enjoyed a social regime more favourable than that 
of most people on land. This did not mean that there were no 
attempts to improve the position. In Etaples, paid holidays and 
compensation payments for the loss of earning were instituted for 
inshore fishermen and in some deep-sea ports agreement was reached 
with the owners to establish written records of hours. 
56 
However, 
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these changes only served to underline the contrast with other EEC 
countries, including Britain. The difference between national 
industries became very clear when union representatives from 
several countries attended meetings in Brussels and pressed for 
the use of the Treaty (Article 117) to develop social policy in 
the fisheries sector. 
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The French representatives were amazed to 
find that the representatives of other industries, like the SFF, 
wanted to set minimum standards based on the lowest level of 
provision rather than harmonising upwards to the highest level. 
58 
From this comparison it is clear that the employer/employee 
clivage in France did not challenge the cohesion of the industry 
in France to anything like the extent that marked the British 
case. 
3.3 Regional interests 
It was suggested above (p 199)that the trips of the British 
fishermen to Brussels illustrated a united ability by the industry 
to develop new techniques to influence government. However, the 
number of people making the trip to the bar of the Charlemagne 
building in Brussels was also an indicator of the regional tension 
within the British industry. This tension continued throughout 
the period of this study, despite increased organisational unity. 
A good example of the difficulty could be seen in the activity of 
the SFF. The Federation spans an enormously large range of 
geographically dispersed fishing communities with considerable 
suspicion between them. Thus as many as six men went to EEC 
meetings from the Shetlands because they were determined to ensure 
that their own particular point of view did not become submerged 
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in the overall stance of the Federation. 
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Indeed as the EEC 
settlement came to be formulated, the SFF was threatened by a 
substantial breakaway of component associations including the 
Shetlanders: the alliance that the fight against Brussels had 
forged proved fragile with the ending of that fight. 
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Similarly, there was a running battle between the 'nomad' 
Scottish fishermen, who descended to the South West of England in 
search of mackerel and the small-scale local boat owners of Devon 
and Cornwall, who felt that their own grounds were being put at 
risk by the massive catches of the men from the North. And, it 
proved very difficult indeed to devise any way of dampening the 
conflict. It began as early as 1975 and was still rumbling on five 
years later, complicated still further by the presence of the big 
trawlers from Hull, whose owners saw in mackerel one way of 
keeping their boats in operation. 
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The issue illustrated very 
clearly that simply calling for a fairer EEC settlement generated 
no deeply-rooted consensus. As early as April 1976, the Editor of 
Fishing News commented that many in the industry would be well 
satisfied by the Commission's proposal for a 12 mile exclusive 
limit. 
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The owners in the South West were an example of a group 
for whom the calls for 200 or 100 mile limits were both more and 
less than they needed. They could expect to keep out foreign 
boats with a much smaller band but they could not be protected in 
such a way from fellow nationals. Such protection required 
something more than the winning of a lion's share of fish for 
Britain within the EEC. 
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Such divergences in the industry were amplified as a result 
of the way complaints were ventilated: the parliamentary arena not 
only gave greater salience to the issue as a whole, it also 
accentuated the competition amongst fishermen. An example can be 
seen in the way in which the Hull MPs protected their own port's 
position in relation to Grimsby. 
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The decline in the number of 
ships fishing from Hull had the effect of pushing up the cost of 
unloading as the use of the dock was spread among fewer operators. 
By 1980, the cost had risen to £51.92 per tonne, as compared with 
£10 per tonne in Grimsby, where the presence of an inshore fleet 
had served to keep expenses down. However, Prescott, in 
particular, made full use of this comparison on the radio and was 
successful in getting the British Transport Docks Board to bring 
the cost down to £22.50 per tonne for British trawlers and £12.63 
for Icelandic ones. The intention was to encourage foreign ships 
with their very big catches to be more willing to come over from 
Grimsby to Hull. It was a classic example of the decentralised 
character of the policy process in Britain, very flexible but with 
little conception of harmony among competing private economic 
interests. 
It is true that the French fishing industry has never been as 
concentrated regionally as the British one. In France there is a 
greater evenness reflected both in the lack of a single dominant 
port or area and the relatively small size of the deep-sea 
companies, when compared with their British counterparts. 
Nevertheless, this lesser degree of concentration does not mean 
that there was no conflict between regions, the most conspicuous 
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being between the North, centred on Boulogne, and Brittany. In 
1971, for example, the Breton owners clashed with the men from the 
North, because the former felt that the latter were pushing too 
hard in the debate over the shareout of money for modernising the 
fleet. 
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As a result the Bretons established their own 
association, though they did not carry through their threat to 
leave the UAP altogether. Subsequently, there was a significant 
degree of mistrust because Boulogne was the main source of the 
imports that came into France, while Brittany was the area that 
suffered most from the drop in prices caused by those same 
imports. 
However, these conflicts did not spread or increase in 
visibility during the period of this study. The reason was that 
individual regions were not free to protect themselves at the 
expense of others, by changing their pattern of behaviour in a 
major way. When there were conflicts between particular ports as 
between La Turballe and Quiberon in Brittany, the fishermen did 
write to their local deputy, Bonnet, to give their case more force 
but the solution still came through traditional channels. The 
local maritime administrator brought the representatives of the 
two local committees together and got them to agree on new rules, 
without the issue gaining any further ventilation. 
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On a larger 
scale, it has already been shown how disagreements between areas 
were contained within the central state-sponsored institutions. 
Inside FIOM the owners of the North were defeated in their 
attempts to limit the money going to the SNPL from Bordeaux (cf 
Pt79above). The vote against them did not eliminate the conflict 
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but equally there was no question of it being challenged within 
the parliamentary arena, as it would surely have been in the 
British context. Nor was this centripetal process one that the 
industry as a whole seriously resented: it was very ambivalent 
about the notion of more local autonomy within the industry. When 
Le Pensec presented the CCPM with his proposals for change in the 
context of the government's general policy of decentralisation, 
the response of the profession was anything but favourable. 
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Ministry in Paris was to retain control of most decisions - ENIM, 
training, employment and security issues as well as disciplinary 
and general administrative matters. However, there was 
considerable disquiet about the facts that aid submissions for 
building boats would be devolved to the regions, and that the 
administrative structure of 'Affaires Maritimes' would be placed 
directly under the prefects, renamed 'Commissioners of the 
Republic'. The industry feared that it would lose its direct 
links with the Ministry in Paris. To a man, the Bureau of the CCPM 
- owners, unions, inshore, deep-sea - gave a fulsome tribute to 
the work of the maritime administrators and pressed for the status 
quo to be retained. 
Once again the example indicates the importance of 
deep-rooted societal attitudes towards the state. In the fishing 
industry these attitudes provoked resistance to modest change 
whilst at the same time underlining the cohesion of the industry. 
There was a reluctance to accept that regions should have more of 
a say in their own affairs. This was in marked contrast with the 
British mediatory tradition, where differences between regions 
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could be freely expressed and amplified in the open parliamentary 
arena. 
3.4 National interests 
The difference between the two traditions is also well illustrated 
in the way in which broad national interests were conceived and 
pursued. Contrasting economic stances, in the two states combined 
with distinctive political styles to generate approaches to the 
identification of national interests which bore very little 
relation to one another. Here we will illustrate the contrast by 
looking first at the way in which the British government moved 
towards a settlement of the fisheries issue within the EEC and 
then at how the French responded to the arrest of a number of 
Breton trawlers off the South Wales coast. 
When Walker presented the EEC agreement to the Commons in 
January 1983, he was able to describe it as "superb", without 
provoking a major outburst of indignation. 
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The majority of the 
those who spoke were Conservatives and they congratulated the 
Minister on his success. Yet even two Labour members, Johnson of 
Hull West and Brown of Glasgow Provan, were appreciative of his 
efforts in getting a deal which was, in their view, as good as one 
could expect in the circumstances. When the Labour front bench 
spokesman, Buchan, pulled out his copy of Fishing News with its 
claim that 98% of fishermen did not believe that the new CFP 
provided proper controls, Walker was able to put him down very 
easily by saying that 69,880 of the paper's 70,000 readers had not 
voted in the poll! 
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The change of atmosphere is a remarkable one when one 
considers the level of unanimity that a belief in the rightness of 
Britain's case had engendered from 1976 onwards. Though demands 
for exclusive limits were progressively reduced from 200 to 100 to 
50 to 12 miles, the spirit that accompanied these retreats was one 
of grudging acceptance of political reality, rather than a belief 
that they were justified in terms of fairness. Comparisons with 
Norway which had rejected membership of the Community and with 
Iceland which had rejected the British deep-sea industry in 1976. 
were ones that implicitly or explicitly influenced thinking 
throughout the period. 
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After all, both of them had been free to 
declare their own EEZ without reference to anyone else. 
There was a similar level of unanimity on the issue of what 
percentage of the fish in EEC waters British vessels should he 
allowed to catch. An SFF newsletter put the point as follows: 
"As the nation in whose waters the bulk of the 
fish swim (over 60%) simple justice requires 
that in the eventual CFP settlement, we be 
accorded a share of the resources to which we 
contribute which fairly reflects that 
contribution. "69 
It was a position which no-one was eager to contest. Even the 
European Communities Committee of the House of Lords, which was of 
the opinion that the difficulties of the industry should be 
attributed to the loss of Icelandic waters rather than membership 
of the EEC, called for 45% of the fish in EEC waters to be granted 
to Britain rather than the 31% that was on offer at the time in 
219 
1980. The Daily Telegraph, no opponent of the EEC either, backed 
the Committee's call objecting to any doctrine of common 
resources, which might challenge a state's sovereign rights 
"... a country's fish stocks may be regarded 
as its property whatever it makes of them; and 
there is no clear reason why membership of the 
EEC should entail international socialism., 
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Such appeals to national sovereignty, a focus of unity for 
all shades of political opinion, swamped alternative definitions 
of the problem and of the possibilities that a CFP might offer. 
There was limited discussion of the use of the Community price 
structure to protect fishermen, despite the fact that before 
membership "British fishermen for years (had) wanted a minimum 
price scheme which would come to their rescue when the bottom 
falls out of the market. "71 There was little awareness of the 
benefits of developing the terminology of the Community, such as 
'coastal preference', so as to win arguments in the Council of 
Ministers. 
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There was minimal recognition of the significance of 
fish as a migratory resource, where a change in fishing patterns 
could alter catch distribution very markedly (cf p8l above). And 
there was almost no acknowledgement of the costs that would be 
imposed on fishing communities such as those in Brittany if the 
waters around Britain were to be closed to them. The politics of 
the virility symbol prevailed. 
In the EEC arena no British government sought to change the 
definition of the problem, rather they all made the principle of 
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consultation and consent central to the way negotiations were 
pursued. When Silkin was in office under the Labour government, 
he could argue that a 12 mile exclusive zone, 'dominant 
preference' between 12 and 50 miles and national conservation 
measures up to 200 miles was the least that the industry could be 
expected to accept and that anything less would be a sell-out. 
However, Walker was able to use the attitudes of the industry in 
the same way to deflect domestic criticism and to move towards 
agreement. He did this by maintaining very close consultation 
with the leaders of the industry and by modifying the criteria for 
an acceptable settlement. 
The importance of the widest consultation with the fishing 
industry was something which the Conservative government after 
1979 was very careful to stress. As Buchanan-Smith, Walker's 
Minister of State, put it: 
"We have representatives of the industry in 
attendance at Fisheries Councils and we 
consult them during the negotiations. I 
appreciate the help and support given by the 
industry in relation to this matter. This is 
something which we shall certainly continue 
and we shall work very closely with it. "73 
Subsequently Walker proved remarkably successful in developing a 
close relationship with the nine main industry representatives. 
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He revelled in their presence in Brussels and got them to accept 
concessions bit by bit, persuading them to move ever closer to the 
government position and get their own members to do likewise. By 
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the end, it was difficult for them to say that they had been 
sold-out, as they had been intimately involved in what had been 
going on. 
At the same time, Walker recognised the value of consent in 
the wider political area. In the 1979 elections, the 
Conservatives had been just as tough as Labour, if slightly less 
specific, in the conditions that they had laid down for a 
satisfactory settlement of the CFP75 However, what Walker did was 
to add the consent of the industry as a further condition for a 
settlement. Thus though the agreement was not enormously 
different from what would have been available in 1976, at least by 
comparison with the earlier demands of those inside and outside 
the industry, it was very difficult to attack Walker. He was able 
to claim - and rightly - that he had won the support of the 
leaders of the industry for that agreement 
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The result was the 
identification of a national interest through the use of informal 
persuasion and cajoling. 
The contrast between the state's role in French and British 
experience is well illustrated by what happened in France in the 
autumn of 1979 following the arrest and fining of two Breton 
trawlers off the South Wales coast for using nets with illegal 
mesh sizes. Though the issue was not as major as the question of 
the overall shape of the CFP, it was similar in that resolution of 
the problem depended on factors outside the national arena and the 
degree of domestic unanimity was every bit as great as that which 
prevailed in Britain. 
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There had been considerable worry in the French fishing 
industry as to the effects of the introduction of EEZs, because of 
the possibility of unilateral British action. In 1975 one Lorient 
owner explained the fact that he put his map of British waters in 
a cupboard by saying: 
"I hide this away for when the fishermen see 
it they go berserk with panic ... We 
desparately hope that Britain will agree to 
the Nine sharing their 200 mile zones on a 
Commmunity basis. "77 
On a visit to Brittany in February 1977, Giscard d'Estaing 
responded to such worries by underlining the government's 
commitment to ensuring that fishing would continue around Britain: 
"I have asked the Ministers of Transport and 
Foreign Affairs to be intransigeant in the 
defence of French fishing rights. The 
fishermen are not to worry. Their traditional 
rights to fish will be acknowledged and 
"7$ protected. 
When in July 1979, the British government introduced a 70 mm 
mesh size for nets used to catch Norway lobster ('langoustine'), 
there was an immediate reaction in France whose extent underlined 
the level of unanimity on the issue of 'historic rights'. All, 
including the newspaper of the PCF, were forthright in their 
attack on Britain: the principle of conservation was being used, 
it was said, to hide a narrow nationalism. 
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However, there was 
more than just newspaper comment. On July 19, the Bureau of the 
CCPM agreed that it would pay any fines imposed on French trawlers 
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by British courts. 
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The latter reaction was particularly 
significant in that it underlined the way in which the state could 
subscribe to a decision of the whole industry to protect one 
section even before the effects of the British action had been 
felt or any effort had been made to reverse the decision through 
diplomatic channels. In Britain, over the EEC settlement, the 
reverse was true: diplomatic channels became the focus of 
attention with no semblance of domestic unity as how best to 
develop the different parts of the fishing industry. Such 
development would have to await a settlement whatever its 
anticipated economic impact. 
The first overt diplomatic move in this case did not come 
until the middle of September after the first two arrests. Le 
Theule, the Minister of Transport, wrote to Walker charging 
Britain with acting against Treaty obligations and hence 
ilegally. 
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Walker retorted that the mesh size used by the boats 
in question would have been illegal even before the July measures 
and would remain so under the proposed EEC regulations, due to 
come into force at the beginning of 1982.82 
However, this diplomatic activity became increasingly 
irrelevant to domestic French reaction. On October 1, the CCPM 
decided to use the industry's funds to support arrested boats to 
the level of 8000 FF per day to cover their loss of earnings. 
There was considerable dissatisfaction that the state itself in 
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the shape of the Finance Ministry was not prepared to provide the 
money out of public funds. As the CCPM put it, the state should: 
"protect its members and repay them the losses 
they incur when those concerned are not 
breaking the relevant French regulations, 
which the Commission in Brussels has also 
approved. " 
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Indeed it was even felt that the British state should be 
responsible for reimbursing the French fishermen if the arrests 
were declared illegal by the ECJ in Luxembourg. There was no 
chance of this but in the end the French state did contribute 
53,000 FF towards the cost of the six boats in all that were 
arrested and charged, the profession itself finding 157,000 
FF. 
ß4However, 
it was not just that the French state was prepared 
to offer economic protection to fishermen as part of its 
definition of the overall French interest. There is a further 
contrast with the British experience. French fishermen themselves 
set only limited value on the existing consultative framework and 
informal consultation on the Walker model was not available as an 
alternative. There was a clear move towards action outside the 
conventional channels. Initial strikes by the fishermen of the 
'pays bigouden' and occupation of a townhall and the offices of 
the maritime administrator in Le Guilvinec was followed by more 
robust action. The car ferry at Roscoff was occupied and the fish 
cargo of the lorries on board sprayed with oil or thrown into the 
harbour, causing 200,000 FF of damage. 
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It was only a short 
lived affair - by the beginning of October, the fishermen were 
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back at sea - but it pointed to the possibility that French 
fishermen could seek to make their views known through "a much 
wider set of channels", though very different ones from those 
pursued in Britain. 
4. Conclusion 
The conclusions of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, it has 
suggested that the importance of the British paliamentary arena 
meant that 'wider channels' were available for the leaders of the 
British industry to exploit. The scope for action of the 
conventional, consultative structures in France was more limited. 
At the same time, that scope for action was strongly influenced by 
the industry's attitudes towards the state and the state's. own 
role. In the French context, the shared stress on an aggregate, 
public interest restrained wider discussion and the extensive 
ventilation of grievances; in Britain, the full articulation of 
separate private interests in the industry was encouraged and the 
state was not concerned to prevent it. Hence the validity of the 
distinction offered in the second of our initial assumptions helps 
to explain why the first assumption is not confirmed in the French 
case. 
The second conclusion is that the material here does not seem 
to confirm the general argument that interest groups are 
necessarily supplanting traditional forms of representation, such 
as political parties. 
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The pattern was very different in the two 
countries discussed here. In Britain, parties played an important 
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role in buttressing the consultative ethic to which all 
subscribed, whereas in France their role tends to confirm the 
argument that: 
"... the transfer of power from legislature to 
the executive with the formation of the Fifth 
Republic has resulted in less pressure by 
interest groups on political parties and a 
concentration at the executive/bureaucratic 
"g levels where policy is decided .ý 
Finally, the chapter has pointed to the importance of 
different mechanisms for reaching decisions, each with its own 
weaknesses. The British stress on compromise between conflicting 
economic interests opens it to the accusation of a lack of 
decisiveness. As Hayward has put it: 
"... in Britain the presumption that group 
consent is an indispensable prelude to action 
has generally resulted in timid and irresolute 
decision-making. " 
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The French enthusiasm for common goals has not encouraged timidity 
but it has meant a less developed sense of the need to win over 
groups through persuasion and discussion. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, these two approaches are subject to different 
pressures when an interest goes outside the conventional channels 
for exercising influence. In France centripetal pressures created 
the potential for a very large explosion of discontent, in Britain 
centrifugal forces helped to diffuse disaffection and to make a 
virtue of 'muddling through'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DIRECT-ACTION PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
This chapter takes up the issue raised at the end of the previous 
chapter, namely the abandonment of the conventional channnels of 
consultation and the development of techniques of direct action as 
a way for the fishing industry to influence government. It will 
examine the nature of that action in the light of what we might 
expect to have occurred, as outlined at the beginning of the 
study (pp 30-1 above).. It was suggested, first, that the result of 
major change in the issue area would be for the industry to be 
pushed into "forms of direct action in as far as it perceived that 
its demands for assistance made no headway through the 
conventional channels. " We will find that actual or threatened 
direct action did become an important element in 
government-industry relations for the period of this study, as it 
had not been before. We will also find that the threats were 
carried out more often and more vigorously in France. Hence the 
evidence supports our second suggestion that "the importance of 
the search for consensus in British policy-making and the 'limited 
authoritarianism' implicit in the French activist policy style 
would make ... direct action more common in France than it was in 
Britain. " 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first will 
consider the frequency and form of direct action concentrating on 
1975 and 1980/81, when the dissatisfaction of the industry in both 
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countries was at its peak. The next two sections will look in 
turn at the industry and the state during these periods of unrest. 
It will be argued that the behaviour of the one needs to be 
understood in terms of the behaviour of the other. The French 
fishermen's frustration with the traditional state-sponsored 
mechanisms of representation found expression in protest that 
spread wildly in a spontaneous and uncontrolled way and the 
state's response was marked by a powerful desire to reestablish 
unity and order whatever the cost. The British state's concern 
was rather one of winning over the fishermen with limited 
concessions, directed at a representative leadership. That 
leadership channelled the discontent of its members in a very 
deliberate and organised way. 
In conclusion, it will be suggested that the balance between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces in the two countries discussed 
in the previous chapter was reversed in the context of direct 
action. In France, as a rule, the power of centripetal forces was 
far greater than that of centrifugal forces. But as this chapter 
shows, their position could be drastically reversed and the 
tensions within the 'one and indivisible Republic' laid bare. In 
Britain, the state was disinclined to aggregate interests and 
tended to allow full play to centrifugal forces. At the same 
time, when direct action was threatened or carried out, the 
representatives of the industry were able to restrain their 
members from going too far and government representatives were 
willing to seek some form of accomodation with the protestors. 
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2. Direct action: its frequency and form 
The history of the fishing industry is punctuated by strong 
conflicts of interest, which were by no means always resolved 
through conventional channels. In 1896 there were riots at Newlyn 
in Cornwall because the local fishermen were furious with the 
ungodly men of Lowestoft for working on Sunday. So severe were 
the fights between the two groups that it took the arrival of 350 
soldiers to quell them. 
' 
More recently, there were important 
strikes in the deep-sea industry, which hit both Britain and 
France. Stoppages at Grimsby and Hull in 1958 and 1961 were 
followed by ones at Concarneau and Boulogne in 1967 and 1968. 
Within the French inshore industry, the first part of the 1970s 
witnessed a number of small-scale blockades of individual ports, 
prompted by specific local grievances. 
2 
However, during the period of this study the expression of 
discontent took a different shape. First of all, it assumed a 
national rather than a local significance: sectional complaints 
were amplified and won support amongst a much broader range of 
fishermen. Secondly, this new unity provoked serious conflict 
with the state. The authorities were obliged to find a response 
to tactics, such as the use of blockades, which were designed to 
prevent normal maritime movements through illegal means. Thirdly, 
the justification of such direct action was set in terms of the 
relative position of fishermen in relation to others: militancy 
was seen as the one way of getting one's voice heard in a world 
where the government would only concede to the demands of the 
strong. 
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In more general terms, direct action within the fishing 
industry formed part of a secular trend within all European 
democracies. More and more people have wanted to have their say 
but not everybody has been able to get a hearing. The problem was 
particularly acute in a period of resource 'squeeze' when the 
possibilities for governments to buy off discontent were reduced. 
It is significant that the use or threat of direct action in the 
fishing industry was most prominent in 1975 and 1980/1, when 
increases in fuel prices were making their presence felt 
throughout the economies of Western Europe and when both Britain 
and France had governments committed to control of public 
expenditure. As Richardson has pointed out: 
"... the policy process in the period of 
steady expansion in public expenditure was not 
unlike the Dodo's race in Alice in Wonderland 
in which everyone won and everyone got prizes. 
Not surprisingly a race in which there are 
winners and losers is more difficult to 
manage. "3 
The fishermen did not want to be losers but their governments were 
not free to continue to give everyone prizes. How this potential 
conflict was resolved we will consider by looking chronologically 
at the examples of the use of or threat of direct action during 
the period of this study. 
2.1 France - 1975 
As we have seen (p156 above) the French government responded to the 
increase in the cost of petrol in 1973 by introducing a fuel 
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subsidy which amounted to 20MF in 1974 and was set at 12MF in 
January 1975 for the coming year. 
4 
At the same time, there was a 
recognition that one of the indirect effects of the increase in 
petrol prices was an increase in imports and a consequent drop in 
price levels obtained at auctions (cf p 43 above). As a result, 
Cavaille, the Secretary of State for Transport, called upon the 
EEC Commission to improve its mechanisms for temporarily 
restricting imports. 
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However, what followed underlined that for many in the 
industry these measures were not enough. The 'artisans' of 
Etaples, near Boulogne, had been obliged to stay in port for 8 
weeks because of bad weather and they were furious when they found 
that competition from imports helped to push their first catches 
of the year in February 1975 to very low price levels. What is 
more, the state's treatment of them appeared unfavourable when 
contrasted with its attitude towards the farmers. On Saturday 
February 15, Chirac, the Prime Minister, announced that he could 
not contemplate a drop in the earnings of farmers for two years in 
succession and promised important subsidies involving practically 
a 13th month of salary. 
6 
The following evening the trouble began 
when the 300 inshore fishermen of Etaples were persuaded by their 
leader, Bigot, to travel down overnight by coach to Paris to vent 
their grievances. On arrival in the capital the protestors 
occupied the entrance of the Ministry, the SGMM, in the Place 
Fontenoy. The Minister refused a request to see them and on the 
arrival of the police the men were ejected at the cost of some 
minor injuries and a few broken windows. 
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Their subsequent departure from Paris was to prove the 
beginning rather than the end of the affair as sympathy action 
spread throughout France. On the Tuesday, the channel ports of 
Dunkirk and Boulogne were blockaded by inshore boats and in 
Brittany, deep-sea crews from Douarnenez, Lorient and Concarneau 
came out on an 8 day strike in support of the men from the North, 
calling for an increased fuel subsidy and the closing of the 
frontiers to imports. By the Wednesday, nearly every port from 
Dunkirk to St. Jean de Luz on the Spanish frontier was blockaded 
and fishermen from Calais had carried the action further by 
intercepting fish lorries from Belgium and Holland on their way to 
Paris and dumping their contents on the motorway. 
The dramatic spread of the dispute encouraged the government 
to sit down with the fishermen. On the Thursday, Cavaille did 
accept to see a delegation from Brittany and the North. The 
meeting was a tough one but after five hours of negotiations, the 
government made important concessions, agreeing to further 
financial help: the fuel subsidy for 1975 was increased so as to 
be worth about 4 to 5 centimes per litre; an extra 11MF was set 
aside as social assistance for the inshore fleet to compensate for 
its drop in purchasing power; 20MF was provided to be made 
available for the financing of withdrawals from the market by the 
producer organisations, set up under EEC regulations; and limits 
on imports from non-EEC states were to be introduced on the basis 
of the safeguard clauses in the Treaty of Rome. 
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Despite this acknowledgement of the importance of protecting 
the industry, the unrest did not end straight away. On the 
Mediterranean coast a blockade was maintained at Sete until the 
end of March, where the men had a particular complaint about the 
levels of pollution. In Brittany the deep-sea crews took the 
opportunity of pressing for better wages and working conditions, 
extending their tactics beyond those of the traditional strike. On 
Monday, March 3, crews from Lorient copied the men of Etaples and 
descended on Paris to demonstrate and to dump 40 tonnnes of fish 
in the smart 16th district. Even then the protests did not end 
straight away. It was not until March 21 that the longest-running 
strike, at Concarneau, ended and the men returned to sea. 
2.2 Britain - 1975 and 1980/1 
The grievances of the British industry in 1975 were not unlike 
those of its counterpart in France. The cost of fuel had jumped 
dramatically since 1973 and imports were having a major effect on 
prices at the auctions. Moreover, as in France, the government 
had made an initial response to these difficulties. On February 
27, Bishop, Minister of State at MAFF, announced in a written 
answer that a temporary operating subsidy of six and a quarter 
million pounds would be introduced for the period from January 1 
to June 30. 
However, supporters of the industry were not slow to point to 
the extra help that the French government had agreed to, 
particularly the restrictions on imports. As Buchanan-Smith put 
it in the Commons: "how do we explain to our fishermen if the 
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French can do it, why the British Government can not do it as 
well? "7 In the same debate Gray of the SNP felt that the relative 
success of the French fishermen would tempt, even justify, their 
British counterparts to act similarly unless the government showed 
more concern for their case: 
"It would be a great pity if our fishermen had 
to resort to the extreme measures which their 
French neighbours took to gain some sort of 
Government recognition. "8 
Self-imposed restraints upon their tactics were not only weakened 
by what they saw happening in France. Fishermen also felt that 
others in Britain were getting their way by strong-arm tactics. 
Rather than looking at farmers, as their French counterparts did, 
they compared their situation with that of workers in the 
secondary sector where: 
"... the Government continued to pour millions 
into unprofitable industries; whenever a union 
seemed strong enough, it appeared that the 
Government would concede whatever was 
demanded. "9 
This combination of particular and general grievances was 
powerful enough to prompt direct action, some four weeks after the 
equivalent action in France. On Tuesday March 18, the newly 
founded Humberside Share Fishermen's Association decided to 
blockade Grimsby and Immingham and these blockades were put into 
effect the following day. Immediately the Tor-line ferry 'Anglo', 
with her 500 passengers from Gothenberg was prevented from 
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docking. Despite informal contacts with the government, the 
blockade was maintained and by the Saturday, 65 boats and 260 men 
were involved. 
The following day the North Shields fishermen decided to join 
in and that same afternoon they blocked the Tyne estuary. Up in 
Scotland inshore boats from Wick to Peterhead stayed in port on 
the Monday (March 24), while further blockades were established on 
that day at Blyth, Sunderland, Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough. 
In the Commons, Peart, the Minister of Agriculture, indicated that 
he had invited representatives of the fishermen to meet him on the 
following day. The day after the meeting, on the Wednesday, Peart 
made a further statement in the House but its rather general 
contents failed to calm the fishermen. An Action Committee was 
established at a Thursday meeting in Aberdeen, with 
representatives from all the main Scottish inshore ports plus 
North Shields and Grimsby. The Committee decided on a full-scale 
blockade to start at midnight on Sunday, March 3. 
Meetings were held in all the fishing ports concerned to 
decide on tactics and careful preparations were made to ensure 
that the action had maximum effect. Despite a poor weather 
forecast on the Sunday evening, the Monday morning duly saw 
vessels converging from all sides on the selected targets. The 
boats of Peterhead and Fraserburgh, for example, made their way to 
Aberdeen and within one and a quarter hours of their arrival had 
completely blocked the harbour. The pattern was the same 
throughout Scotland, with 860 vessels involved at 18 separate 
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locations from Granton in the East to Ayr in the West via Lerwick 
in the Shetlands. In England, too, there was support, 
particularly on the Tyne, at Hull and other ports as far apart as 
Newhaven and Whitehaven. 
In general, there was little trouble though on the first day, 
on the Tyne, a 7,800 ton collier, the 'Chevington', broke the 
blockade, by rammming a small 56 foot inshore vessel, and on the 
Tuesday, a small coaster was brought in to port by a pilot, whose 
cutter was subsequently chased by fishermen in angry mood. 
Already on the second day, there were informal contacts with civil 
servants from DAFS, which led to a meeting in Aberdeen with 
Brown, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland on Wednesday, April 
2. 
This meeting produced a Press statement from the Minister 
with an appeal for the end of the blockade. There were no firm 
commitments from the government but there was a general feeling 
that Brown's promises should be given a chance. The blockade 
could, after all, be restarted. After a long debate it was agreed 
to inform the ships involved that they should return the following 
morning to their home ports. The ships duly dispersed with one 
final gesture of defiance as the men on the Tyne threw bags of 
paint and oil at the 'Chevington'. 
In fact, no controls on imports were introduced and no 
changes were made in the terms of the subsidy provided to the 
industry. The one concrete act that followed the blockade was 
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that the Norwegians were persuaded by the government to restrict 
their landings in Britain. But this did not alter the general 
impression that very little had been gained except pubic 
attention. 
10 
These relatively meagre results did not provoke the wider use 
of blockades; rather protest action continued to follow more 
conventional channels. June 14 1977 saw fishermen from all over 
Britain descend on London in their boats and succeed in stopping 
traffic from using London Bridge. Then May 30 1980 was declared a 
Day of Action by the English fishermen of the NFFO. Yet it turned 
out to be little different from the traditional lobbying of 
Parliament with a delegation going to Downing Street and fish 
being sold in London streets at knockdown prices to delighted 
housewives. Even when the effect of imports was to make trips to 
sea unprofitable, the response did not extend beyond ships tying 
up and refusing to set sail. This happened at Peterhead in August 
1980 when prices fell to Z2 per box and was repeated in February 
1981, when the 250 boats at Peterhead were joined by nearly all 
the rest of the British fleet. 
" 
Even the fishermen of the South 
no 
West, /friends of the Scots, joined in. However, on both these 
occasions, the prospect of aid from the government defused the 
situation and there were no more serious attempts to challenge the 
power of the state by such actions as blockades. 
2.3 France - 1980 
In France, by contrast, the period after 1975 did see the industry 
resort to direct action more regularly. Between February 1975 and 
238 
the end of 1979,13 cases of unrest were reported, culminating in 
the incidents provoked by the British arrest of Breton trawlers 
off the South Wales coast in September 1979.12 However, even 
this, the most serious clash with the authorities since 1975, did 
not provoke a chain reaction in other fishing ports. It remained 
the expression of a sectional grievance, even though the CCPM 
acknowledged its wider importance by using money from the industry 
as a whole to reimburse the owners of the trawlers concerned. By 
contrast, what happened in August 1980 saw a whole variety of 
separate discontents coalesce into a nationwide protest, which 
exceeded in scale, duration and ferocity anything that was seen in 
either country during the period of this study. Its impact was 
such that one participant went so far as to call it the 'May 1968' 
of the fishing industry. 
13 
The origins of the protest can be traced to the plan for the 
deep-sea industry that Le Theule unveiled after the meeting of the 
French Council of Ministers on April 2,1980. This plan called 
for the modernisation of the fleet as a way of cutting the trade 
deficit in fish, but this uncontroversial end was to be pursued by 
very controversial means. The 30MF set aside for 'la peche 
industrielle' was made conditional on costs being cut by the 
trawler owners. This meant a reduction either in the wages of the 
crews or in manning levels, both of which the owners set about 
negotiating. At Boulogne they tried to persuade the unions to 
accept a revision of the agreement, 'convention collective', which 
had been negotiated in 1975. The owners wanted the size of crews 
on large trawlers to come down from 22 to 18 and a 10% reduction 
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in crews' wages to offset rising fuel costs. The negotiations 
proved fruitless and on July 22 the owners decided to keep their 
boats in port, effectively locking the men out from work. Some 
two weeks later on August 6a mass meeting was held to discuss a 
revised proposal that the crews be cut from 22 to 20, provided 
there were no redundancies. The men almost unanimously rejected 
the idea and then made their way to the car ferry terminal, 
preventing sailings to Britain for the rest of the day. 
This initial action served to spark off protest elsewhere, 
even though the complaints were different ones. At nearby Etaples 
the merchants refused to buy everything that had been landed and 
in Normandy, at Port-en-Bessin, a similar dispute with the 
merchants was compounded by dissatisfaction over the failure to 
appoint a new official to pay out sickness benefits. 
14 The 
inshore men at both places came out in support of the men from 
Boulogne on August 11, deciding not to go out to sea. Two days 
later the dispute was intensified when the Norman fishermen 
blockaded the ports of Le Havre and Caen, a tactic which had 
spread by the weekend of August 16-17 to Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk 
and Cherbourg. This tactic produced the first dramatic 
confrontation of the dispute when on Sunday, August 17, the 
Townsend Thoresen ferry, 'Free Enterprise', broke the blockade at 
Cherbourg to the delight of stranded tourists and xenophobic 
elements in the British press* 
15 
9 
The question then was whether the dispute would extend any 
further. The government was organising regional conciliation 
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meetings and the CCPM was due to meet on Tuesday, August 20, to 
enable all parties to the conflict to meet around the table. At 
the same time, there was considerable doubt as to whether 
Brittany, the supplier of nearly half of France's fish, would join 
in. This was by no means certain because the Breton inshore 
fishermen remembered that their protests the previous year had not 
prompted sympathy action elsewhere. They also pointed out that 
the summer was their major fishing period, whereas in Boulogne 
August is a quiet time. 
16 
With some hesitation, the two main Breton ports, Concarneau 
and Lorient, did vote to join the strike and they were followed by 
the inshore centres of the 'pays bigouden'. However, the major 
incident of the week occurred on the Mediterranean coast, where 
the oil port of Fos, near Marseilles, was blockaded. To the 
commercial losses incurred in a port such as Le Havre, estimated 
at half a million pounds per day, was added a threat to the 
nation's petrol supplies. Barre, the Prime Minister, appeared on 
television to make it clear that the government would not tolerate 
this challenge to freedom of navigation and the navy duly broke up 
the blockade with powerful tugs and watercannon. 
In the course of the dispute the various separate grievances 
had crystallized around the single issue of an increase in the 
level of the fuel subsidy. Such an increase would help the 
deep-sea owners of Boulogne as much as the inshore vessels of 
ports like Port-en-Bessin. A whole series of national and 
regional meetings over the weekend of August 23-24 seemed to offer 
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the prospect of going some way towards meeting this common 
complaint. Indeed such a possibility encouraged the Norman 
fishermen to lift their blockade of Le Havre for 24 hours but it 
emerged in the discussions that the issue of fuel aid was not open 
for negotiation. So on the Monday, Normandy became the centre of 
renewed protest: the fishermen went to blockade Antifer, near Le 
Havre, France's second oil port, while the blockades at Fos, 
Dieppe, Boulogne and Dunkirk were restored. 
The government showed no sign of making concessions. On 
August 26, the navy was again used to break the blockades of 
Antifer and Fos. On the same day, Le Theule announced the 
availability of new funds for a wide range of problems, including 
loans on vessel construction and price support, but made no 
reference to the chief demand of the industry for an increased 
fuel subsidy. The following day the Council of Ministers met but 
the fisheries question was not even on on the agenda. The only 
reference to the uproar on the coast came under the heading 
'miscellaneous items' with the government: 
"confirming its instruction to keep the major 
French commercial ports open, their activity 
not being concerned by the problems of the 
fishing industry. "17 
Such clear unwillingness to agree to the fishermen's demands 
was followed by a gradual weakening of the action. At Fos the 
fishermen decided not to renew their action for fear of 
endangering lives and by the end of the week the only ports at a 
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standstill outside the North were Concarneau and Lorient in 
Brittany and Bastia in Corsica. The inshore vessels of the 'pays 
bigouden' voted to return to sea on Saturday, August 30. 
By the beginning of September, only the deep-sea men of 
Boulogne and the inshore boats of Normandy were still holding out 
but their scope for action was rapidly diminishing. At Boulogne, 
the fishermen found themselves in conflict with lorry drivers 
bringing fish to and from the processing factories. They were 
obliged to restrict their blockade to the port area alone. The 
men from Port-en-Bessin gave up any idea of a further blockade of 
Antifer - their clash with the navy had caused them between 2 and 
3MF of damage - and carried their protest on September 2 to Paris. 
However, the combination of a delegation to the Transport Ministry 
and a successful attempt to block traffic near the Eiffel Tower 
failed to win any concessions. The next day a vote was taken and 
it was agreed by the 'petits patrons' to go back to work despite 
the opposition of the crews. Similar opposition was expressed by 
the men in Boulogne on Friday, September 5, when they voted by 276 
to 193 against a proposed agreement guaranteeing manning levels 
for the time being, provided the unions accepted a revision of the 
1975 'convention collective' in the course of the following month. 
During the following week the eighth of the conflict, the 
decision of the Lorient men to return to sea on September 9 left 
Boulogne completely isolated. The men faced ever greater 
financial problems, as banal but necessary as paying for their 
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children's books and pens on their return to school. They scraped 
money together at football matches and fairgrounds but the 
situation was hopeless. Eventually, on September 17, another vote 
was taken and this time a majority supported a return to sea on 
the basis of a temporary agreement which put off everything until 
a new accord was reached. 
In the deep-sea industry the action over the previous weeks 
had brought a solution to its particular problem no nearer. 
Indeed the issue of manning levels was to remain unresolved for 
the rest of the period of this study. As for the grievance that 
the companies shared with the inshore industry about the need for 
a better fuel subsidy, there was no action on the part of the 
government to match that of 1975. It was universally agreed that 
the scale of direct action in France in 1980 was in inverse 
proportion to its success. The papers variously spoke of "total 
failure", "almost no gains" and "empty nets". 
18 
Le Monde argued 
that success was the government's: it had gambled on being able to 
play on the divisions in the ranks of the fishermen and it had 
19 
won. 
3. Direct action: the industry's role 
The fact that the 1980 action in France had affected many British 
holiday makers, who were unable to get back to England without a 
lengthy detour via Belgium, encouraged comparison between the two 
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countries. A certain C. J. Beaumont, who wrote to the Daily 
Telegraph on August 22, was clear about the difference: 
"The British worker's attitudes to the law is 
one of respect either natural or enforced. 
This attitude or approach to the law and its 
enforcement does not seem to prevail in 
France. 
Be you peasant, King or fisherman, you are 
under the law: this is the only way a 
civilised country can function. " 
It is not the present author's intention to comment on the 
level of civilisation in France but it will be suggested here that 
the incidents just discussed do need to be explained in terms of 
the relationship between the state and society, of which the law 
and attitudes towards it form a part. It will be argued that the 
direct action of the fishermen illustrates the different ways in 
which a state-led society and a society-led state process 
conflict. In this section, the stress will be on how the 
grievances of the industry were represented to the state. In the 
following section, attention will turn to the response of the 
state. The assumption throughout is that the two processes were 
interlinked, the state sharing responsibility for the way 
grievances were represented and the character of the industry 
influencing the state's behaviour. The section will not deny that 
certain conjunctural variables, notably the prospect of the 1981 
Presidential elections in France had an independent influence. 
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But the prospect of elections did not determine the basic 
structure of relations rather it exacerbated certain tensions 
within that structure. 
3.1 The mode of organisation 
One of the remarkable features of the direct action that was taken 
in France was the spontaneous way in which it spread from port to 
port. It was most obvious in 1980 when there were simultaneous 
blockades of ports as far apart as Fos and Antifer, but the same 
kind of development could be seen in 1975 as the grievances of the 
men of Etaples provided the occasion for others, like the deep-sea 
crews of Lorient to make their own discontents known. There was 
no central direction of these complaints but the sum of individual 
port decisions generated an overall picture of an entire industry 
up in arms at the way in which it was being treated by the state. 
This decentralised structure of protest is in marked contrast 
to the situation in Britain where the major blockade of 1975 was 
under strong central control by the representative leaders of the 
industry. The initial blockades on Humberside and at North 
Shields were organised by the local associations through separate 
decisions, but the moves to the major blockade which followed 
Peart's statement to the House on Wednesday, March 6, were 
meticulously planned by the group of 19 men, known as the Action 
Committee. This group itself was set up at a meeting where 70 
representatives of the industry met. They gave the Committee 
absolute powers to take decisions binding on all the ports 
involved. The Committee in turn elected a Chairman, Willie Hay of 
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Buckie, and then decided on the way in which the dispute would be 
pursued. 
These arrangements defined very clearly the extent of the 
action that followed. There was no question, first of all, of a 
link-up between the inshore and deep-sea industries. A 
representative of the Scottish owners, the STF, stated his 
opposition to a blockade at the initial meeting and Hay maintained 
that the problems of the deep-sea crews themselves were different, 
in that they could not choose whether or not they went out to 
sea. 
20 
As for the unions, the Secretary of the Aberdeen branch of 
the National Union of Seamen underlined the distance between them 
and the inshore men: "They are doing fine on their own. Obviously 
as seafarers we feel for them and wish them well .,, 
21 
Cargill 
relates a story which suggests that any union would have been hard 
pressed to obtain a role in the dispute. At a meeting at 
Peterhead on March 28, a man stood up to declare: "Brothers, you 
have a great opportunity... " but before he could go on, the cry 
went up from the hall: "We are'na wanting any Unions here! Pit him 
oot! " The man was escorted away. 
22 
Hay himself underlined this 
basic antipathy, when he argued in 1976 that the only event likely 
to cause a new blockade would be "if the Government extended the 
dock labour scheme to the smaller ports", a scheme which was the 
reason why the inshore men moved from Aberdeen to Peterhead in 
1971.23 
Secondly, the geographical boundary of the dispute was 
clearly marked. There was no representative of the English 
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inshore industry on the Action Committee, with the exception of 
North Shields and Grimsby, and no attempt was made to extend the 
protest any further. By contrast, elaborate procedures were 
developed to ensure maximum impact for the protest in the ports 
involved. Tremendous effort went into sorting out lines of 
communication well in advance of the beginning of the action: 
"Each port had a fleet commander whether it 
was to be blockaded or not. Ports which were 
to be blockaded and involved vessels from 
other ports (for example, Aberdeen was to be 
blockaded with vessels from Anstruther to 
Buckie) would have a group controller. It was 
agreed that the group controller would then be 
the one to liaise with the AC (Action 
Committee) in Aberdeen. Local problems would 
have to be dealt with on the spot, but 
decisions which were deemed to have over-all 
significance would be referred back to 
Aberdeen*" 
24 
Such clear delimitation of the extent of the action was not 
visible in France. The 1945 institutions were not able to channel 
the protest in the way that the Action Committee did. Their 
interpenetration by the state deprived them of the independence 
necessary to organise resistance or to provide a focus of loyalty 
for the fisherman in the local ports. At the same time, their 
corporatist character made them totally unsuitable for 
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promoting individual rather than collective interests: they echoed 
the dissatisfactions of the industry as a whole. As a result the 
CCPM had nothing to do with the organisation of the port protests: 
in 1980, for example, it only met twice during the dispute, on 
August 20 and 29. However, at those meetings it presented united 
industry opposition to both Le Theule's April plan for modernising 
the deep-sea sector and to his proposals of August 26, directed 
mainly at the inshore sector. The industry was at one in 
demanding an increase in the fuel subsidy, drawing attention to 
the extra money given to the British industry by Walker earlier in 
the month. 
25 
The effects of this lack of delimitation of the protest were 
twofold. Firstly, the differences between the separate interests 
inside the industry were concealed in marked contrast to Britain. 
The most obvious example was the way in which the clash between 
the crews and owners in the deep-sea industry evolved in 1980. 
At the beginning of August, it looked like traditional class 
conflict, with the men locked out by their employers. By the end 
of the month, the two sides were united around the plea for extra 
fuel aid, which would enable the owners to avoid a head-on clash 
with their men. Thus Yves Dhellemes, an important owner in 
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Concarneau, made his sympathy for the men and its basis very 
clear: 
"As head of a firm, it is never much fun to 
have to face up to a strike but today, as 
owners, we understand the reaction of the men 
and the decision they have taken to 
demonstrate in company with their comrades 
from the ports of the North. For more than 
two years now the owners have been asking the 
government for special measures and rates for 
"26 fuel used by the fishing industry. 
Similarly, the strategy of the unions changed. The CGT, in 
particular, began the month of August by stressing the idea of an 
alliance between the government and capitalist owners, but it came 
to see such an appeal as irrelevant in the context of the wider 
dispute that developed. By late August, increased fuel aid had 
become "the CGT's sine qua non for the satisfaction of the 
fishermen's claims., 
27 
The example provides clear evidence of the 
way in which the protectionist environment, created by the state, 
concentrated political demands upon it, rather than encouraging 
conflict resolution between divergent interests in society. 
The second consequence of direct action not being restricted 
in scope, as it was in Britain, was that the initiative for taking 
action was at the local level and remained there, even when the 
dispute assumed a national dimension. The important figure in the 
1975 dispute in France was the local leader from Etaples, Bigot, 
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who did not represent a wider constituency, comparable to that of 
Hay, chairman of the Action Committee, and a man respected 
throughout the Scottish fishing community. Similarly, in 1980, no 
major national figures emerged as representatives of the industry 
in France. In each port, the debate about what to do revolved 
around the particular interests that were dominant there. This 
meant that in Boulogne, for example, it was the local CFDT and CGT 
unions, roughly equal in strength, that were most heavily involved 
in organising the fishermen, whereas in the inshore ports, such as 
Port-en-Bessin, individual 'patrons' i. e owners of 'artisanal' 
boats, channelled the protests. All remained very much isolated 
from one another and indeed preferred it that way. The idea, put 
up by the men of Etaples in 1980, that flying pickets move from 
area to area was rejected as challenging the principle of that 
autonomy. 
28 
As a result, it was very difficult to know what was 
going on anywhere at any one time. And when the fishermen 
returned to work, they all did so independently of one another, in 
marked contrast to the British, where central organisation 
prevailed to the end. Special codewords ('Snowflake' in the Clyde 
and 'Ben Nevis' in Cromarty) sent the boats home with naval 
precision on the express order of Willie Hay. 
3.2 The limits of protest 
The central guidance of representatives of the British industry 
not only defined the extent of the action but also strongly 
influenced its character. In the same way, the decentralised 
nature of the French protests influenced their content as well as 
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their form. In particular, the strength of the representative 
institutions in Britain enabled the leaders to guide the 
discontent in a way which proved impossible in France. 
It was one of the main decisions taken by the Action 
Committee at its inception that every effort be made to ensure the 
minimum level of conflict. It issued clear instructions 
"confrontation to be avoided at all costs" and "image of the 
industry must be protected" which were broadly followed by the men 
in all ports. 
29 
There was certainly no enthusiasm for pushing 
illegality too far. Cargill recalls asking why the names of the 
boats involved in the blockade had not been covered up so as to 
avoid the possibility of civil action. He received the reply: 
"oh, that is against the law". 
30 
Such reluctance to break the law was more than simply a 
function of the way the industry was organised. Many fishermen in 
the North East of Scotland, associated as it is with the religious 
discipline of the Close Brethren, were very troubled by the 
prospect of the 1975 protest, while others saw it as a mistaken 
tactic and cautioned against it when trouble seemed likely to 
recur in 1980. As Fishing News put it: 
"... the kind of militancy which hits at the 
public or the country as a whole is hardly the 
way to win popular support. "31 
However, what happened in 1980-81 itself illustrates the 
importance of leadership. Atkin, the Chief Executive of the NFFO, 
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set the tone by making it clear that the May 1980 day of protest 
was not going to be allowed to get out of control: 
"It will be a gentlemanly day of protest. Not 
illegal but disruptive. We want to show the 
government the strength of our feelings. "32 
His prediction proved correct but he and his fellow leaders were 
put under severe pressure to change the tone. There was 
increasing unrest at boat level, from where it looked as if the 
industry's representatives were losing touch with their members. 
A determination developed in the local ports to repeat what had 
happened in 1975 but against the resistance of the leaders, who 
were prepared to move towards a national tie-up only "through all 
the proper machinery of the industry and through legal 
channels. "33 When there was unofficial action in Grimsby and a 
sporadic blockade in North East Scotland, they were firmly 
condemned by the NFFO and SFF respectively. The protesting 
skippers were very dissatisfied and in Scotland, they passed a 
vote of no confidence in the SFF leadership and got up a petition 
to support their position. However, the leaders were not slow to 
respond: within a week they had won a confidence vote, and-the 
militants' case faded quietly away. 
34 
This ability to contain protest was itself not unconnected 
with the relationship of the leaders with the government. Just as 
it was important for the government to have some confidence that 
the leaders were representative of their members and could hold 
them together, so the leaders needed to feel that the government 
could itself respond to their promptings. The possibility of 
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militant action was one that the leaders wrote to government about 
in the early part of 1980 and they pressed the government for help 
within a particular time limit to avert such action. 
35 
The 
government obliged both in March and August 1980, with its 
packages of aid worth £3m and £14m respectively (cf p148 above) 
and was in turn rewarded by a 'responsible' leadership able to 
limit the protests directed at the state. 
What the British case underlines is that the more restrained 
character of protest in Britain was not the product of some 
innate quality but rather of the nature of its representative 
leadership. Without it 1980 might indeed have witnessed something 
comparable to what occurred in France. Certainly the lack of such 
leadership was very important in enabling the French protests to 
develop in the way they did. There was no equivalent mechanism 
for containing militancy. 
In France the CCPM did not limit the character of direct 
action any more than it defined who should be involved. In its 
retrospective view on 1980, it took an indulgent attitude towards 
the blockades of Fos and Antifer, which had aroused such a strong 
reaction from the government; 
"... if some people in the indust 
on the illegality of several of 
the fishermen, they are also 
acknowledge that those actions 
justified because of the deep 
which French fishing found 
ry are agreed 
the acts of 
prepared to 
were partly 
disarray in 
"36 itself. 
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Indeed it went further and agreed to pay 100,000FF and 12,000FF to 
Port-en-Bessin and Sete respectively as a contribution (about 15%) 
towards the costs that their ships had incurred as a result of 
their clashes with the navy, thus expressing the collective 
sympathy of the industry in a similar way to its action in favour 
of the Breton trawlers the previous year (cf p223 above). 
However, these comments and actions followed the dispute 
itself. During the protest, the 1945 institutions were a forum 
for discussion rather than decision-making. They played no role 
in limiting the protest of the fishermen and there was no 
effective alternative inside the industry. In the inshore sector, 
individual ports went their own way and gave up the protest either 
because they saw no advantage in continuing, as in Brittany, or 
because they had been so severely treated by the navy, as at Sete 
and Port-en-Bessin. 
In the deep-sea sector, it was the local branches of the 
unions that were most prominent but their ability to restrict the 
action was very limited. First of all, they found themselves 
faced with men who were not willing to accept their 
recommendations. The deal that was rejected by the men in 
Boulogne on August 6 was one that both the CFDT and CGT local 
maritime officers had agreed to with the owners. Secondly, the 
unions were themselves subject to severe divisions which were 
reflected at the local level. The general struggle at national 
level between the reformism of the CFDT and the more resolute 
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approach of the CGT made it increasingly difficult for the local 
leaders to work together. When a joint agreement was reached in 
Boulogne with the fish processors to allow them to get fish to 
their factories, the national headqaurters of the CGT told the 
local branch to reverse its stance and a total blockade was 
maintained. In similar vein, the two unions were no longer united 
when the issue of a return to work was again put to the men on 
September 5. The local CGT leaders were now obliged to take a 
maximalist position, maintaining that any settlement had to be 
based on no reduction in manning levels, while the CFDT 
unsuccessfully recommended a return to work. 
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This low level of control by the representative institutions 
specific to the sector was a peculiarly French problem. Even the 
TGWU, whose membership was crumbling as the deep-sea industry 
disappeared, could still claim to speak as the sole representative 
of the crews of the deep-sea sector and not see its suggestions 
undermined within a wider political struggle. It worked through 
its parliamentary links to press its main demand of 
decasualisation and could hardly be outflanked on the issue. By 
contrast, the weakness of the French unions in the fishing sector 
was symptomatic of a wider problem, provoked by the absence of 
strong representative institutions. Political forces outside the 
industry were able to manipulate and exacerbate the fishermen's 
discontents for their own ends, in a way which was distinctly 
difficult in the British context. 
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It has already been suggested earlier that the Scottish 
fishermen were not easily manipulable by the SNP (cf p195 above). 
Equally in the present context the Nationalists were not able to 
influence the direct action of the industry. When a prospective 
SNP candidate urged the fishermen to consider a blockade of 
Rotterdam, it was more a question of showing interest in the issue 
than hoping seriously to bring such a blockade about. 
38 
Indeed 
when the blockade had been on, it was the representatives of the 
industry who determined its limits, with others, such as the SNP, 
very much on the sidelines. 
In France, by contrast, there was much more scope for 
political parties to seek to mould the protest of the industry. 
In 1975 the affair was over too quickly for those outside the 
industry to become involved but in 1980 the situation was very 
different. The prospect of the Presidential elections of the 
following Spring gave the opposition parties, in particular, a 
strong incentive to use the fishermen's case for their own 
purposes. When the action started to spread in the second week of 
August, Leroy, a member of the PCF bureau, was able to attack on 
two fronts. He pointed the finger at the level of the fuel 
subsidy accorded by the goverment, comparing it with the support 
just given by the British government to their fishermen. At the 
same time he could attack the PSF and in particular, Lengagne, the 
mayor of Boulogne, for their attitude on Europe, arguing that it 
was the Community which was destroying the French fishing 
} 
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industry. 
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This proved to be the opening shot in a polemic which 
continued throughout the month. Socialist spokesmen were no less 
critical of the government but rejected Communist criticism of the 
party's view on the EEC. As Maire, head of the CFDT, put it: 
"75% of our catch comes from foreign waters. 
France cannot say 'no' to a European fisheries 
policy. " 
40 
This wider political aspect of the conflict served to 
accentuate the weakness of the representative structure. The 
political parties had no particular interest in seeking to limit 
the extent of the protest and were very reluctant to suggest that 
what was going on was illegal or illegitimate. Even on the Right 
the prospect of the elections produced anything but unanimity. 
Those in the centrist UDF saw the villain of the piece as being 
the Minister, the Gaullist, Le Theule: the deputy for 
Port-en-Bessin, for example, strongly supported the action. 
41 
Those in the Gaullist RPR, such as Guermeur, one of the deputies 
for Finistere, blamed the government in general and Barre, the 
Prime Minister, in particular, for failing to see that the affair 
was not a CGT plot to undermine the whole French economy but the 
natural and spontaneous response of a group in deep economic 
crisis. 
42 
Guermeur specifically contrasted what the government 
had done with the measures taken by the RPR's party leader and 
presidential candidate, Chirac, when he had been Prime Minister in 
1976. 
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The final comment underlines that there was more than 
electoral politics involved. What Chirac had done in 1976 and 
what Le Pensec was to do in 1981 was to underline the character of 
the fishing industry as a vulnerable producer group that the state 
was obliged to help in as far as it could. What the Barre 
government was trying to do in 1980 was to reverse a deeply rooted 
historical tradition and hence resistance by the fishermen was not 
seen as subversive of the political order. No newspaper, of 
whatever political persuasion, was eager to attack the fishermen 
for committing illegal acts. Le Figaro, for example, a 
conservative paper, stressed the unpleasant conditions of work and 
viewed the Boulogne fishermen's case with considerable sympathy. 
43 
The contrast with British opinion in 1975 could not be more 
stark. The Times took a very hard line on the blockade: "The 
appearance at least must be preserved of not caving in before the 
latest example of creeping lawlessness in pursuit of sectional 
grievances. "44 The Guardian, too, was far from happy with what 
the fishermen were doing. Its Leader commented: "The quickest 
route to anarchy is to give in to those who break the law. "45 In 
other words, the lack of the protectionist ethic in Britain 
provided a much less understanding environment of the reasons for 
direct action than existed in France. The limits upon such action 
were therefore very much more pressing in the British than the 
French environment, limits which the representative leadership in 
Britain itself acknowledged by their behaviour. 
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4. Direct action: the state's role 
The attitude of the media underlines the point that the industry's 
stance towards direct action cannot be understood in isolation. 
The fishermen responded to a wider environment, just as much as 
they sought to influence that environment's shape. The same point 
needs to be made in relation to the state, which was not entirely 
autonomous in the way it reacted to the actions of those in the 
fishing industry. The way in which in France in 1980, for 
example, the political parties used the conflict in a 
pre-electoral situation meant that the Barre government was under 
a definite pressure: it could not give in without allowing the 
opposition to make political capital out of what had occurred. 
46 
However, the government only found itself in this difficulty 
because of the wider character of relations between the state and 
the fishing industry. If it had been more sensitive to the 
traditional pattern of that link, it is highly unlikely that 
disruption in France in 1980 would have been any greater than it 
was in Britain, and therefore no opportunity for political 
manipulation would have occurred. To underline the importance of 
the state's role in both countries in the context of direct 
action, the next section will look in turn at the way in which the 
two states structured their relations with the industry, and the 
nature of the solution that the different structures produced. 
4.1 The structure of relations 
After the Left's victory in 1981, Le Pensec, the new Minister for 
the Sea, attended the CCPM to announce that "the time of scorn and 
"47 naval battles is past . His attendance was greatly appreciated 
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by a profession which had never previously seen a minister at one 
of its meetings. This event, and the reaction to it, provides an 
important element in understanding what it was that made French 
fishermen feel as desparate as they did in 1975 and 1980. 
As we have seen (cf pp117 23 above), there is no shortage of 
committees offering the French fishing industry an opportunity to 
express its views to the government. However, what is also clear 
is that the main contact is with civil servants from the relevant 
government departments. The idea of direct links with government 
ministers was not one that was embodied in the thinking behind the 
1945 institutions. In 1975, Cavaille, the relevant minister, only 
went back on his initial refusal to meet the protestors when the 
dispute was assuming national proportions and he felt he had no 
choice. In 1980 Le Theule proved still more adamant in seeking to 
avoid involvement in the dispute, arguing that it was one for the 
"social partners" to resolve themselves. 
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Even towards the end 
of August, after the Bureau of the CCPM had specifically asked to 
see him, he remained aloof and insisted on negotiations being 
conducted through the normal channnels. As a result, when the 
CCPM met again at the end of the month, its dissatisfaction with 
the government's proposals could only be voiced directly to Essig, 
the Director-General of the DGMM: Dubreuil, the Committee's 
President, was obliged to write to Le Theule to tell him that 
nobody thought his measures were sufficient "to permit the 
conclusion of the crisis. "49 As for meeting fishermen from the 
coast, the Minister left this, too, to his civil servants. When 
the men from Fe'camp, Port-en-Bessin and Cherbourg interrupted 
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their blockade to come to Paris on Saturday, August 23, they, like 
the CCPM, spoke to Essig and when he failed to satisfy them, they 
returned to blockade the oil port of Antifer on the Monday. 
This refusal to meet the representatives of the industry and 
the attempt to keep the conflict in separate compartments was not 
simply a political strategem. 
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There had never been a tradition 
of direct ministerial involvement in national discussion of 
fishing policy. The CCPM structure was a classic case of 
institutionalised consultation as extensive as it was powerless 
in the context of a major dispute. 
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Moreover, the result of 
organising consultation in this way was that it was far from clear 
with whom a minister could have spoken in order to reach some kind 
of national agreement. The lack of a strong representative 
tradition in the industry meant that there were very few 
individuals who could claim to speak for more than a single port. 
When the fishermen did get to meet Cavaille in 1975, it was a 
chaotic affair with as many as 45 local delegates up against the 
men from the ministry in a battle for increased support. The 
contrast with Britain is enormous. 
One of the important consequences of the move away from port 
associations to regional or national ones within the British 
inshore industry was that it created a number of clearly 
identifiable individuals to whom the government could speak. We 
have already seen in the previous chapter how these leaders proved 
critical in Walker's moves to make the consent of the industry a 
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criterion for the settlement of the CFP (p221), and this link was 
just as important in the more charged atmosphere of February 1975. 
As soon as the blockades at Immingham and Grimsby had begun, Peart 
introduced his statement to the Commons with the remark that he 
had invited representatives of the fishermen to meet him. 
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Even 
when the response of the industry hardened and the Action 
Committee was set up, contact was maintained by a compromise which 
enabled the state to escape the charge of condoning illegality. 
As Brown, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, put it, after his 
discussion with the fishermen on April 2: 
"I took the view that it was inappropriate to 
meet the Action Committee but I had no 
objection to the attendance of members of the 
committee who were on the executive of the 
Scottish Fishermen's Federation, and two 
others who were invited as guests of the 
federation. " 
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More generally, the problem of the blockade was defined in terms 
of the need for discussion. Brown argued that the very reason 
that it had occurred was because of "inadequate communication 
between the Government and the industry. "54 Hence it is not 
unreasonable to claim that one reason why it did not recur was 
that ministers were very sensitive to the warnings that they 
received of growing militancy in their meetings with the 
representatives of the industry. 
By contrast, nothing had really changed in the structure of 
relations in France between 1975 and 1980. The CCPM was clear 
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that the explosion in the latter year could have been avoided "if 
the government had been willing to listen more carefully to the 
many appeals issued by the industry. " 
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However, the relationship 
between the two parties was not organised in such a way as to 
permit such appeals to have an effect. Instead the government 
found itself taken by surprise and left with very little room for. 
manoeuvre, a fact which its opponents were not slow to exploit. 
As we have seen, its initial response was to keep out and hope 
that the dispute would just 'rot' and collapse, the so-called 
'strategie de pourrissement'. This was, though, a very difficult 
line to maintain once the dispute became as broad and virulent as 
it did. 
Hence the second reflex which was to take a very firm line in 
repressing the blockades of Fos and Antifer. Given the special 
links between the navy and the fishing community since the time of 
Colbert, these actions were astonishingly maladroit and aroused a 
correspondingly high level of resentment amongst the whole fishing 
industry. It is difficult to see what electoral advantage the 
government could have hoped to gain by such ruthlessness, 
especially as fuel stocks were not seriously in danger. The 
inshore boats involved were traditional supporters of the Right, 
and so could hardly be portrayed as tools of the Leftist unions. 
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More to the point, the strategy revealed the way in which other 
options could be seen not to exist once the French state was faced 
with centrifugal pressures strong enough to undermine the 
generally high level of order within this particular sector of 
society. 
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A third strategy was developed, by this government to cope 
with the situation. It consisted in offering piecemeal 
concessions, such as those announced by Le Theule on August 26. 
Whereas these suggestions might have been productive at an earlier 
stage, by the end of August opinion in the industry had hardened 
considerably. It did not perceive the Minister's proposals as 
concessions, even though they were certainly more significant in 
financial terms than anything suggested by the British 
government in 1975 in its successful attempt to defuse the 
blockade. Such was the cost of the more brittle, less flexible 
structure of relations that existed in France. 
4.2 The nature of the solution 
last 
As the /paragraph suggests, the structure of relations and the 
solution it produces cannot be kept rigorously apart. Indeed it 
is arguable that in the British context, the structure was itself 
one of the solutions. When Hay called off the blockade, he gave 
two reasons: firstly, 75% of the demands had been met; secondly, 
there was a genuine belief that the Government meant business. 
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The very vague content of the statement by Brown, the Minister who 
negotiated the ending of the blockade, made the first of these 
look decidedly optimistic. As Fishing News put it, it was "Back 
to Sea on a Promise*" 
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However, this very fact underlined the 
importance of the second reason given. The Scottish inshore 
industry, in particular, felt that it was now being considered 
more seriously and that the UK fishing policy would no longer be 
geared predominantly to the demands of the BTF and STF. 
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Subsequently, the possibility of direct action was something 
that Walker, in particular, guarded against with great political 
skill. As soon as he announced the aid package of August 1980, 
the threat of unofficial action by the Scots petered out. 
Similarly, when the boats throughout Britain tied up in February 
1981, he responded quickly by saying that he was bringing forward 
a review of the subsidy scheme, a move which the representatives 
of the industry could point to as indicating the success of their 
pressure tactics and which the government could present as 
successfully bringing the action of the fishermen to an end. At 
the same time, the particular complaint of the fishermen against 
the large imports coming into the country was one that Walker 
dealt with in a way designed to defuse the situation rather than 
provide a specific solution. Firstly, he put the burden of 
argument on the industry, by saying that he would do something, if 
it could prove that 'dumping' was to blame for the low earnings of 
the fleet. Secondly, he set up a committee of enquiry with six 
representatives of the industry under the chairmanship of the 
Fisheries Secretary at MAFF, Mason. 
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The report itself emerged 
six months later when the situation was much less tense and 
concluded that the basic problem was the high value of sterling 
rather than unfair practices by exporters to Britain. 
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Indeed as 
the year progressed, controls on imports were quietly relaxed as 
their adverse effect on processors became clear. In this way 
politically adept solutions were devised for potentially explosive 
situations. 
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The way in which similar situations in France were treated 
was quite different. Rather than seek compromise, the French 
state was torn between surrender and technocratic repression. The 
first option was taken in 1975. Chirac indicated to his Minister 
that he should concede to the fishermen's demands and the question 
at issue was simply the extent of the concessions that would be 
made to calm the fishermen down. Thus on top of the 8MF agreed to 
on the morning of February 20, the weary government negotiators 
agreed to a further 3MF in the afternoon. 
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It was not a question 
of putting off a response to a later date until a committee had 
reported or the shape of an aid package had been agreed. Nor was 
this the question in 1980 when the second option proved more 
acceptable to the government. Everything that was done confirmed 
the idea of the technocratic character of the French state, where 
technical competence and a sense of public service amongst 
administrators is combined with a woeful inability to understand 
and respond to the desires and expectations of the objects of 
government, the 'administres'. 
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At the level of individuals, the nature of the state response 
was epitomised by the role played by Essig, the Director-General 
of the DGMM. He had had a brilliant career with the Regional 
Planning Agency (DATAR) and been drafted into the Ministry of 
Transport in September 1978. He was not a man with a feel for the 
difficulties of the fishermen, however well he could analyse them, 
and his association with the events of August 1980 led to his 
being moved on at the end of the year. Indeed one of the moves of 
the new Socialist government to correct this bias was to appoint 
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as Director of the Fisheries Directorate, Proust, a man with long 
experience as a maritime administrator on the ground, and very 
much respected by the fishing fraternity. 
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However, it was not simply a question of personalities. It 
was also a matter of the way in which arguments were openly used 
to try to suppress the validity of the fishermen's case. In no 
sense did Le Theule see himself as their champion against 
other interests, rather he called on facts and figures as if he 
were some kind of neutral arbiter. Thus in the second week of 
August, he sought to sway opinion against the idea that the 
financial situation in the industry was as bad as was claimed by 
quoting figures for the average earnings of a trawler skipper, a 
chief engineer and a member of the crew. He suggested, for 
example, that a crewman could expect to earn 117,000FF per year, a 
total which provoked a reply from the owners that in reality, the 
figure was unlikely to exceed 70,000FF and that in any case, the 
intervention only served to exacerbate the situation. 
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A second example of a technician's attack on the fishermen 
was the use of the Community 'card' as an argument against 
according a higher fuel subsidy. The EEC Commission sent a letter 
to France on August 12 threatening to take her to the ECJ, the 
Luxembourg court, for unfair competition in view of the fuel 
subsidy she was already giving. This was to provide ideal 
ammunition for both Le Theule and Barre, who noted that French 
fishermen were in any case paying less for fuel than almost all 
other European fishermen. However, to argue that EEC law left the 
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government with no choice would be quite unrealistic. As 
Eisenhammer puts it: 
"These official fuel prices mask the fact that 
most countries practice hidden subsidies of 
some sort. The surreptitious manner in which 
the French government gave massive aid to the 
Saint-Nazaire shipyards, in contradiction of 
Brussels' regulations, and the fact that the 
newly-elected Mauroy government in 1981 
covertly doubled the fuel subsidy, shows that 
where there is a will there is a way. "65 
In a similar way, the solutions that were proposed as well as 
those that were excluded reflected technical rather than political 
competence. At a Paris meeting to discuss the case of the 
Boulogne deep-sea crews on September 2, a compromise was put 
forward by the administration involving the rotation of fishermen 
rather than any redundancy. Those staying on shore would receive 
a reduced wage supported by the National Employment Fund. 
However, as was remarked at the time, there was no attempt to 
'sell' this proposal. Ministers failed to utter a word of 
sympathy or understanding to make the ideas palatable after such a 
prolonged and bitter dispute; it was a case of 'too little, too 
late'. 
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The contrasting British and French states' responses to 
direct action were not only dictated by considerations of how best 
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to deal with an interest within society. There was also the issue 
of the broader way in which the problems of that industry should 
be conceived. As we have already seen in Chapter Five (pp146-55) 
the philosophies of economic intervention that applied in the two 
countries were very different. In particular, there was a 
contrast between a French protectionist tradition which dictated a 
thorough attempt to shape the fishing industry, and a British 
liberal tradition which accepted a need for intervention without 
depriving the industry of the main role in determining its future. 
This difference was important in the context of the tension 
generated by direct action in that it established different 
expectations of what the state should do. 
In the French case, the unwillingness of the Barre government 
to contemplate an increased fuel subsidy suggested that it was 
considering imposing an important change on the shape of the 
fishing industry. Barre argued that to concede on the fuel issue 
would not only open the way to similar demands from other 
interests, such as taxis, but also enable fishermen to avoid the 
'real costs' of energy, which he was eager all should face. 
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position was not solely determined by the blockade: later in the 
year, Le Theule's successor, Hoeffel, remained opposed to fuel 
aid, despite his generally more cooperative stance. 
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Such a liberal leaning opened the government to the charge 
that it no longer wanted to protect the industry as all 
governments had in the past. In the documents of the 8th Plan, it 
was pointed out that without the 'political will' there could be 
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8,000 direct and 40-50,000 indirect job losses in the industry by 
1985. So successful was the CGT in arguing that this would happen 
because the government lacked the necessary will that by the end 
of the month, foreign commentators of liberal economic views had 
picked up the argument and accepted it. 
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Hence it was not just a 
question of an authoritarian style on the part of the government 
but also the fact that its ideas for solving the crisis ran 
contrary to a traditional pattern of economic support. In this 
way, the political and economic strands of the French state 
tradition can be seen to merge in an explanation of the response 
of French governments to direct action. 
The British example underlines a similar combination of the 
different strands of tradition. Just as politically the stress 
was on concession and compromise when direct action was taken or 
threatened, so economically there was a reliance on short-term ad 
hoc arrangements, designed to appease but reflecting a marked 
reluctance to run counter to a liberal interpretation of 
intervention. For this reason, British governments could use 
similar arguments to the French about the knock-on effects of a 
fuel subsidy without exacerbating discontent. In the same way, 
they could avoid the pressure for import controls, which had a 
clear effect in France. Walker's response in 1981 to the pressure 
for import controls in appointing a committee was not just a 
clever way of sidestepping the problem but also reflected a 
long-standing economic tradition, which the threat of direct 
action by fishermen could not hope to undermine. 
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5. Conclusion 
The present chapter has come to two main conclusions. First, it 
has confirmed our initial expectations that the severity of the 
changes in the issue area would induce a tendency towards direct 
action in both states but that the tendency would be more marked 
in France given its particular traditions. In so doing, it has 
underlined distinctive features of the character of the industry 
and the state in the two countries. The French industry has been 
seen to conform to a decentralised pattern of interest group 
behaviour with leadership coming from behind, 
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while in Britain 
representation was concentrated in the hands of powerful 
individuals, able to influence significant sections of the 
industry. The contrast was one which the two states had helped to 
bring about but which also influenced their behaviour in that 
British governments found themselves with a reliable interlocutor 
in the search for compromise, while French governments were driven 
to choose between repression and surrender in controlling 
centrifugal pressures. 
Secondly, the chapter has underlined the link between this 
perspective and the previous ones. It has stressed the way in 
which the same divisions within the British industry which were so 
from 
important in the mediatory perspective in preventing a united view/ 
emerging were critical in limiting the extent of direct action, 
given the strong leadership of each section of the industry. By 
contrast the lesser degree of open articulation of differences in 
the French mediatory context served both to harden opposition to 
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the state and to limit the possibilities of conflict resolution 
when tension increased. Similarly, the state's response to direct 
action has been seen to be linked to the interventionist 
perspective. The British liberal economic tradition rendered the 
defusing of conflict more straightforward than it was in France 
where protectionism generated more specific expectations as to the 
way in which the grievances of the fishing industry should be 
resolved. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SELF-HELP PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
The fourth and last of the chapters organised around a perspective 
will consider the efforts of the fishing industries of Britain and 
France to manage their own economic environment. It adopts 
therefore a 'bottom-up' view of the link between state and society 
which complements the 'top-down' approach adopted in Chapter 
Five. As with the previous three perspectives, this self-help 
perspective is linked to two claims as to how we might expect the 
relationship between the fishing industry and government to 
develop (cf p 31 above). The first of these is that "the industry 
would respond to change by intensifying its efforts to help 
itself". We will find that this did occur but that the industry's 
efforts cannot be considered in isolation. They were heavily 
influenced by the attitude of the state towards them. Hence we 
will also find confirmation for our second claim that "the 
difference between the character of French and British state 
intervention in the economy would make such self-help efforts much 
less individualistic in France than they were in Britain''. 
The chapter is organised into three parts. The first will 
suggest that the fishing industry has always been marked by a 
strong clash between the individual and collective interests of 
catchers. Before the 1970s neither country had much success in 
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reconciling this clash of interests in the inshore sector but in 
both countries, the deep-sea companies were able to develop 
structures of joint self-management. In France these structures 
were heavily influenced by the state, in Britain they were the 
product of mutual agreement amongst the companies. The second 
section will argue that these contrasting views of self-help were 
reflected in the development of EEC producer organisations. In 
France there was a shared determination on the part of state and 
industry alike to use them in order to develop a common producer 
interest. In Britain the EEC structure was not used in the same 
way but generated a fragmented pattern of activity within the 
industry, subject to no significant coordination by the state. 
The third section will claim that the growth of producer power in 
Britain was blocked by the existence of a broader set of trading 
and processing interests, closely entwined with those of the 
catchers. No British government was prepared to disentangle these 
various interests or to accord clear priority to the interests of 
fishermen as national producers. In France, by contrast, the 
interlocking of interests was less marked and there was strong 
pressure to protect the national producer interest. The result 
was that self-help efforts in Britain lacked the collective shape 
they had in France. 
2. Individual and collective interests 
The fierce individualism of those involved in fishing is 
legendary. As one writer put it: "every fisherman is a poacher 
and a smuggler at heart. "' The result is that there has been 
tremendous competition between fishermen with each man determined 
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to earn more than his neighbour on his return to port. In the 
British deep-sea industry, this competition was institutionalised 
and legitimated by the annual award of what was known as the 
'Silver Cod' trophy to the trawler captain who made the largest 
catch in a year. The winner could expect quite a contest from his 
fellow captains, even those within the same firm, the following 
year, and the tactics used were anything but gentlemanly. A 
favourite trick was the placing of a sack over the cod end, i. e 
the rear of the net so that fish could not escape, whatever the 
net's mesh size, and the vessel's catch could be increased 
accordingly. More dangerously, a vessel might give the impression 
of lowering its nets over ground known to be strewn with 
'fasteners' or obstacles in the hope that a competing captain 
would fish in that area and damage or lose his trawling 
equipment. 
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Within the inshore industry, the attraction of making a 
bigger catch than one's competitor has encouraged fishermen to 
risk contravening legal rules. Despite the widespread belief in 
Britain that French ships were landing herring illegally in 
France, as illustrated by the March 1980 TV documentary (cf p 87 
above), it was not beyond Grimsby inshore captains to sail to 
Denmark to land herring as a way of escaping British controls and 
making money at the same time. 
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It was a classic example of the 
'free-rider' problem which the individualism of the industry 
exacerbates. Why should fishermen risk their economic survival if 
they cannot be sure that others will adhere to the rules? 
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Such competition has created an important barrier between the 
industry and the state. Fishermen have been reluctant to reveal 
too much about practices that can bring them economic advantage. 
Thus the state structure is well aware both of the unsatisfactory 
nature of much of the information it receives as well as its 
dependence upon the industry for that information. As the French 
Fisheries Directorate put it in 1976: 
"Unfortunately, very many captains and owners 
have still not understood that the future of 
their industry is linked to the quality of the 
information that they ought to supply and 
there is reason to fear that it will not be 
possible to defend their rights effectively in 
the years to come. "4 
Similar kinds of worry emerged during the Trade and Industry 
Sub-Committee's discussion of fish dumping. The Director of Research 
at MAFF made it clear that the government is obliged to accept what the 
industry tells it and can only hope to obtain very rough estimates 
made : 
"either by interrogation of skippers or mates 
on landing or, in some cases, observers have 
been put aboard the vessels, but the number of 
observers one can put on vessels is clearly 
few. "S 
However the same secretiveness which limits the information 
given to governments has also limited the development of the 
collective rather than individual economic interests of fishermen. 
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Fishermen are anything but eager to share with other fishermen the 
information which helps to determine their individual wealth. For 
example, in order to maintain their own secret knowledge of where 
and when to make the best catches, they will frequently switch 
their radios off so as to avoid giving away their position away 
and they will never wish to indicate how much they have caught in 
any particular place. 
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Yet the common organisation of the catches 
made by fishermen is one way by which they can avoid gluts in the 
market, and the consequent fall in price which affects all of them 
adversely and can only benefit retailers and consumers. Agreement 
on collective action could make all catchers better off. But the 
strength of individualist ideology hindered such an agreement and 
adequate structures of self-management. The nature of the 
structures that did come into being will be considered in turn for 
the inshore and deep-sea industries. 
2.1 Inshore industry 
Before the 1970s, the cooperative was the basic mechanism for 
self-management that existed in the inshore sector. The 
cooperative offered a forum for fishermen to take economic 
decisions, while their local association (in Britain) or local 
committee (in France) provided a mechanism for representing their 
views to the authorities. Through the cooperative, the inshore 
industry could hope to act directly to improve its economic 
position. 
In both countries, the idea of encouraging the industry to 
come together and organise itself in this way goes back to the 
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early years of this century. 
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In Britain, as we have seen (p124 
above), the government established the FOS back in 1914 'to foster 
the propagation of cooperative principles' within England and 
Wales (in Scotland, the cooperative movement only began between 
1940 and 1945). An annual Treasury grant (amounting in 1972, for 
example, to £14,000) was given to the FOS to assist it in its task 
and to supplement the contribution that it received from its 
member cooperatives. In France, too, the state took a lead, 
though establishing a much more direct supervisory role. A law of 
1901 gave maritime administrators the right to attend and exercise 
a veto at meetings of the cooperatives, and in 1913, a common bank 
for the inshore industry, the Credit Maritime Mutuel, was 
established under state decree. This bank was given the job of 
receiving the membership claims of cooperatives, agreeing to their 
statutes and guaranteeing them credit. 
Since that time the system has spread to include ten regional 
banks in mainland France and three in the DOM-TOM. These bodies 
along with the cooperatives have come together to form the 
Confederation des Organismes de Credit Maritime Mutuel (COCMM), 
which gives a national sounding board to the inshore cooperative 
movement. In Britain, by contrast, the FOS remained very much a 
regional phenomenon, concentrated in the South West of England, 
and undermined as the spokesman of inshore men by the growth of 
the NFFO in most of the rest of England and Wales. 
Despite these long-standing arrangements and despite their 
diverse forms, neither country was notably successful in 
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generating a firm cooperative structure. In France, there was an 
increased interest in cooperatives in the 1960s but by 1970,50 of 
the 69 coops were still restricted to dealing with the common 
purchase of supplies, such as rope, fuel and nets, and only ten 
were concerned with the marketing of fish once caught. By 
contrast, in Britain, including Scotland, only 25 of a total of 
125 in the middle of the 1970s were supply cooperatives and only 
54 were marketing cooperatives, the remainder being representative 
associations attached to the FOS as non-trading societies. 
However, the fact that members were not obliged to deliver their 
entire catch to the cooperative for sale and that membership, 
particularly in Scotland, was not high meant that the marketing 
cooperatives were not very successful. No more than half of the 
inshore production in England and Wales and as little as 10% of 
Scottish landings were marketed by cooperatives in the early 
1970x. 
In both countries there was a constant problem of obtaining 
the right kind of people to run the cooperative. For long periods 
of time the fishermen themselves would be at sea and their level 
of involvement would extend little beyond a small financial 
contribution to its expenses. The management of the cooperative 
would necessarily be devolved to someone who did not go to sea, 
and the financial rewards offered to that person could not be 
high. The typical kind of situation that arose as a result was 
280 
described by the Chairman of the Hastings' Fisherman's Association 
in his evidence to the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee: 
"Up until about 12 years ago we used to have a 
fishermen's cooperative. There was not enough 
money going into the cooperative society to 
get anybody to run it full-time and we had a 
retired fisherman running it. We could not 
afford to pay him a lot of money and when he 
died we had to pack up the cooperative. "8 
There were some exceptions to this general rule in both 
countries, where local circumstances proved to be particularly 
favourable. As early as 1945, at Eyemouth in Scotland, for 
example, the Presbyterian minister played an important role in 
establishing a coop which by 1972 had 400 members and an annual 
turnover of over El million. Moreover, it took on a remarkably 
wide range of tasks, going well beyond the provision of supplies 
and basic marketing. It established deep-freeze and storage 
facilities; it worked out independent withdrawal price systems; 
and it organised market intelligence on the level of prices in 
other ports. Similarly, at Etaples, near Boulogne, the cohesion 
of the fishermen which was to drive them to Paris to protest in 
1975 (cf p231above) enabled them to form a cooperative in the 
mid-60s, which came to work for virtually all the 'artisans' in 
the area. Like the Eyemouth coop, it set up a freezing capacity 
so as to cope with gluts on the market and could exercise 
sufficient authority over its members to organise limits on the 
levels of catch. 
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However, the environment of the cooperatives in both 
countries has been transformed by the EEC structure of producer 
organisations, agreed to in 1970. This structure offered an 
opportunity for the inshore industry to manage its economic 
welfare in a much more direct way than it had done in the past. 
The result was that some cooperatives like Etaples, became POs, 
aiming to bolster first hand sales of fish, while others continued 
to exist as separate entities but in a new and close relationship 
with the POs in the search for outlets for products. The 
character of the balance between individual and collective 
interests was radically altered in the process. 
2.2 Deep-sea industry 
The difficulty of managing conflicts between individual catchers 
proved less severe in the deep-sea industry than in the inshore 
industry because of the existence of shore-based companies. 
Whatever the conflicts between captains on the fishing grounds, 
the companies in both countries came to recognise, as early as the 
1960s, that it was in their collective interest to control the 
competition between themselves. Above all, they recognised the 
importance of the need to organise the link between the catching 
and the selling of fish. They devised mechanisms to avoid one of 
the constant difficulties of the inshore sector, namely that 
vessels tend to leave port together and to return together, thus 
provoking gluts on the market and a general lowering of prices. 
Not only would owners phase the return of their boats so that they 
did not land their catch together, but they also supplied 
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information in advance to the merchants and processors as to what 
fish and in what quantities a ship would be returning with. 
However, within this general framework of increased 
cooperation, the two countries differed markedly in the way in 
which the pursuit of collective interests was organised. The 
French industry invited the state to establish the terms of 
cooperation and accepted a degree of direction determined by 
public law. In Britain the arrangements were the product of 
informal agreement amongst the companies and imposed a much more 
limited set of obligations on those involved. It was a classic 
example of the contrast between interest accommodation in a 
state-led society and a society-led state. 
As we have seen in Chapter Four, the French industry had been 
involved since 1945 in a degree of collective economic management, 
through the Interprofessional Committees. However, in the early 
1960s, the feeling grew that these committees were not enough and 
so the industry pressed the administration to create new, more 
wide-ranging institutions. Thus from 1965, the structure of the 
1945 Decree was supplemented by three Regional Funds for the 
Organisation of the Market (FROMs), one for the North region, a 
second for Brittany and a third for the South West. Each was run 
by a governing body with representatives from the industry and the 
state. 
All three FROMs were given significant powers to intervene 
in the market and to implement a system of legally enforceable 
4 
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withdrawal prices. If fish could not be sold above the withdrawal 
price the company concerned was obliged to place its fish on a 
'second market', where it would be bought for conversion into 
fishmeal. It would then receive from the FROM the difference 
between the price obtained on the 'second market' and the 
guaranteed withdrawal price. To ensure this level of protection, 
all companies were obliged to belong to the FROM in their area. 
They also had to accept instructions from the FROM such as 
changing a ship's course, if the market it was coming to was 
saturated. To ensure adequate financing, alongside the compulsory 
contributions of the industry, the state provided substantial 
sums: in the case of FROM Nord, for example, 42% of the budget in 
1965,25% in 1966 and 50% in 1967.9 in this way, the FROMS were 
able not only to pay their members, if prices fell, but also to 
offer special premiums to processors if they were prepared to 
accept particular quantities of fish in advance. 
The British arrangements were very different. First of all, 
there was no question of the state being involved institutionally 
or financially: consultation with the WFA was the limit of 
involvement by those outside the industry. Secondly, the system 
that was established, known as the Distant Water Vessels 
Development Scheme, set minimum prices below which the members of 
the scheme would not sell their product: it did not establish a 
system of price guarantees should prices fall below the minimum 
levels. What was designed to keep prices up (and succeeded in 
doing so between 1966 and 1973) was the mutual agreement of the 
owners not to undercut their competitors rather than the 
a 
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availability of finance for sales under the minimum prices set by 
the owners. Finally, the fact that the arrangement was not 
embodied in law meant that it could be attacked in the courts for 
distorting the market. The BTF was obliged to defend the scheme 
before the Restrictive Practices Court in 1966 and was successful. 
But in Scotland, the equivalent Court issued an order in 1970 
preventing the STF from operating any scheme designed to limit the 
mode of operation of a trawler firm. 
10 
Only in 1975 was this 
order rescinded as a result of the application of EEC legislation 
on producer organisations. 
11 
This last comment underlines how important the development of 
EEC policy was for the industry. The PO system opened up the 
opportunity for part of the financial burden of withdrawal and 
guarantee prices to be undertaken by the Community. However, the 
catching sector was not unanimous in perceiving the usefulness of 
such support for their efforts at self-management. The FROMs in 
France moved rapidly to obtain status as POs, but in Britain the 
process was much slower. The first operation to withdraw fish 
from the British market did not take place until the middle of 
1975.12 The reasons for this need to be sought in the different 
ways in which the two industries responded to the possibility of 
EEC support for their activity. 
3. EEC producer organisations 
In Chapter Three (pp90-108) we saw that Britain and France had 
consistently different attitudes towards the CFP. France's major 
concern was to ensure maximum protection for her fishermen whereas 
Britain wanted as large an area of exclusive access and as 
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substantial a level of quotas as possible. Hence the creation of 
the system of producer organisations in the fisheries sector did 
not have the same meaning for the two states. Though Britain was 
just as much bound by this part of the 'acquis communautaire' as 
any other, for her and her fishing industry it was a far less 
significant aspect than it was for France and her industry. For 
the French the existence of the PO framework was a critical 
element in a policy they wished to use to protect the interests of 
their fishermen. For the British the need for such protection was 
not perceived in the same light, and POs received a 
correspondingly smaller level of attention. 
3.1 Historical development 
In the early 1970s most British concern was expressed about the 
idea of fishing 'up to the beaches', as the 'equal access' 
provision suggested would occur after the ending of the 
derogations agreed under the Treaty of Accession. In as far as 
there was discussion about the CFP more generally, the marketing 
arrangements were not commented upon very favourably. The idea of 
a unified pricing structure was seen as very inflexible and likely 
to lead to major distortion in the market. The fact that it might 
assist fishermen as a group was not necessarily perceived as an 
286 
advantage. Laing of the BTF noted a possible parallel with the 
difficulties of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): 
"... the policy is explicitly directed towards 
the protection if not the promotion of the 
interests of producers rather than consumers. 
If EEC agricultural policy provides any 
precedents, then the extent to which or at any 
rate the pace at which rationalisation of the 
fishing industry will proceed must be a matter 
of doubt .,, 
13 
In other words, there is little evidence that the industry itself 
in Britain was particularly interested in having to deal with a 
further layer of bureaucracy, at a time (before 1975) when it was 
doing very well without such interference in its affairs. 
In France, by contrast, there was every interest in the 
potential of producer organisations. As already indicated (p 95 
above), French negotiators were concerned to obtain as much 
protection as possible in the face of the impending dismantling of 
all barriers to trade in fish products between Community members 
in 1971. They were determined to ensure 'an equal chance' for 
French fishermen in the face of the freeing of the movement of the 
factors of production. The fact that consumers had traditionally 
been obliged to pay higher prices than in other countries was seen 
as a necessary effect of guaranteeing producer income. 
14 
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Ironically, the French industry was anything but happy with 
the results of the negotiations. As the CCPM commented: 
"The Community idea of producer organisations 
is, in our eyes, unrealistic, because these 
organisations are neither obligatory nor 
interprofessional. ', 15 
In other words, the industry felt that the PO system could only 
work if all fishermen in a particular area were obliged to belong, 
allowing no opportunity for individuals to sell outside the 
official network at a lower price. Although French pressure in 
the EEC resulted in three years being fixed as a minimum time for 
participation in a P0, it proved impossible to get all EEC members 
to agree to the idea of compulsory membership. 
16 
Despite continuing complaints it was recognised in France 
that the POs could play a very major role in helping the inshore 
sector, in particular, to overcome the inadequacies of its old 
cooperative structures and that they could come to have an 
increasing role in controlling the market. Such potential was 
perceived much more slowly in Britain. However, in both countries 
it was the events of 1975 that gave further impetus to the debate 
about POs. 
1975 was, as we have seen, a very difficult year for the 
fishing industry in Britain and France. It prompted higher 
government intervention, it increased the volume of complaint from 
fishermen and it produced unprecedented levels of direct action. 
What it also did was to encourage a tendency for the industry to 
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seek to help and organise itself. In France, in particular, there 
was an increased awareness of the possibilities of using the PO 
structure to overcome internal infighting. On the Mediterranean 
coast alone, seven new POs were set up in the first half of the 
year, when there had been none before. 
17 In April, 18 POs, 
inshore and deep-sea, from throughout France decided to combine to 
form a National Association of Producer Organisations (ANOP). At 
their inaugural meeting, they were given a symbolic speech of 
support by the infamous head of the vegetable cooperative of 
St-Pol-de-Lon, Gourvennec, whose members had used their combined 
wealth to set up Brittany Ferries. 
'8 
In Britain, too, it was recognised that POs offered a new way 
forward. In July, the SFP, the largest PO in Britain, was able to 
fix herring and white fish prices. This was possible because the 
legal ban on the setting of minimum prices in Scotland had been 
lifted and its members could now realistically start to encourage 
other fishermen to join. However, it was by no means easy to get 
fishermen to conceive of their interests in collective rather than 
individual terms. Membership remained low and awareness of the 
separate interests of the different sections of the industry meant 
that it proved very difficult to create an equivalent of ANOP. In 
February 1976, an association of inshore POs was set up. But it 
excluded the major Scottish inshore interest, the SFO, and 
consequently foundered to be replaced later in the year by the 
United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations 
(UKAFPO). 19 As we shall see, it too had a difficult career. 
28 9 
Despite the difficulties in Britain, the years that followed 
produced an important growth in the range and activity of POs in 
both countries. By 1982, the coverage of the coastlines was 
almost complete: there were 14 in Britain and 21 in France 
(including one for the tuna fleet based at Dakar in Senegal). 
Moreover, they came to be involved with each other in a wider 
arena. In November 1976, at the instigation of ANOP, POs from all 
over the EEC met for the first time in Brussels. In June 1980 a 
European Association of Producer Organisations (EAPO) was 
established to act as a lobby for improved price levels for fish 
products and a tilting of Community policy in favour of organised 
producers. 
0 
Thus the POs were becoming more than economic agents. 
They were moving into the political arena of obtaining resources, 
the task traditionally undertaken by the representative 
associations, such as the SFF and the NFFO, in Britain, the CCPM 
structure in France and 'Europeche' at the European level. In 
this way, the difference between self-help and the more 
traditional notions of an interest influencing government became 
blurred. 
However, the blurring of the distinction does not alter the 
fact that the producer organisations retained a distinctive role. 
They were concerned to act directly on the market in order to 
assure a 'fair income to producers' and were not simply interested 
in persuading government to improve that income. At the same 
time, they were not just agents of the state or the Community but 
retained an important degree of autonomy. They could only be 
established 'on the producers' own initiative' and they were free 
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to decide whether to apply EEC prices or autonomous prices, though 
forfeiting Community support if they chose the latter. This did 
not mean, however, that they operated in similar ways. The 
contrast between their role in Britain and France after 1975 was 
very marked and illustrates the importance of the state's role in 
channelling the self-help efforts of the fishing industry. 
3.2 The role of the state 
What happened in France to the PO structure cannot be understood 
without recognising the role of FIOM. In Chapter Five, the 
importance of this body in encouraging experimental voyages was 
stressed (p169-8l above). However, it also became the effective 
patron of the French POs and their link with the administration. 
By 1982 over half of its budget (63MF) was being spent to help the 
POs in their efforts to intervene on the market and to complement 
the funds coming from the Community, while the POs themselves had 
come to turn instinctively to FLOM as the guardian of their 
interests* 
21 
The close relationship betwen FIOM and the POs was 
particularly clear in the operation of a system of national 
withdrawal prices. As the Community-guaranteed withdrawal prices 
only applied to 13 species and France markets over 40, there was a 
clear difficulty over how to deal with non-Community species. The 
system that evolved from 1976 was for ANOP to agree to, and 
present, to FIOM prices for these non-Community fish. Once 
agreement was reached on these prices, they were presented to the 
merchants to allow for further bargaining. From then on, FIOM 
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would guarantee financial support, if prices dropped below the 
agreed withdrawal price level. The mechanism of, guarantees was 
based on a close tie with all the POs. At the beginning of each 
year, FLOM would establish a total value of the 'drawing rights' 
or 'credits for market support' to which each PO was entitled. 
During the year, the PO would itself pay for withdrawals and 
receive 45% to 60% of the money back from its FIOM allowance. If 
it then reached the limit of its credit, the Fund's administrators 
could acknowledge a particular difficulty and grant more money or 
tell the PO to find the money out of its own resources. 
In 1980 this basic support mechanism was supplemented by the 
creation of a system of 'objective prices', intended to compensate 
for loss of earnings. POs were allowed to choose 10 species and 
for each of the species the average price that obtained in the 
previous year was calculated. This figure was then increased by 
10% to produce an 'objective price' for the current year. Where 
the actual price received by the fishermen was lower than the 
'objective' one, FIOM made a contribution of 50% of the difference 
to cushion the blow of decreased income, with the remainder coming 
from the P0's own funds. The scheme proved popular with the POs 
but was also very expensive. As a result, the number of species 
that each PO could choose was reduced to three in 1981 and then 
zero in 1982. However, the very existence of the scheme 
underlines the closeness of the link between FIOM and the POs. 
British POs looked at the arrangements with an envy as large as 
their chances of obtaining a similar scheme were small. 
22 
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In addition to its role in supporting prices, FLOM also made 
tentative steps towards obtaining a larger level of control over 
the market beyond the first-hand sale. It encouraged supply 
contracts between producers and processors, offering the latter a 
small financial incentive of 20 centimes per kilo for such deals. 
It was anything but easy to get such arrangements, with producers 
inevitably seeking a high price and processors a low price, 
neither eager to settle for a fixed price. However, what was 
clear was that POs looked to FIOM to help them in this domain: 
some even went so far as to want it to be 3bliged to take all 
surpluses and to get rid of them as best as it could, so that the 
fishermen would cease to have to worry about what happened after 
first sale. 
23 
In other words, in the French context, the self-help reflex 
was strongly conditioned by the knowledge that the state was 
supporting the producers' initiatives and offering important 
financial backing. This was not the case in Britain, where there 
was no equivalent to FIOM and the only special assistance for POs 
came in the £2m allocated to them in March 1980. None of the 
subsequent aid packages contained money specifically allocated to 
the POs. In part, this can be understood in terms of the 
different British market structure: the main British catch was 
covered by the Community withdrawal system, unlike the French. 
Equally, the government was reluctant to contravene EEC rules 
concerning the level of support to be given to POs. More 
important, however, was the British aversion to interference in 
293 
the economic arena and its greater enthusiasm for competition 
within the market. 
It has already been indicated that the French fishing 
industry was disappointed that the Community arrangements did not 
conform to their own consultative structure and make membership of 
POs compulsory. Hence there was constant pressure throughout the 
1970s for the extension of discipline to non-members to prevent 
fishermen picking and choosing whether or not to sell through POs. 
The 1983 EEC deal did make it possible for members and non-members 
of a PO to be differentiated, the former receiving up to 100% of 
the withdrawal price, the lattter restricted to 60%, but there 
were major British doubts about any further discipline. Lord 
Mansfield, the Scottish Fisheries Minister, had stated clearly the 
government's worries about how much compulsion should be 
exercised, referring to the: 
"fundamental question of whether it would be 
right to seek to impose on those fishermen who 
have chosen, for whatever reason, not to join 
a producer organisation an obligation to 
conduct their affairs in certain, as yet 
unspecified respects, as if they were members 
of a P0. "24 
In such 'voluntarist' circumstances, it was hardly surprising that 
British POs were not able to develop the same kind of relationship 
with the state that their French colleagues could. 
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However, it was not simply a question of an unwillingness to 
intervene in private choices. There was also a strong feeling - 
particularly strong under a Conservative government - that the 
acknowledged problem of an uncertain market demanded a higher 
level of entrepreneurial skills, not the development of producer 
power under state supervision. Walker, the MAFF minister, 
commissioned a marketing report which appeared in July 1981 and 
called on fishermen to stop being 'quarelling gamblers' and to 
cooperate. 
25 
oo perate. 
25 
However, the authors of the report did not see POs 
as the way to further cooperation. Rather the stress was on the 
need for greater fish promotion through the selling of new species 
and the use of catchy new brand names - MacFish was suggested! 
The report provoked a considerable amount of comment and debate, 
ending in a major conference in November, but all this activity 
served to underline a general belief that market conditions could 
be improved by simply pointing to the benefits of cooperation. 
Why this should be seen to be enough to bring about cooperation, 
when any individual could hope to benefit from it without making a 
contribution remained obscure. 
The general tendency of government policy was confirmed by 
the nature of the SFIA, which replaced the WFA and RIB in October 
1981. Far from acting as the financial sponsor of the POs in 
Britain, the new Authority devoted its first efforts to 
encouraging the purchase of fish. Its method was a large scale 
marketing campaign transported round Britain by train. Moreover, 
its own structure made it difficult to envisage it ever becoming 
more directly involved in the allocation of resources to the 
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industry. The presence of eight industry representatives on the 
Board of twelve brought the Authority closer to fishermen than its 
predecessors but it also made it more difficult for it to take 
decisions benefitting one group more than another. 
26 
In other 
words, the notion of a collective catcher interest remained much 
less developed in Britain than it was in France. 
3.3 The societal response 
The behaviour of the producer organisations themselves was a 
reflection of the state's attitude towards them. In the French 
context, they flourished; in the British context, they faced a 
constant up-hill battle. There was an important psychological 
element in that in France the POs felt strongly that they were 
operating within an officially-approved environment. As early as 
1976 (cf p 137) the French state gave exclusive recognition to 
ANOP, while five years later there was still a belief that the 
British had failed to match the unity of the French. As the head 
of the Bridlington PO put it: 
"We desparately need to breathe some life into 
the UK Association of Fish Producer 
Organisations so that it can become a vital 
forum for mutual cooperation and benefit .,, 
27 
Without the kind of supervision offered by FIOM it was hard to see 
how the environment for such unity could come about: the divergent 
interests within the industry were too great. 
The result of this difference in environment was that the 
French P0s found it easier to act both in concert and alone. 
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Already in 1976 an agreement was reached in ANOP that the PO to 
which a boat belonged would be responsible for the payment of 
guaranteed prices and the landing taxes of a ship, even if the 
ship put its catch ashore at a port other than its home port. 
28 
In Britain, by contrast, UKAFPO was never able satisfactorily to 
cope with the conflicts that arose between the 'nomad' ships of 
Scotland and Humberside, who sometimes fished for mackerel and the 
small-scale indigenous fishermen of the South West coast. The 
difficulty may have been greater in the British context but the 
institutions were certainly not designed for the resolution of 
conflict. 
The belief that the French state considered membership of POs 
important - government aids to investment, for example, were less 
favourable for non-members - increased members' willingness to 
hand over responsibilities to their individual POs. This was 
reflected in the fact that French POs were more easily able to 
levy higher contributions than their British counterparts. For 
example, members of the SFO paid half a per cent of the gross 
value of their catch to PO funds, whereas members of FROM Nord 
were estimated to pay almost 2.2% of their gross earnings. Though 
the latter figure was particularly high, the average in France was 
reckoned to be around 22 of the value of landings* 
29 
This does not mean that British POs were necessarily poor. 
We have already seen that the SFO had an income in 1979 of 
E300,000 (p 134 above) but even earnings at this level were not 
sufficient to cope with all the problems that were faced by the 
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industry during the period of this study. When, for example, 
prices fell at the auctions, many British POs felt that the 
Official Withdrawal Prices (OWP) of the Community were inadequate 
to guarantee income levels. So they decided to forego EEC support 
and to apply Autonomous Withdrawal Prices (AWP). However, this 
proved very expensive indeed, as the SFO discovered. In 1979 it 
paid out such large sums of money (E325,000) that it was obliged 
to stop to avoid going bankrupt. 
30 
Throughout Britain the pattern 
was similar with different POs applying different AWPs. What was 
lacking was any degree of coordination like that which which 
existed in France. There, even the single PO which did not belong 
to ANOP - that of Etaples - applied the national withdrawal prices 
agreed within the FIOM framework. 
It is true that the British market is not directly comparable 
with the French: the former is dominated by large quantities of a 
smaller number of species. However, there was also a difference 
of attitude. The French POs were not content simply to apply the 
withdrawal system, whether official or autonomous, because they 
recognised that they too would go bankrupt if they did. Within 
the inshore sector, in particular, an important link was 
established between the POs - forbidden under EEC rules to engage 
in any activity beyond that of 'first sale' - and the older 
cooperatives, for whom no such restriction applied. At Lorient, 
for example, the artisanal P0, PROMA, worked with a merchanting 
cooperative SCOMA, whose job it was to help the fishermen to get 
better prices. SCOMA competed with other merchants at the 
auctions and when there was a glut, bought at the minimum price 
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and put the goods on the market for frozen products. In 1976, 
PROMA withdrew 305 tonnes for human consumption at a value of 
430,000FF, but SCOMA, acting on behalf of the P0, withdrew fish 
worth 1.6MF and put it on the frozen market. Without this help, 
PROMA would either have run out of money or been obliged to double 
the contributions of its members. 
31 
The absence of this kind of mechanism undermined the ability 
of the British POs to act effectively. In turn, the lack of 
perceived effectiveness intensified the 'free-rider' problem, with 
non-members free to sell at any price and thus able to depress the 
general level of prices. The result was continuous financial 
difficulties for the POs. Despite receiving £600,000 of the March 
1980 aid package, the SFO soon ran out of cash again. In these 
circumstancs, as Fishing News pointed out, any fishermen was bound 
to ask himself what the point was in belonging to the 
organisation: it could not guarantee prices and no amount of money 
seemed able to make it viable. 
32 
The heads of the POs continued 
to complain bitterly about unofficial sales under the minimum 
price. And yet they could not point to clear material benefits 
which might persuade the 30-40% of fishermen estimated not to 
belong to any PO to surrender their individual interest in favour 
of a wider collective interest. Fishermen were no more eager to 
pay up for the POs than they had traditionally been willing to 
increase their payments to the WFA, when it appealed for an 
increase in its levy on landings. 
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The French fishermen were no more virtuous than the British 
ones and unofficial sales, 'ventes sauvages', did continue. 
Nevertheless, there was a greater feeling of the success of PO 
activity as a way of helping the fishermen's income. Again this 
was not because of any innately superior powers of organisation 
but because these organisations were supported by the state, both 
ideologically and financially. The proposal of one observer of 
the British fishing scene that "the UK POs would do well to 
consider the French POs and to model their activities on them"33 
was no easy one to bring about. Such a reform would require that 
a whole way of thinking about the relation of an industry to the 
state be transposed, as well as the institutions themselves. 
4. Interests beyond national production 
Up to this point we have assumed that self-help could be 
understood solely in terms of the conflict between the interests 
of producers as a group and as individuals and that the resolution 
of that conflict depended very much on the attitude of the state. 
However, it will be suggested in this section that the earlier 
arguments need to be broadened to include the relationship between 
the interests of producers, in general, and the interests of those 
who are not involved in production. 
The liberal economic stance of the British state did not make 
it possible for fishermen to develop a common producer interest. 
What it did do was to encourage the industry to pursue much more 
individualist forms of self-help, which did not necessarily help 
to maintain national production. Such individualism was very much 
frowned upon in France. It was part of the protectionist French 
4 
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ethos that priority be given to national production over other 
interests and any attempts to subvert it were viewed with 
suspicion. 
4.1 The structure of the two industries 
Despite their different economic orientations, both Britain and 
France were relatively open to imports of fish. They were unable 
to avoid the surge of imports which followed the growth in the 
export potential of countries such as Canada and Norway in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The catching interest in both 
countries tried to limit this increase in imports but the only 
result was increased conflict with other interests, particularly 
fish merchants and processors, who saw their job as guaranteeing 
supply to consumers at the best price. Thus merchants were 
particularly upset by the catchers' attempts to push up prices, 
notably through the PO system. The fishermen, for their part, 
maintained that the prices they were getting through the auction 
system were not sufficient to allow them to continue operating. 
There were regular appeals for those further down the economic 
chain to show solidarity and to rally round the catchers. As the 
Chief Executive of the SFO put it: "It's time for British 
processors to stand up and be counted along with fishermen to get 
to grips with imports. "34 The buyers would retort that what they 
were paying reflected market conditions and not any conscious 
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attempt to undermine national catching capacity. As one put it in 
the summer of 1980: 
"The message at the moment is that the 
consumer is not prepared to pay the high 
prices for fish we experienced in the 70s. 
Buyers can only pay what the market will 
accept and today that price is low. 
... we cannot afford to subsidise fishermen 
with high auction prices .,, 
35 
In France, the conflict was the same, though the attempts to 
escape the dilemma were rather more varied. While the merchants 
refused from time to time to attend the auctions, the fishermen 
tried to organise direct sales to the public, something the 
Leclerc supermarket chain assisted and encouraged. However, these 
similarities between the two countries' conceal the fact that 
non-producer interests were much more entwined with those of 
producers in Britain than they were in France. The situation was 
particularly obvious in the deep-sea industry, where there were 
strong links between processing interests and the British fishing 
companies. The existence of a large frozen fish market encouraged 
firms such as Unilever, Christian Salvesen and Bird's Eye to 
establish a direct or indirect interest in the catching sector, so 
as to guarantee supply for their downstream operations (cf p44 
above). BUT, the largest of the trawler companies (149 vessels in 
1974), was a direct subsidiary of Associated Fisheries, which had 
interests in the Ross foods group; Bird's Eye, though it had no 
fleet of its 
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own, needed as much as 40,000t. a year to maintain its leading 
position in the UK frozen food market and so negotiated suitable 
contracts with the deep-sea owners. 
36 
The sheer scale of the operations was not matched in France, 
where even in Boulogne, the centre of the French processing 
industry, the involvement of catchers outside production remained 
relatively limited. There were negotiated deals with processors 
but they were necessarily on a smaller scale, given the smaller 
size of French trawler companies. Even the largest firm in 
Brittany, Jego Quere never had more than 20 ships, as we have seen 
(p 56 above). As for the processors, they made some moves into 
the catching sector, but it remained a minor operation compared 
with the British equivalent. Saupiquet, for example, the largest 
tinned fish producer in France, operated only three freezers, 
while Peche et Froid, a firm with turnover comparable to that of 
Associated Fisheries (400MF), owned only five vessels. 
37 
The contrast between the two countries necessarily made the 
British deep-sea companies more ambivalent about the notion of 
producer self-help than their French counterparts. In the EAPO 
forum, the French complained that the PO of the British deep-sea 
industry, the Fishery Organisation Society Ltd, was allowing 
imports into Hull and Grimsby at prices below the EEC withdrawal 
price. However, the POs own lack of catching power and its close 
links with the world of the processors made such behaviour 
unsurprising: the idea of maintaining supply to traditional 
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customers prevailed 
production. 
38 
over any notion of keeping up national 
This dilution of the producer interest was evident in Britain 
in the inshore as well as the deep-sea industry. At the beginning 
of this study (p54 above), it was stated that the defining 
characteristic of the inshore industry is that the boat belongs to 
one or more member of the group who man it. Although in France 
the increasing cost of vessels have encouraged ownership within the 
framework of cooperatives, the statement is basically correct. In 
Britain, by contrast, the situation is more complicated. 
39 In 
many English ports and some Scottish ones, ownership is shared 
with, or even assured by, independent agencies. The agencies are 
small land-based companies, to which the fishermen have turned to 
look after the practical problems that their profession entails, 
be it selling the catch, keeping accounts or preparing the ships 
for sea. In exchange, the agencies receive a percentage of the 
vessel's gross earnings. So widespread is the practice that 
Oliver claims that in the area he studied, "scarcely any vessels 
larger than the cobble class operate totally independently of the 
agencies. " 
40 
The agencies offer more than just a useful service. At a 
time when vessels are making little or no profit, they can act as 
secondary bankers and protect the skippers for whom they are 
working from going out of business. What is more, it is a job 
which offers only small profits and very high aggravation. Any 
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hint of dishonesty drives the skipper immediately to one of the 
agency's competitors. 
However, the fishermen themselves are locked into a 
relationship which offers them very little opportunity to 
influence their own economic environment. Unlike the situation in 
a producer organisation or cooperative, they have no say in the 
running of the agency, nor any direct financial stake. Hence the 
policy of the agency may conflict with the fishermen's own 
interests as producers without their being able to respond, other 
than by turning to another company. Oliver indicates for example, 
that agencies are certainly not opposed to dealing in imported 
fish to supplement their income: 
"One agent admitted that his commission from 
overland fish in 1979/80 had been £100; in the 
1980/81 financial year it had been £18,000, 
and most of this had come from imported fish. 
He admitted that importing fish was not in the 
interests of the local industry but said that 
it was the only way that he could stay in 
business at the time. Of the two evils this 
he thought was the lesser; if he had gone 
down, so would the nine vessels in which he 
had interests, and their skippers and 
crews. , 
41 
The example of agencies within the British inshore system 
illustrates a further barrier to the development of self-help 
through the system of producer organisations. The British liberal 
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tradition of competition between economic agents created 
conditions in which the clear delineation of a producer interest 
within the fishing industry could not occur in the way in which 
the French protectionist ethos permitted. The structure of both 
the deep-sea and the inshore sectors in Britain encouraged the 
link between catching and trading interests and thus weakened 
resistance to imports. Hence efforts at self-help followed a 
different course from those in France. 
4.2 The behaviour of the two industries 
In discussing the British fishing industry at the beginning of the 
1970s, a French observer was particularly struck that foreign 
trawlers could land fish anywhere in the United Kingdom without 
any particular formalities. 
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Such a liberal regime was in marked 
contrast to arrangements in France. To accept imported fish meant 
having a special 'import card' from the authorities. Though this 
card was abolished - amidst much dispute - in 1975,43 the 
protectionist idea that it embodied continued to play an important 
part in determining the kind of behaviour that was considered 
legitimate by the French industry. Similarly, the two economic 
traditions conditioned the fishermen's attitudes of who should 
be allowed to fish. In France, the norm was for French boats with 
a French crew to return their catch to a French port and any 
exception demanded an explanation. In Britain there was a much 
more relaxed view towards the criterion of nationality and the 
major question was whether the activity made economic sense to the 
company or individuals concerned. 
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During the late 1970s and early 1980s fishermen in both 
countries looked for alternative ways of disposing of their catch. 
Here was a different way of the industry helping itself to cope 
with difficult economic circumstances. However, the scope for 
such action was not the same for the two industries. It was very 
much more difficult for the French to pursue such alternatives 
than it was for their counterparts in Britain. Indeed British 
practices appalled the French industry, who saw them as 
illegitimate, if not illegal. It was far from eager to encourage 
such initiatives at home. 
In France the recognition that disposal of catches abroad 
could be profitable was particularly marked amongst the deep-sea 
owners of Lorient in Brittany. The port is far from the main 
European distribution networks and - like the ports of Scotland - 
suffers from major variations in prices. Considerable amounts of 
fish have to be regularly withdrawn for conversion into meal. In 
1978, Besnard, the major Lorient owner, started to organise sales 
abroad, particularly to Germany and Britain. At the time, 
haddock, for example, was fetching the equivalent of 4.50FF per 
kilo in Britain and 1.50FF in Brittany. However, there was 
immediate concern that such landings would threaten the employment 
of dockers and merchants in Brittany. FROM Brittany met and 
agreed that any such sales would have to get the approval of the 
FROM i. e the owner himself was not free to determine the scale of 
overseas landings. 
44 
Moreover, the state effectively gave its 
blessing to a restriction of this kind when the issue reappeared 
on the agenda. On a visit to Brittany in the autumn of 1983, 
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Lengagne, the Secretary of State for the Sea, made it clear that 
such landings were only admissible as long as the capacity to 
process the catch did not exist in Brittany. 
45 
Besnard met similar kinds of difficulty when he tried to use 
Scottish ports as 'forward bases' for his trawlers so as to cut 
costs. It took considerable negotiation with the unions to 
satisfy the crews and an agreement was only worked out when he 
contracted to fly the crews home for 15 days after every 27 days 
they spent at sea. Similarly, the domestic processors had to be 
calmed by arranging to transport the fish by lorry back to Lorient 
for 'value to be added' to the catch. Despite the technical 
difficulty of keeping the catch fresh, this was the price to be 
paid for reducing the fuel bill of Besnard's vessels. 
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The obligation of negotiating a code of practice before 
undertaking new initiatives of this kind was in marked contrast to 
what happened in the British context. In Britain rules of 
behaviour, if they were thought necessary at all, came after such 
initiatives were attempted. Thus British ships continued to land 
fish wherever they thought they could make most money and this 
practice did not stimulate any lengthy debate. As one fisherman 
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commented, when asked about illegal landings of herring in 
Denmark: 
"I'm not saying it's on a grand scale as far 
as the British concerned, but they are 
involved. It's not possible to bring the fish 
to this country so they take them to the 
Continent for the good markets. Most men feel 
that if the continentals are being allowed to 
fish for herring then why shouldn't the 
British .,, 
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A similar example was the landing of some of the major mackerel 
catch in nothern France. Though it was not illegal, the French 
response was one of considerable concern at the likely effect on 
prices in the market: for the Scottish seiner involved it was a 
question of where the captain thought he could make the most 
48 
money.. 
A much more important British initiative was the development 
of transhipment of mackerel onto Eastern European trawlers without 
the fish being landed at all. Until 1977, this fish was mainly 
caught by the factory ships from Eastern Europe. However, the 
extension of British fishery limits to 200 miles in 1977 and the 
failure of the Eastern European to reach any agreement with the 
EEC on continued access led to their exclusion from Community 
waters, including those containing mackerel. 
Thereafter the continuing needs of the Eastern bloc trawlers 
were catered for in a different way. Some of the Hull Humberside 
trawlers which were no longer able to fish for cod off Iceland 
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joined some of the Scottish inshore boats and followed the 
mackerel each season from Ullapool to Falmouth. The fish they 
caught was far more than the domestic market could cope with and 
so they arranged to transfer the catch directly onto the factory 
ships. This proved to be a very profitable business with the 
catch rising dramatically from 326,000 tonnes in 1977 to 606,000 
tonnes in 1980.49 
The French industry saw this as an activity escaping any 
effective national control. FROM Brittany, for example, 
maintained that as much as two-thirds of the mackerel catch was 
not being declared and that as a result the quota was likely to be 
exceeded by 150 to 200,000t. 
50 Certainly it was correct to say 
that the setting of rules to govern the activity followed rather 
than preceded its initiation. The organisation was highly 
decentralised and depended on a whole series of independent agents 
who negotiated prices with the Eastern Europeans. In some cases, 
fishermen themselves set up their own selling company and went out 
to attract further interest in the mackerel fishery: in 1979, for 
example, the Taits from Fraserburgh established a company, 
Falmouth Fish Selling, to persuade five Rumanian ships to come 
and then sold them over 1,000t. per week. 
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It was not until February 1982, as the mackerel catch began 
to tail off, that a system of licensing was introduced for the 
factory ships involved and this fact alone illustrates how much 
more conducive the British environment was to this kind of 
self-help. The argument that counted was economic necessity, not 
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any worries about where the fish was destined. As the Executive 
Director of one of the agencies pointed out, the vessels provided: 
"an outlet for about 70 per cent of the total 
British catch of mackerel and without them the 
severe crisis that the fishing crisis is going 
through would have ended in complete collapse 
for large sections of the industry two or 
three years ago. "52 
By contrast a much smaller deal with a Soviet firm to sell 3 to 
6,000t. of herring from Boulogne caused considerable 
consternation. This was so despite the fact that as with the 
mackerel, there was no way of getting rid of the fish by normal 
export or internal consumption and the price was better than that 
for conversion into fishmeal (5FF per kilo rather than 1.75FF). 
The owner concerned was not free to carry through the deal as he 
wished but had to come to an arrangement with the rest of the 
local industry, giving an assurance that the processing of the 
fish would take place in Boulogne to protect local employment. 
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Once again it was a case of behaviour deviating from the norm of 
national production: for fish not to be landed and processed in a 
French port had to be justified in a way that was never considered 
necessary in Britain. There the place of landing needed no more 
justification than that it corresponded to the needs of the 
market. 
The value of national production in the French context was 
not only buttressed by norms of behaviour as to the place of 
landing but also by particular expectations as to who should be 
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involved in fishing. The 'code de travail maritime' laid down 
that the crews of French ships must be of French nationality. 
Although this rule was challenged by the ECJ in 1974, claiming 
that it contravened the Treaty article on the free movement of 
workers, it remained a powerful influence on French thinking. 
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In 1982 L'Helgouach, the CGT chairman of the Local Committee at 
Concarneau, complained that Spanish fishermen were getting the 
'livret maritime professionell, entitling them to work as 
fishermen. The Minister, Le Pensec, defended what was happening 
but he made it clear that the problem was one of a shortage of 
candidates for the training courses provided under the auspices of 
AGEAM and that these were exceptional circumstances. 
55 By 
contrast, it was seen as perfectly normal and something of a 
'coup' for Marrs' of Fleetwood to get the expertise of some French 
sailors, using French gear, to help a British ship to fish in 
unfamiliar waters off the West of Scotland. There was great 
delight that the ship 'Irvana' returned with a catch valued at 
E48,872, a delight only matched by angry French reaction at the 
traitorous conduct of their compatriots in passing on their 
know-how to the English. 
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However, the French raised a much more serious complaint 
about the registration of Spanish trawlers in Britain. This 
practice revealed to what extent other interests were intertwined 
with those of national fish production in Britain and helped to 
prevent a common producer front emerging. Though in French eyes 
it appeared to be a case of deliberate use of the law to increase 
British fishing capacity, it was in reality a reflection of the 
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importance of a wider shipping interest which was only amended 
with difficulty to take account of the narrower fishing interest. 
The practice consisted of Spanish trawlers being bought by 
companies, generally based in the Channel Islands, being 
reregistered at a British port and with a British name and then 
being sent to sea to fish with a British captain but a Spanish 
crew. It first gained serious attention in 1980 when fishermen in 
Devon and Cornwall started to express concern about the impact of 
the landings of these vessels, mainly registered and landing their 
catch in South West ports, on local fishermen. Despite 
reassurances from the companies concerned, the pressure for 
something to be done grew in 1981, with the Euro MP for the area, 
Harris, particularly active in pressing for change. Some 
amendments to the rules were introduced but the number of ships 
involved continued to increase. By the end of 1982, there were 60 
ships operating in this way and it was not until 1984 that the 
first instances of deregistration took place, when the companies 
concerned were found to have only the most cursory link with 
Britain. 
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These developments were of no small interest to the French 
because the ships fished off the Azores in an area where their 
own industry was active. They found it incredible that such 
practices were possible given French attitudes towards the 
nationality criterion. They therefore assumed that it was a 
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manoeuvre designed to increase British negotiating strength in the 
EEC arena. As FROM Brittany put it: 
"The UK no longer has a fishing fleet of 
sufficient size (for the quotas it demands) 
and now openly appeals to ... Spanish mercenary 
vessels to which it fastens the British flag 
so as to try to succeed in fulfilling those 
quotas. 
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However, this charge underestimated the importance of a 
pattern of rules which did not distinguish between fishing and 
other types of vessels. The responsibility for the registration of 
vessels belongs not to MAFF but to the Department of Trade (DoT) 
and its own priorities are determined by the Merchant Shipping 
Order of 1927. This piece of legislation had specifically wanted 
to encourage an increase in the number of ships on the vessel 
register, and had therefore specified only that the skipper and 
master needed to be British. The DoT remained reluctant to 
tighten the regulations on the grounds that it did not wish to 
discourage investment and wanted to make foreign shareholding 
possible in the ship industry. 
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In early 1981, it did agree to 
impose the condition that the companies concerned should be able 
to show that their principal place of business was in Britain but 
it was unwilling to go any further to modify legislation which 
affected all shipping and not just fishing vessels. 
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What reinforced an unwillingness to discriminate on the basis 
of nationality was the feeling that the ships were not necessarily 
a threat to domestic producers. As an agent for one of the firms 
put it: 
"We are doing the local fishermen no harm. We 
do not fish anywhere near their grounds. I am 
providing good business to Penzance and 
providing local employment. "60 
Local fishermen certainly did complain and increasingly so, but 
their argument was not based on the criterion of nationality. 
Rather they felt that the argument of the firms was disingenuous. 
Although the fish was not sold on the open market, it necessarily 
depressed business and prices at the auction where locally-caught 
fish was sold, especially when so many ships were involved. 
However, when it came to discussion at the European level within 
EAPO, it was the French rather than the British who pressed 
hardest to have a rule for the registration of boats so that 757. 
of the capital and of the crew must be of EEC origin. 
61 
British 
opposition to the scheme was more muted because it was clear that 
it did benefit some in the industry. Former Humberside captains 
were helping themselves by signing up on the Spanish vessels and 
it was not so clear that they should not be allowed to. Certainly 
the nationality of the vessels was not the central issue as it was 
in French arguments. 
What has emerged in this section is that the French state 
stood behind a pattern of economic activity which the fishermen 
themselves maintained. It did not require the state to express 
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formal opposition to more liberal practices. The industry 
internalised resistance to them, channelling its self-help efforts 
through the producer organisations. In Britain, by contrast the 
idea of national production was only one element and not a strong 
one at that. Producer organisations were developed alongside 
agencies and companies, all seeking to help themselves in the face 
of economic change. This itself was possible because the state 
never took a very firm view as to how the industry should operate: 
that was for the industry itself to decide. The very diversity of 
the decisions that were taken by the operators only serves to 
underline the power of liberal economic doctrine in Britain. The 
attempt in France to reduce or control that diversity, a reduction 
undertaken by state and producers alike is what justifies the 
claim that 'dirigisme' remains a guiding principle of action 
there. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has come to two main conclusions. First, it has 
broadly confirmed our expectations as to the behaviour of the 
industry. There was a realisation in both countries of the value 
of self-help. However, the shape of that self-help varied 
enormously in the two countries. In France stress was laid on the 
potential of the EEC POs as a way of jointly organising the 
market; in Britain the activities of the industry were more 
individualistic and less coordinated. The French protectionist 
tradition made it considerably easier for the POs to organise 
themselves and to discourage production outside an organised 
framework. In Britain, by contrast, the liberal tradition meant 
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that control over the activities of separate economic agents was 
not encouraged and as a result, the concept of a fish producer 
interest, clearly distinguishable from other interests, made much 
more limited progress. 
Secondly, this chapter has emphasized once more the 
importance of the idea of the state in this study. It has shown 
that societal self-regulation cannot be disentangled from the 
nature of the state environment within which it takes place. The 
French and British states heavily determined the shape and 
behaviour of self-help structures. In France particular stress 
was laid on the idea of fishermen as a group, thus reducing the 
scope for individual initiative; in Britain the concentration was 
not on fishermen as a collective but as a set of distinct 
individuals, with different problems and priorities. Once again 
the British state acted as an arbitrator between separate 
interests in their efforts to help themselves rather than seeking 
to set the terms of such action in the 'transcendental' style 
adopted in France. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The final chapter will review the study as a whole and examine two 
aspects of the relationship between state and society in the 
fishing industry. First, it will look at the pattern of behaviour 
of government and industry in the two countries and suggest that 
it displayed an important degree of continuity. In this context, 
it will stress the importance of different historical traditions, 
the power of the national arena as the focus of attention and the 
links between the four perspectives used. Second, it will 
consider the issue of success in devising a response to change in 
the industry. It will point to three dilemmas over conflicting 
priorities that received different answers on the two sides of the 
Channel: the choice between production and consumption, the 
balance between public and private power and the clash between the 
exploitation and conservation of a common resource. 
2. The pattern of behaviour 
Although one of the aims of the study was to examine the impact of 
a period of major change upon the behaviour of an interest in 
society, one of the results has been to stress the degree of 
continuity in the pattern of relations between that interest and 
the state. By considering what we might have expected to happen 
to that pattern, we have certainly found changes of emphasis. 
Actual or threatened direct action, for example, became more 
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widespread than it had ever been before. However, what is more 
conspicuous is that the differences between the two countries 
remained as marked at the end of the period as they were at the 
beginning. By itself, an economic crisis is not sufficient 
therefore to explain why those affected by it respond in the way 
that they do. 
2.1 Historical tradition 
What the continuity in relations shows is that a 
historically-established pattern was not easily overturned, as 
some expected or desired. At the beginning of the 1970s Mordrel, 
for example, argued that France's increasing openness to the world 
economy would combine with the growing internationalisation of the 
market in fisheries to break down the interprofessional system 
established in 1945 and the protectionist outlook that it 
embodied. 
I He was mistaken. The resistance of the French 
industry to the encroachment of liberal economic pressures 
remained remarkably strong and a certain weakening of the CCPM 
structure was made good by the development of new corporatist 
structures in the form of FIOM and its privileged relations with 
the French producer organisations. True the increase in the 
volume of imports was not stopped as a result. But opposition to 
the 'Europe des marchands', i. e a traders' Europe, remained a 
significant principle of action throughout an industry still 
united - employers and union, inshore and deep-sea - around the 
promotion of production. Their joint opposition in 1980 to the 
liberal ideas of the Barre government, and their continuing 
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commitment to the protection afforded by a fuel subsidy, afford 
eloquent testimony to the maintenance of a system whose demise 
Mordrel had predicted nearly a decade previously. 
Similarly, the repeated refrain in Britain that the industry 
should become more united and overcome its notorious level of 
fragmentation met only partial success. New federations were 
founded - notably the NFFO and the SFF - which did succeed in 
generating a degree of unity in the inshore industry but the 
common denominator between their members remained at a rather low 
level. As we have seen (p 1.99 above) their leaders flew in 
strength to Brussels and Luxembourg every time the Council of 
Ministers met to keep up the pressure for a favourable settlement. 
However, the presence of so many was not just a sign of improved 
organisation; it also revealed the weight of the fear that some 
would be favoured more than others when agreement came. In this 
sense, the EEC provided a convenient scapegoat for a very long 
time, and hid the extent of the differences that continued to 
separate British fishermen. The British government might deplore 
those differences but it did very little to limit their fullest 
articulation. 
Both examples show the strength of the separate historical 
traditions that prevailed in the two countries, traditions which 
strongly influenced perceptions of those faced with the need to 
respond to change. At the beginning of 1975, for example, both 
countries suffered from a large volume of imports of fish and a 
consequent drop in prices. France's response, notably in the 
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creation of FIOM and the establishment of a substantial fuel 
subsidy, reflected a protectionist past which Britain did not 
have. Hence the British government did not perceive an equivalent 
response as in any way suitable and persisted in a more 'liberal' 
form of intervention. Similarly, in 1980 the French government 
was blind to the possibility of cajoling the fishermen into 
accepting limited concessions in return for giving up their direct 
action. The 'limited authoritarianism' of the French state 
excluded the kind of flexible response which marked the behaviour 
of British ministers in 1975 and 1980. The problems for the two 
governments were similar but their different economic and 
political pasts made it hard for them to devise equivalent 
solutions. 
The importance of the distinct traditions of the two 
countries becomes still clearer if we consider the concepts of 
'corporatism' and 'overload'. It was suggested earlier (p8 ) that 
the literature linked to these concepts tends to underestimate the 
differences between Western European states. This view is 
confirmed by the evidence for continuity which has emerged here. 
The 'corporatist' thesis that governments are drawing 
interests more closely into the business of government because of 
the difficulty of managing the modern economy, requires an 
awareness of the evidence uncovered in this study. In France, the 
pattern of relations in the fishing industry already had a 
corporatist imprint long before the 1970s. The 1945 institutions, 
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a suitable variant on what the Vichy regime had set up, implicated 
the industry in the state's decisions and offered the state ample 
opportunity to influence the industry's attitudes. In the period 
of this study, the closeness of the links continued to limit 
outside involvement in the fishing sector. In Britain, by 
contrast, representative channels, provided by MPs and Parliament, 
not only remained in use but were still more intensively exploited 
by an industry that saw no better way of making its position known 
and accepted. The state remained very conscious of the importance 
of these channels and did not try to short-circuit them, despite 
the difficulty of resolving the problems of the industry. In both 
countries, certain features in the pattern of relations were 
accentuated but the basic shape did not change. 
According to the 'overload' thesis, Western governments 
increasingly lack the means to cope with the number of economic 
demands that the political base of their authority invites. The 
lesson of the study in this case is that such a general thesis 
needs to accommodate the relative tolerance of different countries 
to increased demands. Certainly in 1980 the French mechanisms of 
consultation were 'overloaded' and unable to cope with a crisis. 
But that was because the government concerned was attempting to 
reduce a high level of expectations as to the state's obligations 
towards the industry. The goverment that followed was able to 
revert to the old pattern and thereby satisfy the industry. The 
establishment of a Ministry of the Sea was seen as the expression 
of a caring form of 'tutelle', which for the industry stretched 
back to the 18th century and the age of Colbert. In the British 
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case, not only was the level of expectation traditionally lower 
but there was a range of channels through which complaints could 
be filtered. The strength of the various representative leaders 
of the industry served to reduce the danger of the government 
being overtaken by the industry's demands. Moreover, ministers, 
in particular Walker, were conscious of the importance of this 
channel and responded to the industry's promptings in finding sums 
of aid at the appropriate moment. That the demands of the 
industry came at a time when the general economic situation was 
bad cannot be denied; that the capacity of government to respond 
to them was so reduced as to merit the term 'overload' is much 
less clear. 
In this way the historical context of this study has 
underlined the value of an intermediate level of analysis which 
goes beyond day-by-day detail but does not draw broader 
conclusions as to the changing shape of societies in Western 
Europe. Such changes may be taking place, but the evidence here 
suggests that there are also important pressures for continuity 
which derive from the character of the relations between state and 
society. 
2.2 The national arena 
A second conclusion of this study, which also underlines the 
importance of continuity, is that the national arena remained the 
central focus of action on the part of the fishing interest. This 
may seem paradoxical when it was argued in Chapter Three that the 
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entry of the issue into the EEC framework ended its treatment as a 
sectoral concern and heralded a new era of institutional 
interdependence. It may also appear to be contradicted by the 
ability of the ten member states to reach agreement in January 
1983 on the shape of a CFP, designed to govern relations in 
fisheries until the next century. Leigh, for instance, has argued 
that "the CFP provides an example of tangible integration achieved 
by the indirect functional route. "2 
However, the fact that national administrations were put 
under pressure by the Community institutions and their Treaty 
obligations to reach an accord, should not be exaggerated in 
importance. As Chapter Three showed, agreement did not mean that 
national perceptions of the problems to be resolved did not remain 
crucially distinct. At the beginning of the 1980s France was 
still concerned to ensure protection of its national market 
through the EEC, as it had been ten years previously, while Britain 
remained committed to the importance of maximising limits and 
quotas and ensuring that conservation measures were as effective 
as possible. The final agreement had to contain elements that 
satisfied both views (as well as those of the other member 
states). Hence the idea to have Community fisheries inspectors 
was a British one just as much as the strengthening of discipline 
in producer organisations was French-inspired. Common policy did 
not correspond to convergent perceptions. 
The relative weakness of the Community arena was underlined 
by the behaviour of governments domestically. They were certainly 
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not eager to find themselves arraigned before the ECJ in 
Luxembourg, but equally they were prepared to act unilaterally if 
they felt such action to be necessary. In Britain the argument 
that the government was unfairly subsidising the industry was met 
by stressing the temporary nature of the aids. But on issues 
perceived to be more crucial, such as conservation, neither Labour 
nor Conservative ministers hesitated to take unilaterial measures 
contrary to the Hague agreement. The French, for their part, were 
happy to abide, at least in principle, by conservation measures 
such as the herring ban, but made no excuses for the fuel aid that 
they accorded to their fishermen. Le Theule, the French minister, 
might quote EEC policy as a justification for not increasing that 
aid in the summer of 1980 but the actions of those who preceded 
and came after him indicated that he was in reality seeking to 
deflect criticism from the government and using the Community as 
an excuse. What determined national policy were domestic, 
economic and political considerations, not a supranational 
authority. 
The fishermen, for their part, were equally reluctant to 
transfer their loyalties outside the national arena. When they 
attended Council meetings, it was to back their national minister 
or at least to prevent him backing down, not to support any 
Commission compromise. When they went to 'Europeche' or EAPO, it 
was as much to gain a wider airing for their own domestic 
complaints - be it the Spanish vessel registration scheme or the 
illegal landing of herring at Boulogne - as to develop common 
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European policies. They were well aware that the differences 
between the representatives of the industry were likely to be 
greater at the European than the domestic level. As French 
inshore fishermen commented as long ago as 1967: 
"Do we find in Brussels and elsewhere people 
who want to listen to us? Instead of owners 
and above all, active fishermen, more often 
than not we discover that the people we speak 
with are only representatives of the traders 
(i. e. Unilever, Findus, etc) who have no 
interest in the fate of producers and with 
good reason. "3 
Nearly 15 years later, the instincts of French producers were no 
different when the head of the cooperative organisation (COCMM) 
remarked: "If we do not act, in a few years the French fishing 
industry will be a marginal activity integrated into the workings 
of multinational companies. "4 In such circumstances, there was 
little incentive to establish any kind of clientelist relations 
with EEC institutions to replace their activity in the national 
5 
arena. 
The argument presented here does not seek to deny that the 
character of the issue changed, that there was a significant 
'blurring of the boundaries' between foreign and domestic policy 
within the EEC framework. Nor does it attempt to suggest that 
national solutions were necessarily a viable alternative to the 
CFP, or that the levels of integration may not be increasing and 
increasable. What it does do is to challenge the easy assumption 
326 
that the move towards agreement in 1983 was the product of some 
linear process of integration, which can be separated from the 
domestic relationship between state and society in the fishing 
industry. 
6 
2.3 The link between the perspectives 
The final conclusion in this section returns to the point made at 
the outset (Chapter One, p29) that the four perspectives used in 
this study should not be seen as separate entities without any 
relationship one to the other. Rather they form an inter-related 
an 
set of ideas which together define/overall logic of action 
governing the relationship between the government and the fishing 
interest in the two countries. Here. too we can see why that 
relationship was not fundamentally affected by the changes that 
occurred in the issue area. 
The two perspectives which stressed the economic behaviour of 
state and industry were presented in Chapters 5 and 8. The first 
of these assumed a 'top-down' view, stressing the idea of the 
state's intervention in the affairs of the industry, while the 
second took a 'bottom-up' view, considering how the industry 
organised to help itself in the face of economic change. It 
emerged from the discussion that neither state intervention nor 
the industry's self-help could be understood on their own without 
reference to the other. The industry's expectations as to the 
state's intervention were as important as the state's attitude 
towards the industry's self-help. Moreover, differences between 
these expectations and attitudes explained why behaviour varied so 
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much between the two countries. The French industry had 
traditionally looked to the state for economic support and this 
pattern remained as clearly visible as the reluctance of the 
British industry to see such support as anything but a necessary 
evil. Thus the 'barons' of the British deep-sea sector were at 
one with the individualists of the inshore sector in pressing for 
temporary injections of cash to keep the creditors at bay, just as 
the UAP could agree with the French 'artisans' on the need for 
maintaining or increasing the subsidy to maintain their productive 
potential. Similarly, the supervisory nature of the state's 
economic role in France encouraged it to provide strong financial 
and institutional backing for the industry, as it sought to 
organise itself more effectively, while the British state's 
aversion to anything beyond limited intervention meant that there 
was considerably more scope for individual skippers and companies 
to help themselves but considerably less for fishermen to 
establish a collective economic identity as producers. The mutual 
recrimination between the two industries is hardly surprising when 
these contrasting attitudes towards intervention and self-help are 
considered. 
The political response of state and industry was the centre 
of attention in Chapters Six and Seven. The former looked at the 
conventional channels for exerting influence on government, 
considering how the grievances of the industry were mediated and 
represented, while the latter examined the extent to which those 
grievances spilled over into illegitimate behaviour with direct 
action serving to underline forthright opposition to the state. 
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As in the case of the 'economic' chapters, a link was found 
between the two cases with legitimate action mirroring the 
unconventional and vice versa. The centrifugal pressures at work 
in the British industry generated a group of powerful independent 
regional representatives, who could ensure the widest ventilation 
of grievances through the parliamentary arena. At the same time, 
their independence helped to control demands for direct action, 
while the openness of the conventional channels served to reduce 
the potency of such demands. By contrast, the French state's 
capacity to incorporate the industry's representatives left them 
with little scope or desire to exert their independence from the 
authorities and meant that they enjoyed no integral connection 
with other mediatory bodies, such as the political parties. 
Rather they were passed by as the discontent of the industry built 
up, with no mechanisms equivalent to those in Britain available to 
dissipate it. The French state, for its part, was obliged either 
to surrender to the pressure or to crush it and could not use the 
combination of limited concessions and the leadership's consent to 
them which proved so successful in the British context in calming 
dissent. 
However, the links between the perspectives go further in 
that the pattern of behaviour in the political arena should not be 
disassociated from those in the economic area. Thus the liberal 
pattern of free competition between economic agents that was 
central to thinking in Britain, was matched by the political 
behaviour of the industry's representative institutions. Both 
were premised on the need for a decentralised system of power, 
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which took account of the variety of the interests involved. 
However much greater unity might be praised, however loud the 
calls for greater protection, ideas of new arrangements which 
would seriously limit the economic and political choices of the 
industry made little headway: hence the continuing disputes 
between regions and the lack of bite in bodies like UKAFPO. By 
contrast, the protection enjoyed by the French industry cannot be 
separated from its corporatist form of political organisation, 
where the differences between the various sections of the industry 
were muted in the interests of centralised forms of control. 
Acceptance of the need for limits on choice meant that the pattern 
of representation changed no more radically than the pattern of 
economic behaviour: the CCPM stayed intact just as Besnard's 
landings in Scotland continued to be seen as an aberration. Thus 
France remained very much a 'state-led society', in both a 
political and economic sense, just as Britain showed that she was 
still a 'society-led state'. 
To make these points is to stress again the claim that none 
of the perspectives should be seen as representing a norm, from 
which the others diverge. If there is such a norm, then it is the 
logic of action in the two countries which emerges when all four 
perspectives are considered together. Within each country the 
balance of behaviour may change over time but what differentiates 
them most clearly is the overall shape of the relationship between 
state and society. That shape cannot be derived from one 
perspective alone. 
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3. The issue of success 
The second major issue of the study that will now be reviewed is 
the success achieved in devising a response to change in the 
fishing industry. Even though such a question involves an 
evaluation which cannot be decided by analysis, it is the author's 
view that any analyst has a responsibility to make the foundations 
of such an evaluation clear. In fact, the possibility of 
comparison between two countries with such contrasting political 
and economic arrangements makes it easier to uncover those 
foundations than would be possible if only one of the countries 
was being examined. They will be seen to have stressed different 
ways of treating the fisheries interest, and no one can hope to 
judge success without recognising the incompatibility of these 
competing emphases. 
3.1 Production and consumption 
It has been one of the themes of this study that though it has 
treated the fishing industry for much of the time as a unitary 
entity, in reality the industry is composed of a whole series of 
different parts which by no means always share the same aims and 
objectives. Once this diversity is accepted, the question of 
success has to be modified so that one can ask: success for whom 
and through whose eyes? Even inside the British catching 
industry, there were many differences of opinion as to the extent 
of the limits and quotas which were necessary to guarantee a 
secure future, depending on the region concerned and the kind of 
fishing involved. It is thus futile to try to ground a judgement 
of success solely on the perception of those involved: there is no 
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way of aggregating a mass of conflicting opinion of varying 
intensities. 
What needs to be done is to consider the purposes that 
fishing can be perceived to perform and the way that the state 
arbitrated between them. There are two distinctive ways in which 
the activities of catchers can be viewed: they can be seen either 
to contribute to the market supply of a product or to maintain a 
market through their production. In the former case, production 
depends upon, and must be conditioned by, the requirements of the 
market; in the latter case, the market is the result of, and has 
to be adapted to, production. This distinction assumed a much 
greater importance as fisheries was more firmly integrated into 
the international economy during the 1970s. The trade in fish 
products increased markedly and national markets became ever more 
vulnerable to economic developments on the other side of the 
globe. The state's basic predilection for production or 
consumption was put to the test and highlighted by a major shift 
in the economic conditions facing the industry. 
In the first chapter (p 7), the question was asked: were the 
two industries doomed to decline? Even on the most optimistic 
assumptions of what Britain could have done outside the EEC, the 
answer without question seems to be positive for both countries. 
The increase in pressure on stocks, the spread of the EEZ doctrine 
and the rises in the price of fuel make it hard, if not 
impossible, to imagine that the two fishing industries could have 
continued to enjoy the relative prosperity of the early 1970x. 
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Nevertheless, it is clear that the position was not entirely 
without hope: there were favourable circumstances which could be 
turned to advantage. The French tuna fleet, for example, was able 
to emerge into the 1980s in as good a shape as it had been in the 
early 1970s. It offered a marked contrast to the rest of the 
deep-sea industry in the two countries. At the same time, those 
sections of the inshore industry which caught valuable species 
that were not subject to the competition of frozen fish could 
expect to continue to maintain high incomes and an important place 
in the fish market. 
However, the question was also asked: could the industries 
have been better protected? The answer to this question obliges 
us to consider the extent to which the two states were prepared to 
go to maintain the shape of their fishing industries in the face 
of change. Yes, British governmnts could have provided better 
protection for their industries, not by negotiating harder in 
Brussels or sending more gunboats to Iceland but by changing the 
balance of their policy between the philosophies of production and 
consumption. As the discussion in Chapter Five indicated, there 
were opportunities - not necessarily cheap or easy ones - for 
maintaining at least some of the productive potential of the 
fishing fleet without pushing other EEC countries out of the NEAFC 
area. But these were perceived as unrealistic or non-existent 
because there was no shortage of supply to the market. Over the 
period of this study, the overall catch level was allowed to fall 
from over 1,100,000t. to under 800,000t. but the level of supply 
to the market remained roughly constant (cf p45 above). There 
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might be fewer fishmongers' shops but there was no drop in the 
level of landings to keep consumption up: the merchants and 
processors stayed in business, even with the virtual disappearance 
of the deep-sea fleet. 
As for the French state, it was clearly more heavily 
committed to maintaining the basic shape of the industry and 
setting production before consumption. Despite an increase in 
imports, the level of national production did not change very 
much: in 1982 landings were around 700,000t. just as they had been 
in the middle of the previous decade (cf p 47 above). This was 
not achieved without paying a price. By 1982 there were just over 
20,000 'matins', 20% less than the number six years previously, 
and the number of vessels had declined markedly from 13,268 in 
1974 to 10,873 in 1981, figures reflecting a greater decline than 
in Britain (cf p 57 above). However, the effect of the drop in 
men and boats was to increase productivity and thus to improve the 
chances of maintaining national production in the face of 
competition from abroad. 
The French productivist ethic was reinforced by the contrast 
of attitudes between the inshore and deep-sea industries. The 
sharing of risks between capital and labour on board the vessel, 
the possibility of the crew member himself becoming an owner, and 
a system where remuneration is directly related to the value of 
the catch, combined to maintain an inshore sector whose members 
were prepared to undergo considerable hardship, long hours and few 
holidays in order to make as large a catch as possible. The deep 
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sea crews, on the other hand, had none of the same incentives and 
as many, if not more, of the disadvantages. Their relative 
decline therefore bolstered the importance of the idea of 
production as an important value in the French industry as a 
whole. 
The motivation of individuals in the British inshore sector 
was similar, if somewhat diluted by the existence of the agency 
system in some parts of the country. However, the disappearance 
of the deep-sea sector did not result in an increase in the 
productivist ethic. Though the Left in Britain, for example, 
castigated the conditions in the company sector as "antiquated, 
vicious and corrupt and lethal", 
7 
the solution was seen in terms 
of decasualisation of the deep-sea vessels rather than 
encouragement of the values of the inshore sector. There was no 
pleasure at the passing of a brutal mode of production, but rather 
annoyance that its chances of survival seemed to have been 
undermined by a deadly combination of rapacious Icelanders and 
continental Europeans. 
Thus the success of the response to change cannot therefore 
be divorced from the purposes seen as central to that industry. 
Two examples from the previous chapter can clarify the point. To 
applaud the relative failure of efforts by South West fishermen to 
end the system allowing Spanish vessel registration is in part to 
defend the liberal, non-productivist philosophy that permitted it; 
to feel that British fishermen should follow the example of ANOP 
is to value the idea that the state should foster the collective 
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interests of producers through close cooperation with them. The 
two traditions are necessarily in contradiction with each other 
and any judgement of success depends on the relative value placed 
upon them by the observer. To the author, it seems that if value 
is placed on preserving a particular pattern of production within 
the economy, then in a period of economic contraction, the French 
tradition is seen to have been better able to achieve that end. 
If, however, the important thing is to ensure that consumers get a 
product at the cheapest price, then there is no reason to condemn 
the more liberal British arrangements. 
3.2 Public and private power 
The second component of an evaluation of success derives from the 
way in which power is exercised and the balance that is struck 
between public and private objectives. The achievement or 
non-achievement of private goals cannot be separated from the 
scope that is afforded to the state to achieve public ends. The 
greater the strength of the collective principle, the less the 
opportunity for individual adaptation to economic change. Once 
again there is a conflict which can only be uncovered and not be 
resolved by analysis. 
In crude terms, it seems obvious that the British fishing 
industry failed to get what it wanted from the government as a 
basis for its future operations. The EEC deal that was reached 
was a long way from what it had wanted. Its demands for a 50 and 
then a 12 mile exclusive limit were not met: the negotiations 
produced a6 mile exclusive limit with a degree of foreign access 
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to the 6 to 12 mile belt. Its call for a fair share of a 60% 
stock contribution, equal to at least 45% of the fish available, 
also made only limited headway: an initial offer of 31% could not 
be pushed higher than 38% of the seven main species. 
8 
However, 
the government could fairly reply that the deal was a good one. 
The increase in the percentage of the total catch available to 
Britain was only made possible by obliging other countries to 
accept a cut in the quota available to them, and the 'equal 
access' principle had been substantially breached by limiting 
fishing in the 6 to 12 mile area to countries with historic rights 
and in a very sensitive area such as around the Shetlands, to a 
restricted number of licensed vessels. 
We can argue about the relative strength of the two sets of 
claims but it is essentially not a very useful exercise. No doubt 
there was a degree of unreality in the initial position of the UK 
industry, no doubt the nature of the EEC limited what was seen as 
politically possible by the British government: both were the 
prisoners of their own perceptions. What is more interesting is 
the way in which the movement towards a settlement occurred. 
There was no attempt on the part of the state to define what the 
industry should accept rather it was a question of testing the 
ground to find what would be acceptable to the various interests 
involved. The process epitomised the activity of what Shonfield 
has called "a wheeling and dealing type of public authority 
constantly seeking out allies, probing and manoeuvring for the 
active consensus". 
9 
It was a good example of a state with an 
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'instrumental' view of the interests in society, seeking to 
arbitrate between them but not seeking to aggregate them into a 
wider collective vision. 
The advantages of such an arrangement are not far to seek. 
First of all, the move towards a settlement could be brought about 
with the maximum degree of consensus. The leaders of the industry 
were given the opportunity to ventilate their grievances as much 
and as often as they wished but could then be persuaded by an 
effective minister into accepting the hitherto unacceptable and 
defending their own 'realism' in front of their sceptical members. 
Secondly, the members of the industry were left free to decide how 
to respond to the gradually emerging shape of the settlement. The 
members of the deep-sea industry, in particular, did not stand 
idly by as the number of active vessels declined. The crewmen 
departed in large numbers to the offshore oil industry, the 
captains sought jobs elsewhere in the industry, some gaining posts 
on Spanish-registered vessels, while the owners moved their money 
into the inshore-sector or away from fishing altogether into areas 
such as agriculture and building. 
The consequences of such a system were not necessarily 
favourable. The passing of the deep-sea sector undermined the 
roots of local communities and provoked a degree of unemployment 
amongst men less well able to adapt to change than their 
well-heeled employers. While this was happening, successive 
governments gave the impression of standing idly by, not taking 
the interests of the industry seriously enough into account. This 
seems, however, to be a consequence that is hard to avoid unless 
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one is prepared to challenge the value of a system based on the 
principles of political consensus and economic freedom of choice. 
Whatever their views on the EEC settlement, few in the industry 
seemed to want to mount such a challenge. 
Although the French system of government does not deny those 
same principles, there is little doubt that the fishing case 
illustrates its capacity to give them a lower level of priority. 
The importance of the state in channelling political and economic 
demands created a different balance between public and private 
power in France. The fact that the state had always exercised an 
important level of 'tutelle' or supervision over the French 
fishing industry meant complaints against it were set in terms of 
an active rather than passive neglect. It was not that nothing 
was being done but that the authorities were proposing to threaten 
openly the interests of the industry, whether by reducing its size 
in the interests of modernisation or by making it face up to the 
'real' costs of energy. As we have seen these efforts, prompted 
in particular by the Barre government from 1976 to 1981, provoked 
a considerable degree of disaffection, which exploded in the 
summer of 1980. The notion of consensus evaporated when the whole 
industry perceived a threat from the state. 
Such a perception was, however, only possible where the 
state's supervision had generally been seen in a positive light. 
There was an almost universal confidence in the institutions 
established in 1945, which was reinforced as FIOM came to assume a 
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larger role in support for experimental voyages and producer 
organisations after 1976. It was acknowledged that the powerful 
position of the state within such bodies helped to reduce internal 
rivalries within the industry and to prevent the much more uneven 
pattern of development seen in Britain from emerging. 
10 The 
institutional incorporation of the sector's representatives was 
matched by a degree of economic protection and direction, without 
parallel in the British context. The economic freedom of choice 
of operators was set within a much tighter set of parameters, 
where the state not only intervened financially but was also eager 
that its intervention have a particular effect on the activity of 
fishermen: hence the choice of a fuel subsidy. The French state 
wanted not only to wind up the clockwork mouse but also to guide 
where it went. 
The problem was that such a system developed an important 
level of rigidity. The CCPM strucure, for example, seemed ideally 
suited to guarantee the maximum level of consultation with the 
minimum level of opposition. But once grievances built up, the 
complex hierarchy of committees proved much less flexible than the 
more informal, ad hoc arrangements found in Britain. Similarly, 
there was state-supported resistance to moves, like that of the 
owner in Lorient to base his operations in Scotland, and yet it 
was hard to see how such a port could survive in the long run 
unless such initiatives were both permitted and encouraged. The 
desire to offer protection to the industry was in conflict with a 
desire to allow operators to arrange themselves in the way they 
thought best. 
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Once again it is not enough to praise one country's practices 
and to chide the other's. Both involved a trade-off, where 
judging success depends upon the value one places on the 
importance of private and public choices. If one prefers economic 
allocation of resources through private channels linked to 
political change governed by consensus and consent, then Britain's 
response to change in the fishing industry was not unsuccessful; 
if, on the other hand, one considers that public influence over 
choice of economic goals is important, even if there is the 
possibility of strong resistance to that influence, then French 
fishing policy can hardly be adjudged a failure. 
3.3 Exploitation and conservation 
The final part of this evaluation of success in the response to 
change is linked to the idea of timescale, the period over which 
the judgement is made. Should one's perspective be short-term or 
long-term? The question is a critical one because of the nature 
of the resource concerned and the behaviour of those involved in 
pursuing it. It was one of the clear lessons of the 1970s that 
fish, although renewable, are not inexhaustible: once a stock has 
been exploited beyond a certain point, it will be impossible for 
it to recover and it will be threatened with disappearance. There 
is therefore a clear collective interest for the industry to avoid 
overfishing but it is one that conficts with the individual 
interests of its members. The 1970s showed that no fisherman has 
an incentive to cut back his own activity; on the contrary, it is 
better for him to have a larger boat, which will increase his 
earnings and reduce his tax liability. However, though the effect 
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is likely to be beneficial to him in the short-term, the long-term 
impact is to weaken the chance of continued fishing for all. What 
is the value of increased catch levels by themselves, if they are 
followed by an irreversible decline? 
The dilemma is one that has exercised governments greatly 
during the period of this study and it is a tribute to the 
intractable nature of the problem that the EEC agreement of 
January 1983 was not able to address it satisfactorily. No 
government was enthusiastic about the idea of withdrawing vessels 
permanently from their fishing fleet and the result was that: 
"out of a total 250 million ECUs allocated 
under the CFP agreement to adjustment of 
capacity, redeployment of capacity, and 
restructuring, modernising and developing the 
fishing industry and aquaculture, only 32 
million ECUs (12.8%) are allocated to the 
'permanent withdrawal' of vessels over 12 
metres in length. "" 
In other words, there was plenty of money allocated for new 
development but very little to cope with the acknowledged 
overcapacity of the Community fishing fleet. 
The reasons for this reluctance are not far to seek but 
differ in emphasis between the two countries in the study. In the 
French context, the difficulty is the commitment of both state and 
industry to the idea of production. Whenever there was a move to 
limit catches, the argument against it from the industry was that 
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it failed to take account of the 'socio-economic environment', in 
other words, it was contrary to support for the activity of 
fishermen as producers. However well the state authorities might 
recognise the scientific case for effort limitation, they could 
not deny that they were themselves strongly in favour of promoting 
national production in the face of increasing imports. 
In the British case, there was not this same ambivalence in 
that market supply was seen as more important than production per 
se. Hence within Britain there was strong support in the WFA and 
the ministries for tight control on entry into a fishery through a 
system of licences. The problem with this proposal was 
countries 
its assumption that the Community/could agree on the respective 
size of their fishing fleets. This was not the case. No one 
would accept a totally-controlled fishery system if it meant that 
there was no room for a large fraction of their fleet. Yet 
without such control, no state, including Britain, would be 
willing to introduce licences and a limit on vessel construction 
for itself alone. As the DAFS Fishery Secretary put it: 
"As long as the majority of fish stocks are in 
nobody's ownership, it is very difficult and 
probably indefensible for a given Government 
to discourage its own fishermen from building 
up their fleets, to make the best use of 
available stocks. "12 
The grounds might be different but the basic resistance to 
effective limits on exploitation was the same in both countries. 
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One way out of this impasse is to argue that real success 
depends on moving from centrally-imposed solutions to those 
devised by the coastal community itself. As Stiles puts it in his 
discussion of Newfoundland: 
"... a decentralised and fisherman-oriented 
management regime is infinitely preferable to 
one which filters down from 'above', that is 
from scientists and bureaucrats living far 
away from the realities of fishing as a form 
of livelihood. " 
13 
Such solutions seem all the more attractive when it is recognised 
that a regime of this kind has proved possible even between 
fishermen of different nationalities in the EEC. There was a 
considerable degree of conflict between the trawlermen at 
Port-en-Bessin in Normandy and the pot fishermen of Devon with 
their static gear, who were active in the same area in the Western 
Channel. Despite their differences, in May 1981, they were able 
to make a formal agreement, dividing up the fishing zones, by area 
and by time of year and ten months later, it had worked well 
enough for them to be able to renew it. 
14 
Unfortunately, the attraction of this approach can only be a 
superficial one. This is not to say that the agreements were not 
valuable, that the two groups were not able to look beyond their 
own individual interests to a wider common interest. But the 
problem was susceptible to a decentralised form of management 
because it was very limited in its extent. There were less than 
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100 vessels involved, the resource implications of the restraint 
imposed were minimal and it was a bilateral and not a multilateral 
difficulty. Once the number of vessels is increased, once the 
costs involved for the participants rise and once it ceases to be 
a question of a discrete issue between two parties, the 
possibility of escaping the collective goods dilemma in the 
fisheries arena begins to disappear very rapidly. 
In reality, there is no reason to suppose that individual 
nation states will necessarily accept limits upon their domestic 
activities in the interests of international collaboration, simply 
because they are shown good reasons why they should do so. It is 
not just that the nature of collective goods can vary, as Ruggie 
indicates15 but rather that the basis of their action depends upon 
the nature of the domestic relationship between state and society. 
On the evidence of this study, neither a state-led society nor a 
society-led state appears to offer a very favourable environment 
for the resolution of the balance between exploitation and 
conservation of the fisheries resource within the NEAFC area. 
Yet if such a resolution cannot be found, then there is every 
likelihood that the fleets of Western Europe, including those of 
Britain and France, will be drawn into a depressing downward 
spiral of declining catches and shrinking fleets. Then the very 
concept of success as applied to the period between 1975 and 1983 
may become irrelevant in the face of an empty sea. 
APPENDIX I- LIST OF REFERENCES 
345 
Two points of presentation should be noted here. Firstly, all quotes 
that come from French sources have been translated by the author. The 
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APPENDIX II - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AGEAM Association de Gerance des Ecoles d'Apprentisage 
Maritime 
ANOP Association Nationale des Organisations deProducteurs 
AWP Autonomous Withdrawal Price 
BFF British Fishing Federation 
BTF British Trawlers' Federation 
BUT British United Trawlers 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
CCPM Comite Central des Peches Maritimes 
CEASM Centre d'Etude et d'Action Sociales Maritimes 
CES Conseil Economique et Social 
CFDT Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail 
CFP Common Fisheries Policy 
CGT Confederation Generale du Travail 
CNEXO Centre National pour l'Exploitation des Oceans 
COCMM Confederation des Organismes de Credit Maritime Mutuel 
DAFS Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland 
DATAR Delegation ä l'Amenagement du Territoire et ä l'Action 
Regionale 
DGMM Direction Generale de la Marine Marchande 
DOM-TOM Departements d'Outre-Mer - Territoires d'Outre-Mer 
DOT Department of Trade 
EAM Ecole des Administrateurs Maritimes 
EAPO European Association of Producer Organisations (French 
initials AEOP) 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECU European Currency Unit 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ENA Ecole Nationale d'Administration 
ENIM Etablissement National des Invalides de la Marine. 
FEOGA European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(French initials) 
FFSPM Federation Francaise des Syndicats Professionels 
Maritimes 
379 
FIOM Fonds d'Intervention et d'Organisation des Marches des 
Produits de la Peche Maritime et de la Conchyliculture. 
FOS Fisheries Organisation Society (Ltd) 
FROM Fonds Regional d'Organisation du Marche du Poisson. 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HIB Herring Industry Board 
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Seas 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield. 
NEAFC North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
NFFO National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OJEC Official Journal of the European Communities 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OREAM Organisation d'Etudes d'Amenagement d'Aire 
Metropolitaine 
ORSTOM Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique 
d'Outre-Mer. 
OWP Official Withdrawal Price 
PCF Parti Communiste Francais 
PO Producer Organisation 
PROMA Organisation de Producteurs de Peche Artisanale du 
Morbihan et de la Loire Atlantique 
PROMER Comite National de Propagande pour la Consommation des 
Produits de la Mer 
PSF Parti Socialiste Francais 
RPR Rassemblement pour la Republique 
"I, 
- 
ýý 
SFF Scottish Fishermen's Federation 
SFIA Sea Fish Industry Authority 
SFO Scottish Fishermen's Organisation (Ltd) 
SGMM Secretariat Ceneral de la Marine Marchande 
SNP Scottish Nationalist Party 
SNPL Societe Nouvelle des Peches Lointaines 
SODIPEB Societe pour le Developpement des Industries de la 
Peche en Bretagne 
STF Scottish Trawlers' Federation 
TAC Total Allowable Catch 
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union 
TOG Trawler Officers' Guild 
UAP Union des Armateurs ä la Peche de France 
UDF Union pour la Democratie Francaise 
UKAFPO United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer 
Organisations 
UNCLOS United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
WFA White Fish Authority 
The following abbreviations for measures are also used: 
cwt hundredweight 
ECU European Currency Unit 
FF French franc 
kg kilogram 
MF million French francs 
t. tonnes 
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The following people, all actively involved in the fisheries sector, 
were interviewed in the course of the study. In each case, the date 
and place of the interview are accompanied by their most relevant 
position at the time. 
BRITAIN 
Name Position Time and Place 
D. AITCHISON Chief Executive, SFF 14.4.80 - 
Edinburgh 
S. ANDREWS Information Officer, 27.3.80. -Iiull 
Humberside County Council 
H. BARRETT Editor, Fishing News 6.2.80. -London 
D. CAIRNS Fisheries Officer, TGWU 26.3.80. -Ilull 
J. CORMACK Fisheries Secretary, DAFS 15.4.80. - 
Edinburgh 
J. DAVIES Public Relations Adviser 
to the BFF 27.3.80. -Hull 
J. KELSEY Deputy Secretary, MAFF 26.2.80. -London 
R. KEMP Head of Industrial 
Development Unit, Hull 
City Council 26.3.80. -Hull 
T. LLMAN Research Assistant, 
Planning Department, 
Humberside County Council 27.3.80. -Ilull 
A. LOUGH District Inspector of 
Fisheries, MAFF 26.3.80. -Hull 
W. MASON Deputy Secretary, MAFF 7.2.84. -Hull 
N. McKELLAR Chief Economist, Fishery 11.4.80. - 
Economics Research Unit, WFA Edinburgh 
I. McSWEEN Deputy Chief Executive, SFO 14.4.80. - 
Edinburgh 
W. OAKESHOTT Fisheries Economist, DAFS 15.4.80- 
Edinburgh 
T. OLIVER East Coast correspondent, 
Fishing News 22.9.83. -Ilull 
W. ROBB Regional Officer, WFA 26.3.80. -Hull 
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FRANCE 
M. BENOISH President, ANOP 1.12.83. -Paris 
M. CLAIROUIN Administrateur, FIOM 18.11.83. -Paris 
M. DION Secretaire, Syndicat National 19.7.83- 
des Thoniers Congelateurs Concarneau 
B. DUBREUIL President, CCPM 11.5.83. -Paris 
J-P. GRANDIDIER Sous-Directeur, Cooperative 30.9.83. - 
Maritime Etaploise Boulogne 
C. GROUHEL Sous-Directeur, PROMA 20.7.83. - 
Lorient 
A. GRUENAIS D'elegue responsable des 
problemes maritimes 
internationaux et des peches 
maritimes, Federation Nationale 
des Syndicats Maritimes - CGT 15.4.83. -Paris 
Y. GUILLEMONT Secretaire, Groupement des 
Armateurs ä la Peche 19.7.83. - 
Hauturiere de Bretagne Concarneau 
J. C. HENNEQUIN Conseiller Technique, 
Secretariat d'Etat ä la Mer 28.10.83. -Paris 
J. HURET Vice-President, CCPM et 30.9.83. - 
President Directeur General, Boulogne 
Pecheries de la Morinie 
M. LE BELLER Secretaire-General, FIOM 23.7.82. -Paris 
Y. L'HELGOUACH President, Comite Local des 
Peches Maritimes de 19.7.83. - 
Concarneau, CGT. Concarneau 
L. LEROUX President, Comite Local des 
Peches Maritimes du 19.7.83. - 
Guilvinec Loctudy 
G. MARCHAND Conseiller Maritime, French 31.7.79. - 
Embassy London 
J. PLORMEL Directeur, FROM-Nord 30.9.83. - 
Boulogne 
P. SOISSON Secretaire-General, UAP 1.10.80. -Paris 
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